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ABSTRACT
Today, the nation of Morocco finds itself in a state of fitna—social upheaval 
caused by public disagreement over adherence to normative Islamic ethics. 
Young women in the medina of Fes are engaged in a complex and socially-
contested process of deciding for themselves what practicing Islam should entail, 
creating gendered and Islamic subjectivities that complement and compete with 
other identities. The result is a set of diverse understandings of what it means to 
be a “good Muslim woman” based on: 1) an increasingly diverse set of concerns 
as women have more opportunities socially, economically, and professionally, 
and 2) an increasingly diverse set of traditions of knowledge and sources of 
information that contribute to and inform religious choice and morality. Through 
v
the lens of ideas on and accusations of nifaaq (hypocrisy), this dissertation 
examines how young Fassi women use peer-pressure and other forms of 
socialization to forge and share new ethical subjectivities and public practices. 
These young Muslims—unlike the idealized portraits of the perfectly pious 
adherents often depicted in the work of other scholars—are imperfect humans 
negotiating with each other and with society at large. Based on over a year of in-
depth ethnographic research in Fes, this study combines media analysis, survey 
data, and intimate interviews and shared experiences relating to fashion, dating, 
Sufi ritual, shame, familial obligation, and religious holidays. This dissertation 
serves as an ethnographic exploration of changing Islamic norms and new 
gendered expectations and opportunities at a time of great social upheaval in 
Morocco. 
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...the discovery of Fez was just beginning. We 
would uncover its layers veil by veil, like a bride  
in her marriage chamber. I have kept a thousand 
memories of that year, which take me back...
--- Amin M'aloof
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At Angles and Odds: 
Hypocrisy and Young Fassi Women's Religious Subjectivities
Anthropologists... should give up the 
pipe dream of coherence and 
concentrate on developing theory 
and concepts for analyzing 
disordered systems, where events 
are underdetermined by rules and 
where—rising now to the macrolevel 
of communities, regions, and society
—such relatively determined 
connections as there are will 
generate processes at angles and 
odds with each other, producing 
innumerable large and small 
incoherences in culture and in the 
body politic. 
--- Fredrik Barth
Salma waited until my interview with her older sister finished, and came 
running into the room with her open laptop in hand. 
“Miriam!1 Help me! How do I delete this picture? Please!”
She placed the hot laptop on my lap, impatiently pressing her finger 
against the screen so that I could see the photograph in question. Open on the 
screen was Salma's Facebook page, hosted on the French language site, and 
the photograph in the center of the page included three college-aged girls holding 
half-drunk bottles of Bacardi Rum Breezer. The fourth figure in the picture, clearly 
shot in a lower-middle class apartment during a house-party, was a young Arab 
man holding a bottle of Svedka, a popular and affordable Swedish vodka popular 
with many college students I knew in Fes. I immediately recognized Salma as 
1 While in the field, I use my Islamic name, Miriam. This is in part because my scholarly name, 
Chloe, sounds very similar to a Moroccan slang term for male genitalia. However, my Islamic 
name of Miriam is common in Morocco and often endeared me to informants.
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one of the three young women. She was not looking directly at the camera in the 
photograph; it was not clear if she was even aware it was being taken at the time. 
I asked Salma to explain the picture to me. She drew her hand away from 
the screen. “No! Delete it! I do not understand this Facebook!” I agreed to help, 
but asked her again to explain the image. She plopped heavily onto the couch 
next to me, looking to the doorway of the sideroom to be sure her sister was off 
preparing tea for me in the kitchen.
“I was at a party last week. It was in the Atlas neighborhood of the Ville 
Nouvelle, with some of my friends from Ben Abdellah University. My friends took 
me in their car, and we had a few drinks. Like American kids, just drinks at a 
party. I did not do anything very haram, Miriam, and I do not think you should tell 
my parents or sisters. But then Yassine, see him,” she pointed to the young man 
in the photograph, “his friend took some pictures on his phone. I did not know. 
And now it is on Yassine's Facebook, and now it is on my Facebook. Why is 
this?2 Make it go away!”
I understood Salma's distress; while she did not wear headscarf or 
regularly attend mosque, both her parents and her sisters forbade alcohol in the 
house and would likely punish Salma for consuming alcohol. I knew both of her 
2 Facebook includes a feature where photographs can be uploaded to an individual's page and 
that individual can 'tag' the faces of people in the photograph. When a person is tagged and 
the image is associated with the person, that image will show up on the person's Facebook 
page and all of her friends will also be able to see the photograph. The person can choose to 
'untag' herself from the image, which will remove the photograph from her page and the view 
of her friends, but she cannot delete the photograph from Facebook unless she was the 
original person to post it. Salma, however, was unable to understand the French instructions 
for untagging the image to remove it from her page.
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older sisters had Facebook pages and would be able to see the image of Salma 
and her clearly alcoholic drink. She had not authorized the picture, nor posted it, 
so I immediately moved the mouse to the proper button and untagged her face 
from the image, removing it from her Facebook page. As I glanced to the right of 
the photograph, I noticed the image had no caption, but had already gained 
thirty-six 'Likes' and numerous comments. Several of the comments caught my 
eye, all of which contained the same word:
munafiqeen (hypocrites)
I informed Salma that I had removed her tag, and explained that her family 
and friends could no longer see the image. But I also pointed to the comments. 
“Why do they call you this?” I asked.
“Because they want to tell me to how to live Islam. But I am not a 
hypocrite. I believe in Allah, I am honest in my Islam. I drink sometimes with my 
friends. But we are all Muslims.”
This moment of great distress for Salma was a moment of realization for 
me. After my first session of fieldwork in early 2011, I returned to America to hold 
a fellowship, and would travel back to Fes to again conduct ethnographic 
research for the entirety of 2012. The six month break in 2011 gave me an 
opportunity to code my fieldnotes, and I found a common theme in many of the 
stories, interviews, and pieces of media analysis I had collected: hypocrisy. When 
I returned, I began to look for the notion in Fassi society, whether in terms of 
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societal discussion of Ramadan practice as hypocritical, spats between dating 
couples, young women's discussion of their career plans, or moments like 
Salma's crisis. The ubiquity of the term3 in discourse brought into focus the 
process of socialization that many Fassi young women were using to construct 
their conceptions of Islam in practice.
Yet what I also learned from Salma's crisis was that it was image of her 
haram action—drinking alcohol as a Muslim—that upset her, especially because 
those within her social circle could see her impious actions. Perhaps more 
importantly, the accusation of hypocrisy was debatable and disputable, but not an 
intolerable insult. Salma was not especially angry that she was being called a 
hypocrite: she was upset that the image had been taken and posted without her 
consent (which she obviously would not have given). Even though Salma had not 
stated a position on Islam with the photograph or in a caption, it was assumed 
that her haram action was hypocritical because it conflicted with her understood 
and accepted identity as a Muslim woman. That she responded to my question 
within the framework of Islam demonstrated that she also recognized the gap 
between professed faith and action, but that intent—“I am honest in my Islam”—
was more important than the doctrinal acceptability of her practice. While being 
called a hypocrite was a critique she had to respond to, it was simply a piece 
within a larger discussion of public recognition of her haram behavior, a part of 
the process of pushing the boundaries of Islamic practice.
3 AR: munaafiq/nifaq; FR: hypocrite/hypocrisie; EN: hypocrite/hypocrisy
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Ultimately, Salma's story was one of many I experienced during my 
fieldwork: young women negotiating with peers to publicly express their religiosity 
while pushing the boundaries of Islamic practice or calling back those who have 
exceeded the boundaries of acceptable practice. In addition to the internal 
debate over the ethics of action, these women are engaged with peer groups and 
Moroccan society at large, particularly at a time of great social flux, politically, 
economically, and socially. This dissertation is the story of the young women of 
Fes and the ways in which they sanction each other, as well as the way they are 
socialized by their families, male peers, and even the state. Hypocrisy, more than 
any other concept, is vital in the process of this socialization in Fes, Morocco.
Hypocrisy, Imperfection, and Change: Religion as a Lived Process
This dissertation has three main objectives: to examine the notion of 
hypocrisy within the Moroccan context; to engage in the emerging discussion of 
Islamic subjectivities as highly fluid, adapting, and occasionally impious; and to 
contribute to the body of literature regarding the rapid changes in the lives of 
women across the Arab World. In first examining the notion of hypocrisy, it is 
worth noting that most societies have some concept that can be classified as 
hypocrisy, but the exact meaning, severity of insult, and practical use of the idea 
varies greatly from society to society. Hypocrisy permeates all our lives, yet the 
term is often misunderstood, misused, and the source of easy offense, meaning 
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that the notion is often ignored or even purposefully avoided in anthropological 
discussions of morality and ethical formation. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, I define hypocrisy as the contradiction between 1) the actions of an  
individual or group and 2) the professed or expected moral values of the  
individual or group. When an individual is accused of hypocrisy, it is because 
others believe that she is behaving differently than she should based on what 
she professes to believe. Salma, as a Muslim woman in Fes, subscribes to an 
Islamic worldview in which the consumption of alcohol is largely unacceptable, 
though in no way illegal. Her actions are thus deemed hypocritical by her peers, 
an accusation she refutes by demonstrating that she possesses a different notion 
of being a good Muslim than her accusers. She is negotiating the limits of her 
Muslim subjectivity, testing the acceptability of a specific practice. For Fassi 
women like Salma, accusations of hypocrisy can serve as a tool to allow peers to 
demonstrate their competing notions of the bounds of Islamic practice in 
conjunction with Islamic belief.
Thus, this dissertation will demonstrate the power and potentials that 
come from using accusations of hypocrisy as a tool to shape subjectivities. The 
young women I worked with in Fes are constantly negotiating and developing a 
sense of themselves—an identity unique to their experiences which provides 
them the ability to cope with the myriad concerns of their lives. Fredrik Barth’s 
(1993) notion of concerns—the collections of interests relating to social 
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pressures and needs in an individual's life which shape the way she interacts 
with the world—refers to understandings that are informed by the many traditions 
of knowledge from which individuals draw. Yet drawing from multiple, at times 
contradictory, traditions of knowledge, including normative Islam, neoliberalism, 
Moroccan traditions and norms, and other authoritative fields of discourse, 
means that the creation of identity is a messy process, full of imperfections. 
Young Fassi women are hardly perfect or consistent: they contradict themselves, 
change their minds, capitalize on opportunities, and make and learn from 
mistakes.
Thus, in using the experience of young women in Fes as an example of 
the tool of hypocrisy put to use, I present a case example which demonstrates 
the importance of the concept in young women's socialization. Women and men 
in Fes are, by their own accusations, hypocrites. But we all are sometimes, within 
our own contexts and our own understandings of the term. How that reality—that 
we can all sometimes engage in actions which contradict our proclaimed 
positions—is understood by a group of people is entirely socially constructed and 
thus subject to great cross-cultural variability. 
So I am not claiming that Fassi women are especially hypocritical or 
immoral; rather, I am arguing that, for reasons discussed in this dissertation 
relating to Islamic ideas of 'forbidding wrong and commanding right,' Fassis are 
currently acutely aware of the notion of hypocrisy in religious practice and are 
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utilizing accusations of hypocrisy to take part in a Moroccan public sphere 
blooming with ethical debate. That claims of hypocrisy exist in Fassi peer 
interactions does not mean that the young women of Fes are immoral, unethical, 
or 'bad.' In fact, quite the opposite: claims of hypocrisy demonstrate that these 
women are in the midst of moral and ethical debate, and that individuals are 
negotiating the boundaries of 'goodness,' 'badness,' and even 'properness.'
The second goal of this dissertation is to join the important and growing 
dialogue regarding imperfect Islamic practice. I use the term 'imperfect' in this 
case to refer to the inevitable departures a Muslim may make from normative 
Islam, either in belief, understanding, ritual, or other practice. Moments of 
impiety, misunderstanding, or even deliberate disobedience fall into this category. 
Anthropologists in particular have long embraced the notion that individual and 
group practice of a major world religion varies by location, population, and other 
social pressures. Not all Muslims live the same lives, or even share entire 
subjectivities, even though they may all agree on the oneness of Allah or the 
sanctity of the Qur’an. But even beyond local variation, there are also differences 
within the group and even within the individual. Nearly all young Fassi women 
are Muslim, yet there is variation in belief and constant adjustment in practice. 
When these young women behave in ways which contradict normative Islam or 
even contradict what they themselves profess to believe, these women do not 
suddenly stop being Muslim. They are still authentically Muslim, simply flawed in 
9
their behavior at the moment and thus imperfect, especially when compared to 
an idealized notion of Islamic subjectivity.
Perhaps equally important, Islam is not the only tradition of knowledge 
which these young Fassi women funnel into their decision-making process, 
meaning that some decisions and actions, while having implications and 
consequences in religious practice, are not achieved with Islam in mind. Just 
because a young woman ignores Islamic norms while making a decision or 
prioritizes other traditions of knowledge while proclaiming a subjectivity does not 
change her status as a Muslim. My many, beloved Fassi informants are 
imperfect: learning, adapting, attempting, failing, retrying, experimenting, 
ignoring, attaining, dismissing, and, ultimately, living. While this makes them 
normal young adults by any cross-cultural standard, these myriad variations and 
imperfections make them difficult subjects for academic analysis, and quixotic 
presences within the religious discourses in which they participate. 
Ultimately, this dissertation is about the tensions which permeate the lives 
of  young women in Fes. These ladies are being pushed and pulled in a variety of 
directions because of economic, political, and social change in Morocco, while 
also struggling as all youth do with generational change and new technological 
opportunities. The third contribution of this dissertation is to provide an 
ethnographic analysis of the changes occurring in the lives of these young 
Muslim women, and to highlight the tensions underlying the accusations of 
10
hypocrisy that I found so common during my fieldwork in the medina of Fes. 
Numerous scholars have presented compelling narratives of young Muslim 
women's experience, and I strive to do the same in this dissertation. This work 
calls into question the processes through which young women form their 
subjectivities, and readily joins the overarching discussion of women's 
experiences, hopes, and struggles in the Arab World.
Thus this dissertation is the story of women in flux. Some of the tensions 
they negotiate are unique to Islam—what does the hijab mean in my peer group? 
What should I do at the Sufi shrine? Do I want to fast during Ramadan hours, 
and how do I want to behave in the late night hours of partying? But other 
tensions are cross-cultural, though no less relevant or stressful—how do I find a 
spouse? What if my parents catch me doing something forbidden? What if my 
peers laugh at my clothing? These questions will be explored through the color 
and flavor of ethnography, tales told as the young women of the medina of Fes 
told them to me.
This dissertation thus presents another example of real, lived Islam, with 
all its variation and experimentation. The highlighting of actors’ hypocrisy is a tool 
which allows for social sanctioning, giving those who wield it the opportunity to 
comment on their peers’ actions and to adjust the social limits of religious 
practice. The prevalence of the idea of hypocrisy in Fassi society marks a time of 
social tension and upheaval, as men and women, young and old, join in the 
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discussion of the boundaries of acceptable religious, social, and ethical action. 
The practice of religion itself is a process, one in which the individual grows and 
continually recontextualizes her religious beliefs while adjusting her behavior. 
This dissertation demonstrates, through rich ethnographic detail, a potential 
approach to the seeming insurmountable challenge of analyzing human 
experience and religious subjectivity by focusing on one tool young Muslim 
women in Fes are using to negotiate their own imperfection: hypocrisy.
From Sheikhs and Scholars: Hypocrisy as a Social Concept
One of the central topics of this dissertation is an exploration of the social 
concept of hypocrisy. Colloquially, the idea of hypocrisy is one of 'two-facedness:' 
a hypocrite is one who says or claims to believe one idea, while acting in 
accordance with a contradictory idea. In this dissertation, I develop a more 
academic definition in relation to ideas of socialization, shame, and the 
pluralization of epistemology, particularly women's religious understanding. 
Perhaps the greatest challenge, and greatest opportunity, presented by exploring 
hypocrisy as an anthropological concept is that “in light of the debunking motif of 
the social sciences which unmasks the latent consequences of social structures 
and action, as well as in the context of theoretical and applied religious research, 
one would expect hypocrisy to receive a great deal of attention, yet except for a 
few scattered and casual references it is ignored” (Moberg 1987:3). The study of 
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hypocrisy is incredibly useful in part because the concept has not been explored 
anthropologically, but also because the concept provides a useful lens through 
which we can explore religious pluralization in Fes today. 
The term 'hypocrisy' originates in the Greek hypokrisis, referring to acting 
on the stage. The term appears often in Aristotle's Politics as “performing a 
function” (Szabados and Soifer 2004:19), while the term hypokrites (actors) 
commonly appeared in reference to Greek theater and rhetorical performance. In 
both of these cases, however, it is important to note that the term refers to the 
concept of performing (which is a central element to my discussion of religious 
hypocrisy), and that the term originally implies no moral connotation, certainly not 
a negative one. 
It is, in fact, the Abrahamic faiths which provide the negative connotation 
to the word. Szabados and Soifer argue that it was in the third century B.C.E., 
when Palestinian Jews translated the Hebrew word hanef (godless) into 
hypokritai (2004:20) that the term became associated with falsehood. Thus, the 
phrase “godless in heart” (Job 36:13) was originally translated into Greek as 
hypokritai kardia, lending a negative association between lacking true love of 
God and acting dishonestly with the idea of being hypocritical. The concept 
appears frequently in the New Testament, but is most notable in the Gospels in 
Matthew 23, in which Jesus derides and lambasts the Rabbinical establishment, 
saying “Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye are like unto 
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whited sepulchres, which indeed appear beautiful outward, but are within full of 
dead men's bones, and of all uncleanness. Even so ye also outwardly appear 
righteous unto men, but within ye are full of hypocrisy and iniquity” (Matthew 
23:27-28). 
For Muslims, the concept of hypocrisy appears repeatedly in the hadith 
and the Qur'an, and is the subject of Surah 63, “Al-Munaafiqun” (the Hypocrites). 
In this Surah, hypocrisy is immediately defined as those who lie about their 
dedication to Allah, for “when the Hypocrites come to you, they say, 'We bear 
witness that you are indeed the Apostle of Allah.' Indeed, Allah knows that you 
truly are His believer, and Allah bears witness that the Hypocrites are indeed 
liars” (Surah 63:1). However, hypocrisy in this case is specific: saying one 
believes in Allah but not actually believing. There is no question that the category 
of 'hypocrites' assumes a special place in the minds of the monotheistically 
devout, and it is not surprising that the concept of hypocrisy enters into the 
process of religious debate and pluralization when religious texts use the term in 
the context of questioning religious faith.
The notion of hypocrisy appears in the academic work of philosophers, 
theologians, and social scientists beginning in the 1950s. Hypocrisy has been 
discussed in theological analysis as a topic appearing in religious texts (Ellison 
1962; Gilby 1979:1752; Hubbard 1984:539; Moberg 1990; Nevins 1965:280, 
Price 1986:474), as well as a sin committed by religious officials and 
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representatives themselves (Hadden 1969; Johnson 1985; Moberg 1987; Peck 
1983; Redekop 1970:168-169). The latter religious debate is best summarized by 
Meadow and Kahoe as they label the argument that 'the church is not for me 
because it is too full of hypocrites' as “the classic heretic's excuse” (1984:350). 
Several similar definitions of hypocrisy have appeared in texts debating hypocrisy 
within religious traditions, particularly Christianity. Johnson argues that hypocrisy 
is "the act of simulating qualities of personality, moral character, religious 
convictions or other beliefs which are not actually present in the person or 
persons assuming that false appearance" (1985:354). Hypocrisy also can be 
defined as an “attitude by which one pretends to be holy or virtuous. It is a 
species of lying" (Nevins 1965:280; see also Peck 1983). This negative 
connotation is also heavily emphasized by Price, who notes that "the 
predominant usage is moralistic; thus the hypocrite is one who pretends to be 
good or upright when one really is not so" (1986:474). Others have applied the 
notion of hypocrisy to discussions of health, medical sciences, and the 
presentation of science to the public (Belgium 1963; Broad and Wade 1982; 
Emerson 1983:253-31; Peck 1983). All of these discussions of hypocrisy have 
viewed the term as a negative state of being associated with the individual and 
deceit of some kind. I would counter that many of these authors present 
hypocrisy as an active trait associated with agency—people choose to be 
hypocrites—rather than viewing hypocrisy as a temporary and often accidental 
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state that results from religious debate and experimentation.
Among those political scientists and political philosophers who approach 
the notion of hypocrisy, Ruth Grant gives the most clear-cut definition of the term
—“the pretense of virtue, idealism, or sympathetic concern used to further selfish 
ends” (1997:1)—but her use of the words “pretense” and “selfish” have some 
very strong negative connotations that I do not wish to imply in my own 
exploration of the idea. Other political scientists have approached specific 
political ideas in terms of the notion of hypocrisy, yet always using the idea of 
hypocrisy as a tool to explore another concept, as opposed to the reverse.
The term came into vogue as a concept or category in philosophical 
studies, particularly in relation to moral hypocrisy, beginning in the early to mid-
1990s. Much of this philosophy focused on a series of questions. First, is 
hypocrisy a flaw of personal integrity or a consequence of the complexity of 
moral reasoning? (Crisp and Cowton 1994; McKinnon 2002; Smilansky 1994; 
Statman 1997) Second, how does the notion of hypocrisy fit within pre-existing 
philosophical discussions, from Aristotelian or Kantian ethics to debates over 
consequentialism? (McKinnon 1991; Shaw 1999; Szabados and Soifer 2004) 
Third, how does hypocrisy compare to similar social practices, such as the use of 
ironic speech? (McKinnon 1991; Szabados and Soifer 2004; see also Kittay 
1982) And finally, must hypocrisy necessarily be a negative concept, or might it 
have some value in moral decision-making? (Benn 1993; Hurka 1994) In all 
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cases, the philosophical focus on ethical and moral issues means that little 
attention is paid to the on-the-ground social implications and the role of hypocrisy 
in modifying group behavior.
The concept of hypocrisy is also used in psychological studies and is 
discussed in psychology literature. For the most part, these studies use loose 
definitions of hypocrisy, such as “an individual's ability to hold a belief while 
acting in discord with it” (Valdesolo and DeSteno 2007:689; see Batson et. al. 
1997). This body of literature focuses on two uses of the concept of hypocrisy. 
First, scholars discuss how the notion of hypocrisy affects one's emotions or 
actions in a group setting (Batson et. al. 1999; Batson, Thompson, and Chen 
2002; Fried and Aronson 1995; Valdesolo and DeSteno 2007). Second, scholars 
discuss how accusations of hypocrisy can be used to pressure an individual to 
take desired action (Aronson, Fried, and Stone 1991; Brunsson 2002; Wagner, 
Lutz, and Weitz 2009). This second category of literature, ranging from using 
hypocrisy to change racist perspectives (Hing, Li and Zanna 2002) to using 
hypocrisy to encourage teen condom use (Stone et. al., 1994), focuses on 
'hypocrisy induction,' or discussing a topic with an individual until he makes 
statements that go against his generally stated values and then pointing out that 
he holds contrasting, and thus hypocritical, views. Many of the examples 
described in my own discussion of accusations of hypocrisy are similar to 
hypocrisy induction, in that this social sanctioning motivates action. However, my 
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informants are not experimenting on each other, and thus using peer pressure 
tools such as hypocrisy lacks the same agency when young women sanction 
each other.
While the idea of hypocrisy has appeared in academic literature, these 
debates have focused on the nature of hypocrisy for the experience of the 
individual (what it means to be a hypocrite) and on social interactions (how 
individuals within groups deal with the notion of hypocrisy) in primarily theoretical 
ways. Little research has been published analyzing accusations within a specific 
society, and none has been published examining the notion of hypocrisy from an 
ethnographic perspective. This is where the focus of this ethnography lies: how 
and why Fassis discuss and criticize hypocrisy in regards to their religious and 
non-religious actions. 
Hypocrisy in the Fassi Context
For many in the Muslim world, the notion of hypocrisy is a very negative 
one. The Qur’an clearly states that being a hypocrite is a punishable offense to 
Allah. As such, to be called a hypocrite is to be questioned and accused, but the 
severity of this accusation varies just as Islamic practice itself does. In Indonesia, 
Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere in the Muslim world, to call someone a 'munafiq' 
(hypocrite) is to begin an angry dialogue, one in which insults are traded, 
accusations are leveled, and tensions run high. In Morocco, the same is not the 
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case.
 I want to first note that my observations in Fes are not unique in Morocco. 
While no other anthropologist working in Morocco has directly focused on the 
notion of hypocrisy, they have commented on Moroccans' recognition of the key 
tension that exists in my definition of hypocrisy—the dissonance which occurs as 
a member of a Muslim society when impious behaviors are observed in oneself 
and one's peers. In his own dissertation research in rural Morocco in the early 
1970s, Dale Eickelman notes that “Boujadi-s recognize incongruities between 
what they perceive as fundamental Muslim ideas and “the way things are” 
(qa'ida), but this perception does not lead to any significant tension between the 
ideal and real” (1976:128). Rather, his informants negotiated together regarding 
their understandings of Islam, gender, and society, creating a Moroccan Islam 
that allows individuals to push the boundaries of acceptable Islamic practice. 
But if we are to focus on hypocrisy, Fes comes to the forefront in Morocco. 
The work of Rachel Newcomb indirectly addresses hypocrisy while discussing 
identity formation through the process of gossip. In her research exploring the 
lives of young women in the Ville Nouvelle of Fes, Newcomb dedicates a chapter 
of her discussion of changing gender norms to the importance of gossip in 
shaping the lives of her informants. When discussing gossip, Newcomb notes 
that many of her informants used the term hypocrisy, for example stating that one 
of her informants who socialized with wealthy elite “chides them for their 
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hypocrisy, for showing a pious face to the world while engaging in all manner of 
debauchery behind closed doors” (2009:29). Hypocrisy is mentioned elsewhere 
in her work, always from the mouths of her informants rather than from her own 
analysis. 
While neither Newcomb nor I argue that Fassis are unique in their 
propensity for gossip or hypocritical action, one of Newcomb's informants does:
Fassis,  [Newcomb's  informant]  says,  desperately  want  to 
uphold the city's image as the spiritual capital of the nation, 
the  ancient  center  for  religious learning,  and they believe 
themselves to the most  spiritual,  the first  true Moroccans. 
The appearance of piety is everything. Yet in terms of actual 
behavior,  she continues,  Fassis  are on the same level  as 
everyone else in Morocco, they just hide their sins and then 
criticize others. Fassis are famous for this. (2009:31)
Fassis most likely gossip as much as residents of any other city in Morocco, but 
because the city is associated with religiosity, allegations of hypocrisy as a tool of 
religious social sanctioning are more noticable to Fassis themselves. It is Fes' 
status as the spiritual capital of the country that can help us to understand why 
Fassis in particular see accusations of hypocrisy as a useful tool for negotiating 
religious boundaries.
While hypocrisy may exist in other societies to cross-culturally varying 
degrees, and while hypocrisy may have varying connotations even within the 
Islamic world, accusations of hypocrisy are very powerful tools of social 
sanctioning in Fes today for two reasons. The first is that Morocco as a whole is 
experiencing a widening of its public sphere of discourse over Islam in the wake 
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of new communications technologies and political change due to the actions of 
King Muhammad VI (reigning 1999-onward) and repercussions of the Arab 
Spring and its aftermath (2011-onward). Thus, there is a great deal of debate 
regarding many Islamic practices that has been taking place in Morocco's print 
and online media, as well as within homes and on the streets. These debates are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
But more specifically, Moroccans take very seriously the notion of 
'commanding good and forbidding wrong' as articulated in the Qur'an. Fassis, 
who often described themselves to me as being 'more spiritual than other 
Moroccans' simply because of the city's long history as the center of Morocco's 
religious establishment, seem to emphasize social sanctioning that includes 
discussion of the boundaries of religious practice and even hypocrisy. To be 
blunt, Fassis—and, as I will explain below, medina residents in particular—
believe themselves to be uniquely situated to comment on the boundaries of 
Islamic practice at all levels, from the national to the peer group. By looking at the 
Fassi example, this dissertation is able to elucidate how a society which willingly 
embraces accusations of hypocrisy in social sanctioning actually utilizes the idea 
to negotiate the limits of Islamic practice and ethical formation.
This obligation to command right and forbid wrong is drawn directly from 
the source of normative Islam—the Qur'an. Surah 3 proclaims “let there be from 
you one community (ummah) inviting to all that is good, commanding what is 
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right and forbidding what is wrong, and those will be the successful” (Surah 
3:104) and that “you are the best nation produced as mankind. You command 
what is right and forbid what is wrong and believe in Allah. If only the People of 
the Book had believed, it would have been better for them. Among them are 
believers, but most of them are defiantly disobedient” (Surah 3:110). Many, 
including second Rightly Guided Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab, considered the 
commanding of right and forbidding of wrong as two major components that 
comprise Islam (Cook 2000:71). But Fes is also a city built around Sufism, and 
so Sufi perspectives on commanding the right and forbidding the wrong also 
have resonance. Since Sufis such as al-Ghazzali argued that, even if you are not 
certain that forbidding wrong will succeed, it is still valuable to make the attempt 
(Cook 2000:434; Cook 2003:49), even Fassis who are less familiar with the rules 
of normative Islam still find meaning in the practice. Thus, even if shamings and 
calls of hypocrisy fall on deaf ears, there is still a moral value to forbidding wrong 
and bearing witness. 
And so, as the self-perceived spiritual leaders of the nation, Fassis use the 
notion of hypocrisy on a societal level to engage in social, political and economic 
discourse. In Chapter 4, a young woman admits that she hypocritically avoids 
wearing hijab so that she can trick a bank into hiring her. In Chapter 6, one of 
Morocco’s largest weekly magazines declared Ramadan “The Month of 
Hypocrisy” (Nichane 2006). But Fassi women also utilize the notion of hypocrisy 
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in their personal interactions with their peers in deeply personal ways. In Chapter 
4, two young women call each other hypocrites while debating dating and pre-
marital sex. In Chapter 5, a couple discusses the hypocrisy of lying on a survey 
about piety. In Chapter 6, youth in a protest movement proclaim that society has 
become hypocritical for forcing them to hide and eat food in public bathrooms 
during Ramadan. In these and the many other discussions of hypocrisy in this 
dissertation, hypocrisy was a notion which was ever-present and debatable, not a 
taboo notion reserved only for the strongest of religious insults. 
Lived Religion in Practice: The Mainstreaming of Imperfect Islam
In exploring the notion of ethical formation and the development of 
religious subjectivities, a number of authors have approached Islamic identity 
with slightly different emphasizes, some of which have heavily shaped the 
discourse of Islamic studies. Drawing from Aristotle, Michael Lambeck focuses 
on practical judgment as a part of moral decision-making, though with heavy 
emphasis on an idealized “middle way” (2000; 2007). Both Charles Hirschkind 
(2006) and Saba Mahmood (2003; 2005) focus on Islamic subjectivities as 
modes of expressing ethical, political and economic ideologies,4 but often gloss 
4 While Mahmood argues that the women in Politics of Piety with whom she worked were not 
expressing political ideologies but rather negotiating ethical values (2005:35), her focus on 
participants of piety movements specifically, which have an undeniably political dimension in 
the Egyptian public sphere, implied a degree of political discourse, even if unintentional. See 
the conclusion of Sarah Tobin's doctoral dissertation (2011) for an indisputable argument to 
this effect. This point is only mentioned here to contrast Mahmood's work with this dissertation, 
which did not focus on piety movements as a lens of analysis, and thus avoided this issue of 
unintentional political commentary and consequence.
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over variation in order to present coherent and deliberate movements, 
particularly in relation to use of media. But as Samuli Schielke notes, “the 
problem of these approaches is that although they give considerable attention to 
practical judgment in the face of conflict, debate, and contestation, they look at 
the practice of morality and religion primarily from the perspective of coherence” 
(2009b:S25). In other words, each of the above mentioned authors focuses on 
ethical formation without attention to the nuances which occur as individuals 
borrow from, rather than wholly adopt, traditions of knowledge that apply to a 
wide variety of peoples with varying experiences. 
One of the most notable discussions of Muslim women's ethical formation 
is also one which deliberately avoids emphasizing variation and impious practice: 
Saba Mahmood's seminal Politics of Piety (2005). In her work, Mahmood calls 
into question Western notions of feminism and discourse surrounding women's 
agency, but she presents a narrow set of voices from within the piety movements 
she studied, with little commentary on the specificity of their ethical debates and 
experiences. Mahmood draws heavily from Foucault's notions of the formation of 
self, Bourdieu's concept of habitus, and Kantian ethics as recycled through the 
work of Charles Taylor, disputing flaws in each and then refining each of these 
ideas to use as tools to analyze gendered social and religious movements. But 
ambivalence and variation are not only ignored but deliberately avoided, as 
Mahmood argues that, “an inquiry into the constitution of the self does not take 
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the personal preferences and proclivities of the individual to be the object of 
study, but instead analyzes the historically contingent arrangements of power 
through which the normative subject is produced” (2005:33). This unwillingness 
to explore inter-personal variation means that analysis of the process of 
socialization and the ways in which women choose to experience their Islam is 
hard to find in Mahmood's discussions of women's piety and ethical formation. 
This dissertation takes an entirely different approach to women's piety and 
subjectivity formation than Mahmood, instead celebrating the variation in young 
Fassi women's experiences and exploring how these women deal with impious 
behaviors within themselves and their peer groups. These Fassi women are all, 
in their opinions and in the opinions of their peers and families, good Muslim 
women, even if there is great variation within that self-proclaimed subjectivity. 
Morality is constructed by individuals, often as part of a continuing process which 
involves contradiction, reconsideration, and ambivalence. The 'illusion of 
wholeness'—the notion that we perceive ourselves as complete wholes even as 
we live in a state of ambiguity—finds its way into anthropological analysis as we 
assume our informants are easily fit into articulated and defined subjectivities and 
categories (Ewing 1990). 
One of the earliest and most graceful articulations of ambivalence and 
complex, individualized subjectivities comes from Lila Abu-Lughod's ground-
breaking analysis (1986) of the role of poetry in the harsh and honor-bound lives 
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of young women in the oases of Western Egypt. The women in her ethnography 
experienced great depth of emotion even as their society discouraged public 
outbursts of emotion, a complex reality Abu-Lughod displays fearlessly through 
her descriptions of their lives and poetry. Abu-Lughod's work anticipates our 
discussion of women's ambivalent subjectivities, where gendered norms and 
normative Islam collide as emotion was experienced and expressed, and sets the 
standard for the discipline. Additionally, Abu-Lughod's exploration of young 
Muslim women's subjectivities is highly introspective and reflects on her personal 
subjectivity development as a young Muslim woman and anthropologist (1986:9-
24). The reader will find, as this dissertation unfolds, that I have borrowed this 
model, embracing my partiality and my own ambivalent subjectivities as part of 
my process of analysis. 
A number of anthropologists, spanning the gamut of anthropological 
fieldsites throughout the Islamic world, have embraced the notion of ambivalence 
as a way of articulating the variety of identities and the indecisiveness that many, 
especially youth, experience as a part of their process of ethical formation. 
Kimberly Hart (2007) examines how young men and women use ambiguity and 
uncertainty to help them approach the stresses of spousal choice in rural Turkey. 
Magnus Marsden's work (2005; 2007; 2009) continually challenges pre-packaged 
subjectivities in northwest Pakistan, demonstrating the variety of understandings 
of masculinity, power, and Islamic experience even in the face of political 
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instability. Christopher Joll (2011) explores how moral calculus connects to 
identity and how rewards of merit are calculated within the ethnically, religiously, 
and linguistically diverse society of Thailand. The team of Osella and Osella 
(2009) continually present new ideas of Islamic morality in conjunction with 
charitable donations and public good in India. Adeline Masquelier (2010) 
examines how young men in economically dire circumstances in Niger justify 
illegal market practices within Islamic identities. Sarah Tobin's work (2011; 2013) 
focuses on imperfectly practiced Islam and the intersection of moral and financial 
calculus throughout Muslim communities in Amman, Jordan. Osire Glacier (2013) 
brings together ideas of ambivalence and Islamic identity in her recent discussion 
of the development of universal human rights legislation in Morocco. 
Much of this debate over individual ethical decision-making in Islam and 
ambiguous subjectivities relates to the notion that Islam as a religion is no longer 
the prevue of madrasa-educated religious elites. Dale Eickelman has argued for 
decades that throughout the Islamic World, Muslims are becoming better 
educated and more connected to global conversations through mass media and 
the internet. In 1999, Eickelman's New Media in the Muslim World articulated the 
importance that media sharing already had in the Muslim world (such as through 
case-tape sermons), and argued that new, worldwide forms of cheap and instant 
communication would dramatically change the way Muslims thought about the 
notion of being Islamic. Due to new media, Islam was facing a 
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“reintellectualization” in which Islamic doctrine and discourse was made more 
accessible but “anchored less in long-standing conventions of interpretation than 
in the current experiences of believers”  (1999:13). As such, an expansion of the 
Islamic public sphere would occur, and many new and often times competing 
Islamic subjectivities would arise. 
The result of this process, he has subsequently argued, is a 
“mainstreaming” of Islam by the middle class and newly educated. Eickelman 
argues that, 
Islam is being democratized. More and more, Muslims today 
claim attachment to God's unmediated word as interpreted 
only by their own conscience. But that does not mean that 
Muslim tradition is simply being discarded. Rather, it is being 
examined and discussed. The forces supporting 
conventional interpretations of God's word remain strong, but 
many increasingly open debates are in progress. (2010:194)
His description of an active Islamic public, referencing traditional practices all 
while critiquing and experimenting with new religious identities, perfectly 
describes the lives of so many of my young female informants in Fes. Of course, 
women, men, young and old, are joining in Morocco's broad debate about living 
'proper' Islam, but this dissertation focuses on young women, whose bodies and 
behaviors are some of the most critiqued in Islam. Imperfect Muslims are some 
of the most active in this process of mainstreaming Islam, as those who operate 
with ambivalence seek to find an acceptable place within larger religious 
discourses regarding certain processes, such as dating or Ramadan practice.
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The bluntest of the diverse scholarly voices proclaiming the importance of 
embracing the study of personalized, ambivalent, and contradictory Islamic 
subjectivity formation has been that of Samuli Schielke (2008; 2009a; 2009b; 
2012), whose work on Sufi festivals in Egypt has become all the more prescient 
as Egyptians struggle to negotiate Islamic identities in the wake of the 2011 Arab 
Spring. Schielke, throughout his work, focuses on the ambivalence with which 
many Muslims approach conflicting traditions of knowledge, arguing for example 
that young men who catcall and harass young women on the street were not 
pious at the moment, but were still pious in most of their lives (2009a:161). He 
examines how both traditionalists and Sufis seek to mainstream their views on 
Islam while negotiating with the community about the use of public space. 
Perhaps his greatest contribution to the emerging discussion of imperfect Islam is 
the critique that 
so much has been written in recent years on Muslims who 
consciously and consistently aim to be pious, moral, and 
disciplined that the vast majority of Muslims who – like most 
of humankind – are sometimes but not always pious, at 
times immoral, and often undisciplined have remained in the 
shadow of an image of Islam as a perfectionist project of  
self-discipline. (2009b:S24; emphasis my own)
This recognition that good and pious Muslims are not necessarily good and pious 
in every ethical decision they ever make is a marked departure from the 
emphasis on standardized subjectivities articulated in the works of Mahmood and 
others.
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Even within his discussion of ambivalence, Schielke himself notes the 
seeming contradiction between Islamic identity and other traditions of knowledge. 
When discussing how young men balance new influences of pornography and 
commercialization of sex and long-standing Islamic values in Egypt, Schiekle 
comments, “my intention is not to moralize about the hypocrisy these 
contradictions may be seen to represent, nor do I want to solve the contradictions 
by establishing a hierarchy of true or essential aims. Instead, I attempt to take 
these contradictions seriously, considering the ways people live them and their 
attempts to make sense of their lives” (2009a:161). Schielke is correct: 
anthropologists must take the contradictions occurring in their informants' lives 
seriously rather than to gloss over these difficult to classify actions. Moral 
contradiction and internal wrestling have great emotional and ethical value to 
individuals; ignoring that entire process of religious experimentation and moral 
questioning results in a disingenuous depiction of the religious experience.
I would also note that formal Islamic practice, ritual, or doctrine are not the 
only lenses through which the notion of imperfect Islamic experience has been 
explored. In a number of her works, Jenny White has combined notions of 
imperfect Islamic practice with the pragmatic realities of everyday Turkish life. In 
her earlier work, emphasis on variety and ambiguity in women's Islam allowed 
White to provide keen analysis of informal economic networks in Istanbul (2004) 
or Islamist political opportunity and the rise of the AKP (2002). But it is in her 
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most recent work on nationalism, Islamic identity, and secularism that White 
securely situates herself within the dialogue of ambivalence and imperfect 
practice. White argues confidently that, 
people rely on the availability of shared, coherent traditions 
of knowledge to orient themselves... they build communities 
around these traditions. They rely on historical traditions, 
streams of knowledge about what happened in the past, to 
justify the “cultural shock” of the present. But these are just 
words, labels that gain meaning only when they are acted 
out. And in the process of being transformed, root identifying 
traditions—like the knowledge, concepts, and values that 
make them up—are continually modified by experience, 
manipulated to meet subjective commitments and concerns, 
and disordered by contradictory interpretations imposed by 
one's gender, religious, racial, and social class positions. 
(2012:194)
 Just as White uses this as a springboard to discuss what it means to 'be' a 
nationalistic Turk, I seek to examine what it means to be a 'good Muslim woman' 
in Fes. But White's commentary on the transformed, the modified, and—which I 
will demonstrate most clearly in Chapter 5 on hijab use—the manipulated, fits 
exactly with my analysis of the ways young Fassi women sanction each other to 
continually push the boundaries of acceptable Islamic practice while also 
satisfying their own needs and addressing their own concerns.
Jenny White argues that people 
do not “do” religion, secularism, or identity, but rather, they 
follow a tradition of specific practices. This means that 
traditions (and, thus, what is glossed as religion, secularism, 
and identity) are open to transformation in practice, as when 
religion in the modern context becomes a form of self-
expression or a touchstone of national identity. Religion may 
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be forced to redefine itself in competition with other faiths 
and ideologies. (2012:5) 
I argue hypocrisy is just one tool utilized in that process of forced redefinition. 
Islam in Morocco, and in the medina of Fes where I conducted my fieldwork, is in 
flux, and young women are at the forefront of this redefinition of acceptable 
Islamic practice.
What all of these discussions of ambivalence, transformation, and 
variation largely point to is perhaps best articulated by José Casanova (2011) in 
his discussion of pragmatic adaptations of traditional religious practices in the 
face of multiple modernities. He argues that the world is experiencing multiple 
modernities, an idea earlier articulated by Eisenstadt (2000), and these 
modernities possess similar characteristics even while diversifying based on 
different experiences. These modernities seem to emphasize individualism, 
intercivilizational notions of the 'other,' personal and national sovereignty, and a 
strongly individualized work ethic (2011:263). Thus, “these modern traits are not 
developed necessarily in contradistinction to or even at the expense of tradition, 
but rather through the transformation and the pragmatic adjustment of tradition” 
(2011:263), a process which includes the development of modern, imperfect, but 
thoroughly authentic Islam. Beyond just arguing for adaptation of traditional 
practices themselves, I would join White in building upon Casanova's analysis to 
argue that it is the evolution of traditions of knowledge, from which Muslims and 
others draw the material to influence ethical action, that is leading to new 
32
debates over the meanings of multiple, competing religious identities. Traditions 
of knowledge are adapted, redefined, and made ambivalently flexible as more 
join the discussion. This entire messy process is in part made possible by the 
mechanisms available to individuals and groups to sanction and critique each 
other, including the commonly utilized tool of hypocrisy.
Casanova, White, Schiekle and others are answering a call placed by 
renowned anthropologist Fredrik Barth, who tackles the 'problem of variation' in 
his Balinese Worlds (1993). He argues that variation in practice and belief among 
members of a group is an inherent part of the process of constant interaction with 
the modern, rather than a difficulty to overcome. Rather than ignore variation, 
Barth rallies us to rise to the occasion: 
anthropologists... should give up the pipe dream of 
coherence and concentrate on developing theory and 
concepts for analyzing disordered systems, where events 
are underdetermined by rules and where—rising now to the 
macrolevel of communities, regions, and society—such 
relatively determined connections as there are will generate 
processes at angles and odds with each other, producing 
innumerable large and small incoherences in culture and in 
the body politic. (1993:5) 
This dissertation develops existing theories regarding young women's 
subjectivities, the role of social change in ethical development, and the diversity 
of Islamic practice in the Arab world and beyond. This dissertation also develops 
the concept of hypocrisy as a tool of ethical social sanctioning to allow me to 
analyze the disordered system of young women's subjectivity formation in the 
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medina of Fes. Through this ethnographic exploration of how young women 
experience ambivalence and imperfection in their own lives, I converse with other 
anthropologists who have given up the pipe dream of coherence and the notion 
of “Islam as a perfectionist project of self-discipline” (Schiekle 2009b:S24). 
Gender and Change: Young Arab Women's Subjectivities
This dissertation also provides a glimpse into the lives of young Moroccan 
women, and joins the body of literature surrounding young Muslim women's 
subjectivities in a time of great political, economic, technological, and religious 
flux in the Middle East and North Africa. Young women have access to exciting 
new educational opportunities (Ennija 2005). Throughout the region, women 
have seen increased participation in national and international politics (Ennaji 
and Sadiqi 2006; Hoffman 2008; Roussillon 2004; Sadiqi 2008; Slyomovics 
2005). This dissertation joins the dialogue regarding changing sexual norms and 
understandings of women's bodies (Ali 2006; Bradley 2011; Deeb 2006; Kelly 
2010). Women are also pushing the boundaries of public and private, changing 
how public spaces are understood and experienced (Ennaji and Sadiqi 2006; 
Ghannam 2002; Newcomb 2006 and 2009). Young women in particular also 
have unique opportunities different than their mothers' generation because of 
communication technologies and global discourses occurring on the internet 
(Bowen 2008; Kaya 2009; Pandya 2009; Sakr 2004).
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Some authors have addressed issues which indirectly relate to this 
dissertation's discussions of ethical subjectivities, but have heavily inspired my 
work. Lara Deeb's work in Shi'ite communities in Lebanon demonstrates how 
Islam contributes to feminist, sectarian, and ethical identities (2009), and her 
work on embodiment and public ritual in particular (2006) nicely mirrors Augustus 
Richard Norton's discussion of changing notions of women's role in community-
building rituals (2007:47-69). Sarah Tobin's work (2011) explores how Jordanians 
develop ethical understandings of banking, consumption, and cosmopolitanism 
as Amman's middle class grows and begins debating the role of Islam in 
women's subjectivities. Lila Abu-Lughod also reminds me, and other 
anthropologists of Islam, not to Orientalize or romanticize women in the region, 
calling us to remain critical and detailed in our discussions of gender and change 
in the Islamic world (2002). 
Regarding Morocco, a number of scholars have pointed to the dramatic 
changes facing young women in the 21st century, but none better than three 
notable female Moroccan scholars: Zakia Salime, Malika Zeghal, and Fatima 
Sadiqi. Salime's5 work, which she dedicates to “the people who are remaking the 
Middle East” (2011:Dedication), demonstrates the increasing role of women in 
shaping the legal and political landscape, in which Moroccan feminism is 
redefined in relation to shari’a, global notions of human rights, and the battle 
5 Zakia Salime not only provides insightful commentary on feminist movements in Morocco. She 
also received her Bachelor's degree in sociology from the University Mohamed Ben Abdullah 
in Fes, one of the two universities at which many of my own informants study.
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between Islamists and the monarchy. Zeghal's work on the evolution of Islamist 
politics in Morocco in the 21st century includes interviews with Nadia Yassine, 
Morocco's most prominent conservative Islamist woman, and subtly discusses 
women's role in Islamist electoral politics and opposition movements (2008). 
Sadiqi has produced outstanding work that explores how language shapes 
women's identities in Morocco's shifting multilingual landscape (2003; 2007), and 
has worked with a number of other scholars of Moroccan feminism to elucidate 
the intersections of gender, language, identity, and political action in the nation 
(Ennaji and Sadiqi 2006; Moghadam and Sadiqi 2006; Sadiqi 2008).
While some of the changes occurring in the Middle East and North Africa 
are specific to the region (especially fall out from the Arab Spring of 2011), many 
authors exploring gendered social change in the Islamic world are working with 
populations outside of the Middle East. Michael Peletz, in discussing the complex 
history of third-genders and alternatives to heteronormativity in South East Asia, 
repeatedly remarks on the use of ambiguity by many to contextualize differing 
views of third genders (2009:32,44 and 176), changing ethics regarding 
concubinage (2009:100-102), and same-sex intimacies (2009:115) in both Hindu 
and Muslim communities. Most relevant to my own research, Nancy Smith-
Hefner has worked with similar populations of young women in Indonesia as I did 
in Fes, allowing for fascinating comparisons of youth experiences on the two 
fringes of the Muslim majority world. While much of her work illuminates 
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generational change and new opportunities for young women in Southeast Asia, 
it is her work on changing dating practices (2005) and diverse understandings of 
the hijab (2007) among college women in Java that stands out as some of the 
discipline's best ethnographic discussions of youth subjectivity formation.
Finally, I am not the only young anthropologist trained in Fes' American 
Language Institute to return to the city to study young women and Islam, seeking 
to contribute a Fassi example to the overarching discussion of change in the 
region. Rachel Newcomb's research (2009) on young women's lives in the Ville 
Nouvelle of Fes addressed some of the same topics as this dissertation, 
particularly in relation to identity construction and ambivalence, but focused on 
changing notions of public/private spaces and specifically middle-class 
subjectivities. Additionally, as will be discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, 
while our informants all hail from the city of Fes, her Ville Nouvelle informants 
cannot be considered the same research population because they themselves 
greatly differentiate their experiences and subjectivities based on their district of 
residence. I consider our research to be two lights trying to shine on the wide 
variety of women's subjectivities constructed and performed in Fes: the diversity 
is so vast that our beams rarely cross.
Method to the Madness: Old City, Young Women
This dissertation is based on sixteen months of fieldwork in 2011 and 2012 
37
in the medina of Fes, Morocco. While young men and women were interviewed 
and observed in all parts of the city of Fes, the vast majority of my work centered 
on the ancient medina, the large and labyrinthine quarter that boasts over a 
millennium of history and status as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Like most 
major Moroccan cities, Fes is divided into a medina which dates back over a 
millennium, as well as a Ville Nouvelle (New City), the newer French quarter 
constructed during the Protectorate period at the beginning of the 20 th century. In 
addition, Fes has a district between these two, comically also called Fes Jdid 
(New Fes), which dates from the Merinid period (14th century) and includes the 
Royal Palace, the Jewish Quarter, and many of the city's best jellaba shops 
where young women would buy the roomy traditional Moroccan dress. Roughly a 
million Fassis move freely between these three districts. 
I chose to focus on the medina of Fes for a few reasons. The most 
obvious was because Fes was the first royal capital of the nation, and serves as 
the spiritual capital of the country of Morocco. Most Fassis specify that it is the 
medina itself which is this loci of spiritual authority. The medina quarter 
possesses the shrine of Moulay Idriss II (featured heavily in Chapter 3), the 
shrine of the famous sub-Saharan Sufi saint Tijani, and graveyards with several 
shrines to local saints. Also in this quarter is the Qarawiyyan mosque, one of the 
oldest mosques in North Africa, and Qarawiyyan University, one of the world's 
oldest extant madrasas and universities. Moroccans from across the nation travel 
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to the medina of Fes for religious healing, religious tourism, and to celebrate 
religious holidays, and the king himself spends large portions of Ramadan in the 
city. The spiritual 'authority' thus imbued on the medina by Fassis themselves 
made the location perfect for studying young women's Islamic subjectivities.
The other reason was purely pragmatic: I was once myself a young 
woman of Fes. In 2003, I travelled to Fes for a foreign study program through 
Dartmouth College under the direction of Dale Eickelman. While wandering the 
labyrinthine medina with Eickelman, I watched ethnography in real time: the 
social networking in dusty alleys, the cheery puns made in local dialect, and the 
power of a shared pot of mint tea. My classmates and I all vowed we would 
return to the haunting medina; I was the first to make good on this promise. After 
converting to Moroccan Islam, I returned to the medina of Fes for two months in 
the summer of 2004 to conduct undergraduate thesis research. After spending 
several months improving my dialect in Fes in 2009, and I then secured funding 
to spend sixteen months in the medina for my doctoral dissertation research in 
2011-2012.6 My romance with the medina reminds me of Lebanese author Amin 
M'aloof's musings in Leo Africanus: “the discovery of Fez was just beginning. We 
would uncover its layers veil by veil, like a bride in her marriage chamber. I have 
kept a thousand memories of that year, which take me back” (1989:111). I study 
6 In order to conduct my research from January to May 2011, I obtained a Graduate Research 
Abroad Fellowship from Boston University. To conduct my research in Fes for the entirety of 
2012, I secured a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Grant which was funded by the Mellon 
Foundation. The author thanks these organizations for their financial support of this 
dissertation.
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the young women of Fes because the city itself so strongly shaped my 
subjectivities as a Muslim, young woman, and intellectual, but also because 
years of visiting the city has allowed me to observe change over time, particularly 
in relation to cross-gender touching and dating.
Because I have been working in the medina of Fes since 2003, I had a 
strong familiarity with a number of Fassi families in several of the medina 
quarters. Within a few days of beginning my fieldwork in mid-January 2011, I 
moved in with a wonderful family in the Kasbah district of the medina, allowing 
me easy access to the medina as well as the roads which connected Fes Jdid 
and the Ville Nouvelle. My host family, consisting of a nuclear family with a live-in 
aunt and cousin, would become my closest friends, beloved informants, and 
generous hosts. They quickly integrated me into their neighborhood mosque, 
university, and family network. Without their loving support and delicious 
vegetable soup, I would have surely descended into madness during Ramadan 
2012.
During my first season of fieldwork (January to May 2011), the Arab Spring 
erupted across North Africa and the Middle East, and Moroccans watched with 
bated breath to see Ben Ali flee Tunisia, Mubarak be evicted in Egypt, and their 
own King Muhammad VI promise a new, more liberalized constitution. 
Moroccans themselves took to the streets on 20 February 2011 to protest 
corruption and the nature of government control; by March, the King promised a 
40
new constitution which he would deliver in the summer. My second season of 
fieldwork (January to December 2012) allowed me to watch the changing 
debates regarding women's bodies, dating, sexuality, and Ramadan in the wake 
of the previous year's changing political landscape.
My fieldwork consisted of immersive participant-observation. I engaged in 
prayer and worship at the Sufi shrine of Moulay Idris II and my neighborhood 
mosque. I collected roughly 250 surveys in Arabic, French, English, and Spanish 
and conducted daily hijab counts with nearly 250,000 points of data. I gave 
roughly 150 formal interviews and engaged in countless informal chats. For one 
semester, I served as a substitute high school teacher. I attended many family 
and community events, both with my host family and others, including celebration 
of holidays, hajj parties, 'drinking events' held by college students, mosque 
picnics, neighborhood cook-outs, local saints' festivals, shopping sprees, and 
Qur'anic study circles. Most enjoyably, I savored countless memorable dinners in 
the homes of generous families, as eating is a major social activity in Fes. The 
friendliness of Fassi society allowed me to use snow-ball sampling and build an 
ever-growing community of informants, ranging in age, degree of religiosity, level 
of education, and socio-economic class. While focusing my research, and as 
such my interviewing, on young women aged 18-24, I conducted interviews with 
both genders and a variety of ages to not only understand the young woman's 
experience of Islam in Fes, but to also place those experiences within the larger 
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context of Fassi society. The vast majority of my informants lived in the medina, 
and thus came from Fes' vast lower socio-economic class, but even within this 
class category there is broad variation from the stably employed to the food 
insecure. I will discuss the identities and demographics of my informants in the 
next chapter of this dissertation.
In addition to the various experiences had due to participant-observation, I 
conducted a survey which informed my understanding of Islamic practice in Fes. 
However, the reader will not find statistical information from this survey in this 
dissertation. My surveys were primarily conducted in universities, 'hang-out' 
spots across the medina and Ville Nouvelle, and homes. Most of the participants 
were 18-24 year old women, though young men of that age group also 
contributed a number of surveys. Some were also conducted among families to 
get the perspectives of different generations. The survey was available in Arabic, 
French, English, and Spanish so that informants could choose their language of 
most comfort. Questions were drawn from the other successful surveys used by 
fellow anthropologists in similar fieldsites, as well as original questions written for 
Fassis specifically.
This survey taught me a few important lessons, first and foremost of which 
was that I did not know how to give surveys in Fes. Fassis love to converse and 
debate, which is a beautiful trait for anthropologists but terrible for survey givers. 
No matter how hard I tried, I could not get my respondents to provide 
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individualized answers: they would immediately begin discussing the survey and 
encouraging each other to answer in certain ways. In several instances, I forcibly 
separated two respondents so that they would not confer, only to turn my back 
for a minute and find that they had moved next to each other and begun 
conferring. Nearly every attempt to encourage respondents to be silent failed. As 
I listened to discussions, I found respondents would pressure each other into 
giving certain answers. As a result, I do not believe that my surveys accurately 
reflect the beliefs of individuals, and so have chosen not to include statistical 
analysis of their results. However, many of the answers given to open ended 
questions influenced my analysis and appear in this dissertation. In addition, the 
conversations which occurred in relation to these surveys appear in several 
chapters.
What these surveys did provide, however, was a segue into focus groups 
and interviews. Often, the discussions about the surveys led respondents to 
discuss key issues I was interested in, and after they handed me the surveys, 
they expanded upon their survey answers without prompting from me. Perhaps 
most beneficially, albeit unexpectedly, the surveys became an opportunity for me 
to watch peer pressure happening. When I would hand surveys to packs of 
college students at, for example, the local McDonalds, they would sit together 
and pressure each other into putting answers the group agreed with, leading to 
debate and even a few accusations of hypocrisy. Watching this process, looking 
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at what issues and ideas were most contentious, and listening to the words used 
to pressure one another became an opportunity more useful than the data on the 
survey itself. The survey as a statistical tool was a complete failure. The survey 
as a springboard for ethnography was a brilliant success.
The statistics which do appear in this dissertation, primarily in Chapter 5 
on the hijab and Chapter 6 regarding Ramadan, derive from my hijab counts in 
the medina. Early in my fieldwork, a young woman noted to me that many 
women choose to avoid wearing hijab outside during the summer months, when 
temperatures in Fes regularly top 100 degrees Fahrenheit. In order to test this 
notion, I obtained a thermometer, chose a spot in the medina, and conducted 
hijab counts roughly every other day for the duration of my fieldwork. After 
obtaining hundreds of days of data, I returned to the United States and 
processed these data to look for trends in hijab use as related to temperature 
and proximity to holy days such as Ramadan.
The hijab counts were all conducted at the exact same location: near the 
intersection of two of the medina's largest throughways, Talaa Kbir and Talaa 
Sgher, within an hour window around sunset. This location is one of the busiest 
as it is near one of the major entrances to the medina (Bab Boujeloud) and 
connects to the main meat and vegetable suqs for the larger half of the medina. 
In addition, since it is near the two main thoroughfares, it is traversed by students 
walking to and from school, shoppers of all kinds, and locals moving through the 
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neighborhood. The location was not next to any mosques or hammams, which 
might have colored my data. The time was chosen because many of my early 
informants noted that this was the best time for women to shop for the next day's 
food or goods, and was also the best time for young couples to stroll the medina 
streets, a popular date activity.
In addition to recording temperature, I kept a running count of how many 
women passed me wearing or not wearing hijab. To be wearing a hijab was to 
have one's head covered with a scarf, but I did not differentiate between 
particular ways of tying the hijab or if a small amount of hair was observable in 
the front. Women who also wore niqab, which is a rare practice in urban 
Morocco, were counted separately. I ran tallies for three separate categories of 
women: 'older' women, 'younger' women, and 'girls.' 'Older' women appeared 
older in age physically, were pregnant, or wore wedding rings. 'Younger' women 
appeared younger in age physically, had no wedding rings, or wore school 
uniforms. 'Girls' were prepubescent. Tourists of obvious foreign origin were 
excluded from the counts.7 Carrying or walking with young children was not 
considered a factor in classifying women as 'older' because it is a very common 
practice for young women, especially teenagers and college students, to help the 
family by looking after younger siblings or cousins. I am fully aware that this was 
not the most precise method of distinguishing 'younger' and 'older' women; 
7 Tourists from other Moroccan cities, such as Casablanca, could not be easily differentiated 
from local Fassis.
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however I contend that by maintaining these categories over fifteen months of 
data collection and over a quarter million points of data, I was able to obtain 
quantitative data to examine overarching trends and to support the qualitative 
data obtained in interviewing and ethnographic experience.
Finally, in addition to participant-observation, my problematic survey, and 
my hijab counts, I regularly read and analyzed local media in Arabic, French, and 
English, both in print and online. This included Islamist publications, press 
releases and speeches from the royal palace, national magazines and 
newspapers, and blogs and social media of young Moroccans. I joined my 
informants' Facebook groups and online communities as well, as many of my 
informants, such as Salma from our beginning vignette, used social media to 
learn about religion, participate in religious discourse, and engage in peer 
pressuring on a daily basis. This media analysis appears in throughout this 
dissertation.
Following the Roadmap: Chapter Outline
In order to explore the notion of hypocrisy within the framework of 
individualized identity, I delve deeply into the lives of young Fassi women as they 
decide for themselves and in consultation with their peers what it means to be a 
'good Muslim woman.' However, this is not to say that Fassi girls are in any way 
especially or uniquely hypocritical; rather, they will serve as a mirror from which 
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we can all begin to contemplate the real usefulness of hypocrisy as a concept. I 
use the following chapters to systematically develop this argument and to 
demonstrate that, when examined in a religious context, hypocrisy serves to both 
preserve and push the boundaries of socially-accepted moral norms. My next 
chapters develop our understanding of the foundational notions which shape 
Fassi women's identity as it intersects with piety: identity derived from Moroccan 
Islam, and the nexus of shame, reason, and Sufism. The following three chapters 
are ethnographic snapshots of key issues that are every-day concerns for young 
women which provide the color and texture behind religious life in Fes. 
This second chapter, Fitna in Fes: The Nexus of Moroccan Islam and  
Identity, presents my ethnographic setting (Fes) within a larger history of the 
development of Morocco's unique Islam. I connect this to modern conceptions of 
Moroccan identity, which I argue is constructed both in union of Moroccan Islam 
and in opposition to Middle Eastern (Mashreqi/Gulfi) identities. I will bring in my 
observations of Fassi experiences in the Arab Spring while presenting Morocco 
as a country with an ever-widening public sphere with increasing socio-religious 
debate.
The third chapter, Acceptable Imperfection: Women's Shame, Sufism, and  
the Intention Exemption, explores the Moroccan understandings of reason ('aql) 
and the passionate soul (nafs) as they relate to women's Islamic practice within 
the larger framework of propriety (hshuma). In Fes, these ideas come into focus 
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at the physical site of the Sufi shrine of Moulay Idriss II. Because of their 
perceived lack of education or knowledge, women are given an 'intention 
exemption' which allows them to make mistakes or engage in folk practices 
deemed innovative without social sanction. I explore the nuances of the Fassi 
belief that 'Islam is in the heart' and demonstrate that the inconsistencies in this 
belief create a public sphere of Islamic debate ripe for the use of  the notion of 
'hypocrisy.'
In the second part of the dissertation, I present three chapters which 
explore essential, day-to-day concerns to young women in Fes. In Chapter 4:  
Only the Prophet was Perfect: Dating, Contact, and Changing Conceptions of  
Public Space, I explore a new and exciting opportunity for many young people in 
Fes today: dating and cross-gender socialization. In the past decade (the period 
in which I have been working in Morocco), norms about physical contact between 
the sexes have loosened shockingly, as public touching becomes normalized. 
Public spaces which were previously fringe or even 'feminine' spaces are 
becoming 'dating' spaces. Drawing heavily from focus groups, I compare 
perspectives on 'acceptable dating behavior' (especially in regards to physicality 
and gender) and hypocrisy. I explore dating along two important axes: degree of 
religiosity and socio-economic class.
The fifth chapter, Strategies to Make and Break Chaos: The Hijab and  
Identity in Fes, examines ideas of dress and the pragmatic use of the hijab as a 
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strategic expression of piety and identity. The hijab is the public expression of 
women's adherence to Islamic norms, except that in many cases, the hijab is 
actually a strategic choice to address non-religious concerns in their daily lives. 
Women wear the hijab strategically in Fes, and it serves as a loci of multiple 
debates about individual freedom, economic gender disparities, piety, shame, 
and socialization. This chapter widens the discourse about why young women 
choose to wear hijab, and includes some excellent graphs measuring seasonal 
variation in hijab use.
The penultimate chapter, (Ch)Eating Together: Ramadan, Piety, and  
Hypocrisy Among Fassi Women, sneaks a peak into the most beloved—and 
according to Moroccans, hypocritical (Nichane 2006)—of Moroccan holidays. 
Holidays serve as crisis events that reveal the nature of hypocrisy in times of 
heightened excitement and piety. The focus of this chapter will be Ramadan, a 
holiday associated with amplified reward/punishment, as seen through the lens of 
the slang term t-ramaDan (to behave poorly because of the fast). In Morocco, 
Ramadan is a series of contrasts: legally required fasting vs. personal freedom; 
public discipline vs. private indulgence; mandated serenity vs. inevitable fast-
induced fighting; days of gender separation and nights of sexy partying. This 
holiday illustrates the connections between hypocrisy, heightened moral stakes, 
and religious pluralization.
The final chapter of this dissertation explores the conclusions that emerge 
49
from this study. In it, I contemplate what I have learned regarding young women's 
religious subjectivities in the medina of Fes. The chapter reconnects my case 
example with the theme of hypocrisy as a tool of social sanctioning and further 
pulls together the vignettes and other ethnographic examples to fully illustrate my 
perspective on hypocrisy. The chapter also discusses the notion of 
anthropologists as challenged by the rapidity of social change and muses on the 
tensions between the complexity of bundled subjectivities and lived religion, and 
the aspirations of anthropologists in a time of rapid communication.
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Fitna in Fes: The Nexus of Moroccan Islam and Identity
They certainly would reject the 
notion that they are an amalgam of 
Islamic and non-Islamic elements. 
They regard themselves as Muslims, 
pure and simple. In what sense, 
then, can such beliefs be considered 
to form a part of Islam?” 
--- Dale Eickelman
“He is a hypocrite! (munaafiq) He uses a fake (munkar) hadith! He tells 
men to kill each other! This is not Islam! Who is this imam to say that men can kill 
other men?”
Noora was clearly agitated. A middle-class, conservative college student 
whose outspoken nature endeared her to me but to few of her peers, Noora 
threw her notebook on the couch next to me, sat down in a huff, and began to 
pick at the French fries I had ordered while awaiting her arrival. A waiter had 
followed her up the stairs of the small ice cream shop, and he took our juice 
orders while Noora pulled out her phone and opened a YouTube video of Imam 
Nhari's lecture. Disgusted, she tossed it on the table in front of me.
“Have you seen this? How can an 'alim encourage violence for a man [for] 
speaking his mind? This is not Islam, Miriam. Shame on him for encouraging 
violence. This is not how we are in Fes.”
I knew the video Noora was referring to; many Fassis had brought it to my 
attention over the course of the week of June 28th, 2012. However, understanding 
this battle over the limits of legitimate religious authority in Morocco begins a 
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week earlier, when Mokhtar Laghzioui, editor of left-wing Moroccan newspaper 
al-Ahdath al-Maghreb, gave a live interview on Lebanese television. Speaking on 
the newly-launched station al-Mayadeen, Laghzioui was asked about the 
controversy surrounding Article 490 in the Moroccan penal code, which forbids 
sex outside of marriage. 
[Female] Interviewer: "When NGOs and activists demand the 
legalization of sexual relations between unmarried men and women who 
have reached the age of consent, in an Arab Muslim country – doesn't 
this violate all taboos and prohibitions?"
Mokhtar Laghzioui: "Hello to you and to all Mayadeen TV viewers. I 
believe that this involves a proper, reasonable, and normal 
understanding regarding the practice of one's individual liberties. We, in 
Moroccan society, have reached a certain level of maturity, which 
requires that we let people decide what to do in their intimate moments. 
This has become essential. The open atmosphere familiar to Moroccan 
society in all aspects requires that we find a solution to this hypocrisy 
(nifaaq). All Moroccans know that sexual relations out of wedlock exist, 
but when it reaches the point that the police or state officials identify 
venues8 in which the 'crime of love' is practiced – for it seems to me that 
love has become a crime in Arab and Muslim countries..."
Interviewer: "But as you know, not everything is done out of love. So 
perhaps we should consider brothels to be part of individual liberties as 
well..."
Mokhtar Laghzioui: "No, no. There is a big difference."
Interviewer: "Why not, if everything is done with the consent of all 
parties?"
Mokhtar Laghzioui: "No, there is a big difference between brothels and 
between arresting two consenting adults engaging in personal intimate 
acts. In Morocco, there is a ridiculous and pitiful contradiction between 
the severity of the law towards anyone caught committing this so-called 
'crime of love,' and between the leniency towards a rapist, who is 
8 Laghzioui is specifically referring to the practice of making arrests at hotels. While Moroccan 
couples are legally forbidden from reserving a hotel room without proof of marriage, many 
lower-end hotels ask few questions, and are used as locations for couples to engage in sexual 
relations outside of wedlock (both affairs and pre-marital sex). Police often raid lower-end 
hotels to catch those breaking Article 490 of the penal code.
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allowed by law to marry the woman he raped.9 [...]
Mokhtar Laghzioui: "I respect the freedom of anyone who chooses the 
institution of marriage, but the freedom of someone who wishes to 
engage in sexual relations out of wedlock must also be respected..."
Interviewer: "Does this apply to everyone – your sister, your daughter, 
your mother?"
Mokhtar Laghzioui: "It applies to the whole world. Even if I did not 
accept this, it exists..."
Interviewer: "We want to know whether you accept it or not."
Mokhtar Laghzioui: "I accept that the freedom of every being on the 
face of this Earth should be respected."
Interviewer: "And your sister enjoys that freedom as well?"
Mokhtar Laghzioui: "I accept that my sister, my mother, or my daughter 
may exercise their liberties as they see fit. We should have that 
courage."
Certainly not all Moroccans agreed with Laghzioui, but the interview 
received minimal attention in Morocco after it first appeared on satellite television 
on June 22nd, 2012. However, a week later, a well-known Salafist imam from 
Oujda, Abdullah Nhari, uploaded a sermon to YouTube which elevated 
Laghzioui's comments to a topic of religious debate.  Sitting on a couch in a 
barren home, appearing as though just conversing with friends, Imam Nhari 
responded to Laghzioui's controversial statements with fire and brimstone:
[The Interviewer] said to him: “If you demand that young people of both 
sexes be allowed to commit the crime of fornication [zina'], what are you 
doing in a Muslim country?” 
[Laghzioui] answered: “These are hypocritical countries [bldaan 
munaafiqa]. This phenomenon exists, and they conceal it. Why not leave 
9 Here Laghzioui is referring to a contemporary debate in Moroccan society about Penal Code 
Article 475, allowing a rapist to avoid prosecution by marrying the victim, that began when a 
16-year-old girl committed suicide after being beaten by her “husband.” This incident is 
discussed later in this chapter.
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it up to the boy and the girl? If they are consenting – this is not rape... 
This has to do with private intimacy, so why do society, religion, or the 
law interfere, and deny them the pleasure of enjoying their bodies in 
these intimate moments?” 
Allah be praised! Allah be praised!! 
[The Interviewer] asked him: “What if your sister or your daughter wanted 
to do it?” 
[Laghzioui] said: “I respect their freedom.” 
In other words, he respects the freedom of his sister, his wife, and his 
daughter... Someone who accepts such a thing for his wife or sister – 
what is he called? A dayouth!10 What is the punishment for a dayouth in 
Islamic law? Whoever has no zeal – kill him! A dayouth is denied 
entrance to Paradise!
Many Fassis, like my young friend Noora, were outraged that the imam 
called for the death of Laghzioui. While everyone from the Salafis to the 
secularists in Fes were debating Laghzioui's words, I could not find any in Fes 
who felt that Imam Nhari's call for Laghzioui's death was appropriate. Most 
moderate Muslims in Fes, much like Noora, expressed far more outrage at the 
imam's comments than Laghzioui's original interview. Reaction in Morocco 
broadly was also very strong; journalists held demonstrations in support of 
Laghzioui in front of his offices in Rabat, and within two weeks of Nhari's 
YouTube sermon's release, the King ordered Imam Nhari's arrest for encouraging 
violence (Brousky 2012). But the incident demonstrated the tensions between 
Salafist ideologies and secular human rights discourse while also exemplifying 
10 Dayouth: one who is not possessive of his womenfolk; one who sells his wife or daughter as 
prostitutes. This term is almost never used in common parlance in Fes. Several of my Fassi 
informants were not very familiar with the term, and so many defined the term to simply mean 
“pimp.” As many of my informants noted, the term does not appear in the Qur'an or in Hadith 
which are broadly accepted (al-Sihah al-Sitta).
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the kind of public, heated debates over women's bodies and sexuality that are 
occurring in Morocco today.
When Rachel Newcomb published her fascinating ethnography on the 
lives of middle-class women in the Ville Nouvelle of Fes in 2009, she argued that 
she was working at a time of great fitna (social chaos) in Morocco: that even in 
the years between the completion of her fieldwork in 2002 and the publication of 
the text, Morocco had seen dramatic changes in the way women lived their lives 
and the way the state balanced political and economic interests (2009:186-193). 
Though the words of Laghzioui, Nhari, or even my young informant Noora had 
not yet been spoken when Newcomb published, the vignette above would easily 
qualify as an example of the fitna that Newcomb predicted would come in the 
years after her fieldwork. Newcomb argues that, “at this particular moment, when 
Moroccans seem intensely concerned with defining a future for their country, 
conversations often focus on how men and women will relate to each other in this 
imagined, ideal Morocco” (2009:192). This dissertation as a whole, and this 
chapter in particular, demonstrate that Newcomb is exactly right, and that many 
of the debates occurring and subjectivities changing for young women are 
directly connected to questions of how genders relate and the ethics surrounding 
Islam's role in defining gendered subjectivities.
Before progressing, it is worth pausing to briefly unpack the complex 
Islamic concept that is fitna. The term refers to the notion of a trial, temptation, or 
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challenge to believers, and is something undesirable: “Our Lord, do not place us 
in fitna before the disbelievers and forgive us, our Lord. Indeed, it is You who is 
the Exalted in Might, the Wise” (Surah 60:5). The term is heavily associated with 
dispute and disobedience, in part because of the first civil war within the Islamic 
community from 656 C.E. To 661 C.E., known as the 'Fitna of Uthman's Murder' 
(fitna maqtal Uthman), nearly tore apart the leadership of the fledgling religion 
(Gardet 2015; Juynboll 1973:142-159). Fitna thus exists as “essentially a state of 
rebellion against the divine Law in which the weak always run the risk of being 
trapped” (Gardet 2015). The term fitna is associated with debates and disputes 
over the very nature of doctrine, social order, and ethical purity within the Islamic 
community. 
Within the Islamic world today, the term takes on a variety of meanings 
beyond active political rebellion, so Moroccan usages are most relevant for my 
definition of the term. The term fitna often covers any chaos or social uncertainty 
caused by ethical debate and moral dispute. Stefania Pandolfo argued that fitna 
is “a flirtation with the unknown, with the insecurity of novel paths; that taste for 
dissent, dispute, and hazardous games” (Pandolfo 1997:332). Broadly, the term 
fitna covers not only social ethical dispute, but is also associated with 
“'temptation,' 'fascination,' 'commotion' or 'disbelief'” (Rosen 2002:208). 
This dissertation explores the lives of young Fassi medina women at a 
time of great social change and ethical debate—fitna—when new ideas about 
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gendered behavior and religious belief are being discussed publicly, as seen in 
our opening vignette. I argue that women from the medina of Fes have complex 
subjectivities, and Moroccan Islam is but one tradition of knowledge influencing 
identity formation. This chapter first elucidates several of the defining 
characteristics of Moroccans' exceptional subjectivities, with a focus on the place 
of Fes in these national narratives and experiences. I then examine how Fassi 
identity is connected to one's district of residence and introduce my informant 
community. Finally, the chapter introduces the notion of fitna and places it within 
the context of some of the emerging debates and changing practices present in 
Morocco today. I demonstrate that women of the medina of Fes cross all socio-
economic classes and degrees of religiosity but identify along other lines central 
to their unique medina experience. These flexible subjectivities, colliding in a 
nation in a time of fitna, are highly useful for young Fassi women pushing the 
boundaries of religious practice and using accusations of hypocrisy to call back 
those who go too far.
Being Moroccan: Traditions of Knowledge Shaping the Fassi Experience
For most, to be Moroccan is to be a part of a larger historical and social 
experience connected to the physical land, the institution of kingship, and the 
development of a unique, local variant of Islam. Each young Fassi woman living 
in the medina has her own sense of self, a subjectivity that actually consists of a 
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bundle of identities, of which Muslimhood is just one. To expand on this notion, I 
explore some of the notions of identity most commonly articulated and discussed 
by my Fassi informants. I examine how being a Fassi reserves one a special 
place in Moroccan history because of the city's spiritual and political role in the 
Moroccan national narrative. I discuss how Moroccan Islam, best exemplified by 
the lives of Muslims in Fes, exists as a unique blend of Sufism and normative 
Islam. Finally, I point to some contrastive aspects of Fassi identity, as many 
informants I interviewed during my fieldwork were more eager to tell me who they 
'weren't' as a way of articulating who they were.
Moroccan sense of self is born out of a history of independence from 
exterior, foreign control and a strong connection to early, Prophetic Islam. Though 
the territory of Morocco features heavily in Roman history (see Laroui 1970:27-
79) and mythology, and exists as a part of the larger narrative of early Christianity 
as the Roman province Mauretania Tingitana,11 I shall begin our discussion of 
Moroccan history at the point at which Islam appears on the scene. After the 
death of the Prophet Muhammad, Muslim traders and warriors quickly reached 
the Atlantic edge of North Africa, but Islam, much like Christianity before it, found 
little support amongst the Berber tribes who preferred pre-existing pagan 
traditions and Judaism (Chouraqui 1985:18). The territory of Morocco was 
administered by Arabs as a province of Ifriqiya (Tunisia), but Berber tribes 
11 One of Morocco's earliest settlements, Tingis (modern day Tangier), was the location of the 
martyrdom of Saint Marcellus the Centurion, who is still revered in the Catholic and Eastern 
Orthodox Churches. 
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throughout the mountainous regions of the territory regularly disregarded central 
authority (Abun-Nasr 1987:32-33). In 740 C.E., Berbers in Tangier began the 
'Great Berber Revolt' (or Kharijite Revolt), throwing off the yoke of Ummayad rule 
from Damascus (Abun-Nasr 1987:36-38; Laroui 1970:94). Quickly, Berbers 
across the Maghreb (North Africa) and al-Andalus (southern Spain) joined in, and 
the Ummayads, seeking to avoid losing all control over Mediterranean trade 
routes, focused efforts on retaining Ifriqiya and lost control of the territory of 
Morocco (Abun-Nasr 1987:41-42).12 The territory of Morocco would never again 
be ruled by from a Middle Eastern capital, a point many Moroccans have made to 
me over the years I have worked in the country. As such, “although there were 
various sectarian revolts, Moroccans generally looked for spiritual guidance to 
the western capitals of Islamic orthodoxy at Cordoba and Kairouan,13 not 
Baghdad or Damascus, a religious autonomy they were to retain even after the 
decline of Muslim Spain” (Howe 2005:59). 
In 787 C.E., Idris ibn Abdullah, a great-grandson of the Prophet 
Muhammad and a member of the Ummayad Caliphate, fled the Levant shortly 
before the Battle of Fakhkh to the Abbasids (Abun-Nasr 1987:51; Laroui 
1970:109). He arrived in the territory known today as Morocco and, with the 
support of local Berber tribes, united the territory under his rule. For many Berber 
12 Al-Andalus also liberated itself from the Arab Caliphate during this period. These two territories 
were the first to declare themselves independent Islamic entities separate from the Caliphate.
13 Kairouan is now in the country of Tunisia.
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tribesmen, Moulay Idriss I's descent from Muhammad gave him the legitimacy to 
convert followers, lead tribes, and demand local allegiance (Abun-Nasr 1987:51). 
Idriss ruled his territory from the town of Walili (near the Roman city of Volubilus 
and the modern city of Meknes) and founded the military encampment of Fes on 
the bank of the Jawhar river in 786 C.E. (Lapidus 2002:304). Military successes 
followed for Idriss, who expanded his territory throughout what is today 
considered Morocco as well as capturing Tlemcen,14 a city at that time still 
controlled by the Caliphate in Baghdad. However, this successful capture of an 
Abbasid city reignited Ummayad-Abbasid tensions, and Abbasid caliph Harun al-
Rashid had Moulay Idriss poisoned in 791 C.E. (Abun-Nasr 1987:51). Luckily for 
the dynasty, Idriss had already married the daughter of a Berber chieftan, and 
she gave birth to his only heir shortly after Idriss I's death (Howe 2005:60). At 
birth, the half-Berber, half-Arab Idriss II became the Sultan of Morocco (sulTan 
al-maghreb). Idriss II was raised in the village of Walili by his mother's tribe until 
taking his position as Sultan in 808 C.E., when he built his capital in Fes and 
founded the Idrissi dynasty (Brignon 1967:62).
For many Moroccans, the history of Morocco, in a nationalist sense, 
begins with Idriss I and his son, Idriss II (Benchekroun 2011:171). Within this 
national birth narrative also lie the embryos of key characteristics of what would 
become Moroccan Islam: legitimacy through Prophetic descent, Berber flavor, 
centrality of Fes, and rejection of Middle Eastern identities. Idriss II expanded 
14 Tlemecen is now in the country of Algeria.
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Fes, invited Arab migrations to the town to develop the city as an Islamic power-
base (Abun-Nasr 1987:51), and was laid to rest in the shrine of Moulay Idriss II in 
Fes. This saint's shrine/tomb has served as a pilgrimage site for Moroccans ever 
since (Benchekroun 2011:171), and was the site at which I conducted my 
research on women's Sufi practices described in detail in my next chapter. The 
Fihrids, a wealthy mercantile family from Kairouan, came to Fes during one of the 
Arab migrations (Laroui 1970:111), and in 859 C.E., Fatima al-Fihri founded al-
Qarawiyyan15 University (jaam'a al-qarweyeen) (Benchekroun 2011:182-187), the 
first degree-awarding university in the world and a center of global Islamic 
learning for centuries. Since Morocco's beginning, Fes was the political, spiritual, 
and educational center of the country.
Even after the administrative capital of the kingdom relocated, Fes 
remained the urban spiritual center of the nation. The leading religious authority 
in Morocco, as much as anyone could be given such a title throughout most of 
Moroccan history, was the Qadi of Fes, who was the highest of all Qadis in 
Morocco (qaDi al-quDat) (Le Tourneau 1949:214). The first duty of Qadi of Fes 
was to maintain the mosque and university of al-Qarawiyyan, including 
appointing faculty and ensuring the quality of instruction (Burke 1972:100). He 
was also responsible for appointing other Qadis for other major cities, such as 
15 Although the school al-Qarawiyyan (نييورقلا) was named after the Tunisian town of Kairouan 
(ناوريقلا) and thus the two locations' names are often pronounced the same way, the two 
names are not spelled the same in Arabic. I have used the common, Anglicized versions of 
both locations names in this dissertation for the sake of clarity.
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Marrakesh or Meknes (Lapidus 2002:333), giving him significant influence over 
who was considered a member of the Moroccan ulema class. Fes not only 
served as a metaphoric spiritual capital for the nation, but also served as the 
politically legitimate and accepted source of religious authority.
While subsequent dynasties would move the capital of the nation through 
four other imperial cities, new leadership always occurred from the combination 
of “strong-man politics with holy-man piety” (Geertz 1968:8).16 Throughout the 
region's history, Sufi leaders were always major players in the political landscape, 
and no Moroccan king could maintain authority without their support (Lapidus 
2002:328). Morocco was never ruled by the Ottomans, and the nation engaged 
with Europe as an independent kingdom until 1912 when the king of Morocco 
signed a Protectorate treaty with French leadership to split the territory between 
Spain and France (Howe 2005:62-64). The reigning Moroccan dynasty, the 
Alaouites, has ruled since the mid 17th century, and continued to rule throughout 
colonial occupation. After gaining independence from France, Morocco retained 
its home-grown king, and the monarchy worked with Muslim leaders and 
intellectuals to ensure that Moroccan nationalism remained strong enough to 
avoid the siren's call of Pan-Arabism or Nasserism (Howe 2005:126). Morocco 
remains engaged in international affairs and maintains positive relations with 
16 This includes the  Almoravids (1040–1147), Almohads (1121–1269), Merinids (1244–1465), 
Saadians (1549-1659) and Alaouites (1664—present), all of which emerged from indigenous 
groups in the territory.
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most17 Arab states, but the Muslim Brotherhood never made serious inroads in 
Morocco. Saudi Arabian Wahhabism never gained popularity in Morocco, and 
only vaguely influenced Salafism in the country, in large part because of 
Wahhabism's incompatibility with Morocco's strong Sufi tradition, the 'ulema's 
unwillingness to abandon Malikite Islam (Zeghal 2008:17-18), and King Hassan 
II's general marginalization of Salafists and other religious leaders, especially at 
the beginning of his reign (Zeghal 2008:32-60). While Fes is no longer the 
political capital of the country, the city remains the spiritual capital and, for many 
Moroccans, the origin of what it means to be Moroccan itself. 
Fes is also one of the most important locations for the practice of 
Moroccan Islam, the unique variant of Islamic practice born out of the historical 
experience of the territory. Just as other nations developed their own specific 
variety of Islamic culture that bundles with national and regional subjectivities, the 
majority of Moroccans practice some form of their national Islam. Born out of 
historical circumstance, “North African Islam was an occidental Islam; it assumed 
Berber characteristics—egalitarianism, austerity, and a certain mysticism—and 
soon declared its independence from Oriental Islam” (Howe 2005:59). The 
characteristics of this Moroccan Islam were best articulated in Dale Eickelman's 
Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center (1976).
17 Morocco's relations with all other Arab nations are very cordial, and Morocco has even been 
invited to join the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the wake of the Arab Spring. However, 
Morocco maintains icy relations with Algeria, its Arab neighbor, because of the ongoing 
Western Sahara dispute.
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In 1968, bolstered by the support of his dissertation adviser Clifford 
Geertz, the brash, young anthropologist Eickelman set out to the pilgrimage town 
of Boujad in the central Atlas mountains of Morocco. His goal was simple in fact 
but infinitely complex in nature: “I am particularly interested in describing and 
analyzing the processes by which religious symbols and institutions are 
reinterpreted and modified to accommodate new and evolving social and 
historical realities. I am also concerned with describing how religious ideologies, 
implicit or explicit, themselves shape the social order” (1976:3). Nearly forty-three 
years later, I returned to Fes to begin my fieldwork with the very same goal in 
mind. Eickelman’s answer is to delve into the nature of pilgrimage and 
maraboutism in Morocco, and to present a thorough, personal, and deeply 
nuanced view of 'Moroccan Islam'—an idiosyncratic flavor of Islam which 
demonstrated the exceptional nature of the Moroccan people. But while the 
concerns, motivations, technologies, and opportunities available to my young 
female informants may be very different than those in Eickelman’s era, his 
conclusion remains: Moroccan Islam is exceptional. The difference is that today, 
in the medina of Fes (and, I would argue, elsewhere in Morocco), Moroccans are 
aware that their Islam is unique. They are proud of this fact. They define 
themselves by it.
Eickelman describes Moroccan Islam as one which comfortably combines 
normative Islam with North Africa's unique maraboutic Sufism. While Islam in 
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Morocco includes the influence of organized Sufi brotherhoods (tariqa pl. turuq), 
Sufism transfers from Moroccan history into the lives of everyday Moroccans 
through the presence of the descendants of popular Sufi saints and the shrines 
they maintain. These descendants are more popularly known as marabouts 
(murabiT; “one who is tied”). Marabouts were not only responsible for the upkeep 
of saints' shrines and protection of pilgrims visiting those shrines, but also served 
as arbitrators of disputes (Bel 1938:357-407; Burke 1972:95-97; Doutte 1900; 
Gellner 1969). Marabouts were also mystical communicators, and “it was 
popularly believed that for temporal success men had to attach themselves to 
marabouts, who were capable of communicating God's grace (baraka) to them” 
(Eickelman 1976:25-26). Marabouts served as intermediaries between the 
Moroccan Muslim and Allah, and
their supporters see marabouts and similar “holy men” as a 
hierarchy of intermediaries through whom the supernatural 
pervades, sustains, and affects the universe. Analytically, an 
observer may hold such a conception of access to the divine 
to be, in Weber's sense of the term, a “magical” accretion to 
Islam; but from the viewpoint of tribesmen, peasants, and 
others who hold such beliefs and act upon them, 
intermediaries with God are a part of Islam as they 
understand it. Supporters of this conception do not in general 
systematically articulate their beliefs, but they certainly would 
reject the notion that they are an amalgam of Islamic and 
non-Islamic elements. They regard themselves as Muslims, 
pure and simple. In what sense, then, can such beliefs be 
considered to form a part of Islam? (Eickelman 1976:10)
Marabouts can be viewed through two different lens: through their 
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association with specific religious centers (ribaT)(Cornell 1998) or as a mosaic of 
the characteristics ascribed to them by their clients (Eickelman 1976; Gellner and 
Micaud 197318). Marabouts have been largely misunderstood or discounted in 
academic discussions of Moroccan Islam because of their role in the Maraboutic 
Crises, a time of religious popularization and general disunity (Laroui 1970:212-
213). Still, as Vincent Cornell points out, the idea of the marabout is popularly 
associated with Moroccan Islam and “has come to symbolize all that is unique in 
the popular religion of the Maghrib” (Cornell 1998:23) even if marabouts 
compose only one aspect of Moroccan Sufism.
Eickelman's answer to his question, “in what sense, then, can such beliefs 
be considered to form a part of Islam?” (1976:10) is what he calls the 
“coexistence of these antithetical notions of Islam” (1976:12): the ability to 
balance scripturalism and Sufism. Eickelman himself notes, and I echo the 
sentiment, that Morocco is not the only part of the Islamic world with maraboutic 
figures, and Sufi 'saints' appear throughout Muslim experience. But Moroccan 
Islam, with its specific mixture of scripturalist Islam and maraboutic Sufism, 
incorporates the specific history of the territory to provide an overarching 
worldview to Moroccans. I would add that, in addition to Eickelman's presentation 
of Moroccan Islam as a pair of contrasting yet intertwined Islamic subjectivities, 
Moroccan Islam also is defined by its relationship to the political head of the state 
18 Gellner's work with marabouts took place in Berber villages, so he uses the Tamazight word 
“agurram” to refer to them (Gellner and Micaud 1973).
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and the Commander of the [Moroccan] Faithful, the king. 
The Moroccan king, according to the Moroccan constitution, holds the role 
of 'Commander of the Faithful' (amir al-mu'minin). The actual requirements of the 
role are not clear, but it expresses a long-standing relationship between the 
Moroccan king as a protector of his people and the Islam practiced in Morocco. 
The position as Commander of the Faithful is made possible by King Mohammad 
VI's Sharifian lineage. Being a 'chorfa' or 'sharif' in Morocco (one who can trace 
his lineage back to the Prophet) means that an individual, even without religious 
training or learning, possesses baraka, the Islamic spiritual combination of 
charisma and blessedness. These are the same characteristics marabouts 
possess. Moroccans feel an ever-present connection to their unique Islam 
through the actions of the king just as they do a marabout; later in this chapter 
this sentiment will be expressed in discussion of Moroccan identity during the 
Arab Spring. 
Similarly, the monarchy greatly benefits from the king's role as the head of 
Moroccan Islam. Anthropologist Abdellah Hammoudi (1997) posits that the 
authoritarian system of the Moroccan monarchy draws its strength from the Sufi 
religious tradition of the master-disciple bond and traditional understandings of 
the how the sultan maintains legitimacy—through charisma, coercion, and 
allegiance. The continuing success of authoritarian rule in Morocco was in part 
based on “a transfer of a powerful sentimental motif of community to newly 
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unfolded spheres of the political” (Hammoudi 1997:xviii). Hammoudi argues that 
it is Moroccans' acceptance of both Sufi motifs and the king's ties to scripturalist 
Islam through Prophetic ancestry that allows the king to maintain influence and 
power within the framework of Moroccan Islam. While his argument may be 
viewed as essentializing and increasingly inaccurate as institutions like the 
display of allegiance (bay'a) lose popular support, I find the connections 
Hammoudi draws between the structure of Moroccan Sufism and the monarchy 
to help illuminate the uniqueness of Moroccan Islam.
Moroccan Islam is largely moderate, normative Islam with some Sufi 
elements headed by a sacred king, but that does not preclude some Moroccans, 
including some Fassis, from practicing more conservative Salafi Islam. Salafism 
does not have indigenous roots in Morocco the way that Berber-tinged Sufism 
does. Wahhabism, specifically, found its way to Morocco in the late eighteenth 
century (Zeghal 2008:275), but while sultans expressed interest, the 'ulema, 
especially the 'ulema of Fes, rejected this Wahhabism as incompatible with 
Sufism (Zeghal 2008:17).  Salafists in Morocco today instead trace their lineage 
to Egyptian reformisms of the nineteenth century brought to Morocco by 'ulema 
returning from travel and study abroad with Salafi reformists such as Muhammad 
Abduh (Zeghal 2008:17). Salafi teachings found support among some prominent 
Berber families, often as a means of counter-balancing the power of local 
marabouts and brotherhoods (Burke 1972:109). 
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Abduhian Salafism gained traction in Morocco in the 20th century when 
many prominent Salafi leaders became involved in the nationalist movement to 
liberate the territory from European control. Many of Morocco's most prominent 
Salafi leaders—such as 'Allal al-Fasi and Shu'ayb al-Dukkali—taught at 
Qarawiyyan in Fes. However, as Malika Zeghal argues, Salafi Islam became 
associated with nationalist activism and “took shape in scattered centers around 
strong personalities who were dispersed and sometimes mutually antagonistic” 
(2008:21). Once King Hassan II came to power, reformist Salafist leaders faced 
oppression as the king dismantled the nationalist movement and reoriented its 
influence towards strengthening the monarchy (Zeghal 2008:21-30). King 
Hassan II temporarily imported Wahhabi instructors from Saudi Arabia during the 
early 1980s to counterbalance Leftist forces threatening his regime (Howe 
2005:318), but Wahhabism did not find long-term popular support from the 
monarchy or from other Salafists, who themselves struggled to maintain the 
monarchy's tolerance. Some scholars do not even consider Morocco to have 
significant Salafi populations today (Pape 2005), but I prefer Zeghal's argument 
that Salafi Islam in Morocco, which “gradually took on a Moroccan identity” 
(Zeghal 2008:17), exists as a largely fragmented classification of Islam, without a 
coherent source or program. Salafis have faced oppression from the current 
monarch, particularly in relation to the terror attacks which the nation faced in 
2003 and 2011, when both Salafists and moderate Islamists alike were used as 
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scapegoats (Atran 2006:132; Buehler 2013; Dalmasso and Cavatorta 2011; 
Salime 2011; Wegner 2011).
Salafists remain a small minority in Morocco, and there are no available 
statistics for the percentage of Moroccans who self-identify as Salafi. In my own 
fieldwork, I found that only 6.2% of my informants were even willing to take the 
title of Salafi. Many Moroccans associate Salafism with jihadism and terrorism, 
but this association is certainly encouraged by the Moroccan government itself. 
Moroccan media often covers Moroccan Salafism by focusing on violence 
associated with Salafist imams. Salafism is more heavily associated with urban 
centers, particularly Marrakesh, Oujda, and Fes, but almost exclusively with the 
medinas rather than the Ville Nouvelles. 
Morocco also possesses secularist currents. Pierre Vermeren argues that 
Morocco's secularist discourse appears in the 1950s and 1960s directly after 
Independence as part of the development of socialist political parties to counter-
balance the religious, monarchical nationalist movement (2002). Secular 
subjectivities have become more popular since the 1990s, particularly as part of 
the Berber rights movement (Almasude 2014; Ben-Layashi 2007). Still, non-
religious, secular Moroccans are in the minority in the country, and they are not 
necessarily popular with fellow Moroccans. In 2007, Moroccan political scientists 
Mohammed El Ayadi and Mohammed Tozy conducted a nation-wide survey of 
Moroccans, asking questions about religious practices and identity. These 
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findings were presented in a major French-language magazine, TelQuel, as part 
of a cover story entitled “What Muslims are We?” (Quels musulmans sommes-
nous?) In response to a question regarding secularism, 38.8% of respondents 
felt that “coexistence of believers and non-believers in the same country was 
unacceptable” (Iraqi 2007). Secularist movements, such as the Ramadan-fast 
protesting group Masayminch described in Chapter 6, have little popular support. 
Few Fassis I have ever met self-describe as secular. None of my informants 
rejected Islam directly, and all cited Islam as one of the many forces which 
shaped their subjectivities, even if only in relation to the overarching Moroccan 
Islam that permeates all public life in Fes.
The flexibility and willingness to push boundaries in religious practice and 
belief that are inherent in Moroccan Islam mean that there is great diversity in the 
actual practice of the religion. Being a 'good Muslim woman' is a broad category, 
one which is contestable with accusations of hypocrisy. But beyond the national 
and religious identities that Fassis carry, there are also a number of other 
subjectivities which resonate with young Fassi women and find a place in their 
bundle of identities. And in many cases, the young women of Fes are more 
interested in negative identities—contrasting themselves with those they 
differentiate from as a way of defining the self.
Contrasting Identity: Who Fassis Are Through Who They Are Not
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Moroccans also look to historical precedent and current religio-political 
situation as evidence of the nation’s uniqueness and exceptionalism. Moroccan 
Islam and the nation's unique political history mean that Fassis are proud of their 
Moroccan identity and see it as a distinctly North African, Arabo-Berber 
subjectivity. However, Arab and Berber identities do not tend to dominate Fassis' 
senses of self.  In the earlier mentioned survey by El Ayadi and Tozy, the 
researchers found that roughly 60% of their informants self-identified as 'Muslims' 
as their primary identity, while nearly 30% identified as 'Moroccan.'19 Less than 
4% of the respondents identified 'Arab' as their primary identity, and 'Berber' and 
'African' were even rarer (Iraqi 2007).  In my own research, the only instances in 
which an informant's ethnic identity was even discussed were to either: 1) 
connect the individual, through kinship ties, to a famous Arab family in the 
medina such as the Benanni clan from which the current queen hails, or 2) 
explain why the informant was so heavily engaged in the Berber-rights struggle 
that carries little recognition in urban centers such as Fes. Most Fassis I 
interviewed, when I asked whether they were Arab or Berber, either stated that 
19 The authors of the survey note that there was actually a significant difference between the 
oldest and youngest respondents. Muslim identity was identified as one's primary identity by 
66.9% of informants aged 60 and over, and only 49.8% among 18-24 year olds. In contrast, 
Moroccan identity was ranked first by 22.1% of respondents aged 60 and over, and 32.1% of 
18-24 year olds (Iraqi 2007). In other words, the youngest batch of adult women—the 
demographic highlighted in this dissertation—is more likely to self-identify as 'Moroccan' rather 
than 'Muslim' than previous generations, but 'Muslim' is still the defining subjectivity for at least 
half of young Moroccan women. My fieldwork and interviews broadly agree with these survey 
results. I would add that, by defining themselves as 'Moroccan Muslims,' many young Fassi 
women circumvent the need to choose a specific label, and also demonstrate the notion of a 
personal subjectivity that is a bundle of multiple identities which is informed by multiple 
traditions of knowledge.
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they were either 'half and half' (beenu-been) said with a shrug, or 'a little [of 
each]' (shweeya) said with a smirk.
Instead, most Fassis, regardless of their district of residence or socio-
economic class, acknowledge that the vast majority of Moroccans are a mix of 
Arab and Berber ethnicity. The fact that most families are ethnically mixed is, 
however, one of those secrets that everyone fully knows but no one wants to 
openly admit: hence the shrugs and smirks in responding to questions about 
one's ethnic heritage. One of Newcomb's middle-class informants makes the 
point elegantly, remarking that “No, I'm not Berber, but I'm not really Arab either. 
Who is? Fassis are hypocrites, wanting to pretend they are pure Arabs, as if that 
makes them more Muslim than the rest of us? Do you think, after a thousand 
years of mixing, that anyone is pure in this country?” (Newcomb 2010:44). My 
young Fassi informants often expressed this 'who cares' attitude when discussing 
their own ethnicity, signaling to me that an ethnic identity neatly distinguishing 
between Arab or Berber to the exclusion of the other was not a major facet of 
their bundle of identities.
But Fassis also do not wish to be readily identified with other Arabs, 
especially within the Middle East. This is not to say that they do not support a 
strong political relationship with the monarchies of the Gulf. Visits by the late King 
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia during my fieldwork were widely discussed with pride 
around Fes, and many Fassis acknowledged the importance of Gulfi investment 
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in various infrastructure projects throughout the Ville Nouvelle. Since the 
beginning of the Arab Spring, the monarchy has strengthened economic and 
political ties with a number of Gulfi states, generally seen as positive fiscal policy. 
But Gulfis are often described in Fes as 'lazy,' 'decadent,' 'intolerant,' and 
'hypocritical.' 
Fassi women were quick to point out that they lived different lives than 
women in the Gulf, and were proud of the difference. Every single Fassi woman I 
have ever spoken to regarding women’s rights in Saudi Arabia has criticized the 
Saudi ban on women driving, with some even joking that 'Moroccan women drive 
motorbikes better than men.'  Many Fassi girls, when describing their experience 
as a woman in Fes, would use phrases of comparison: 
“Unlike Saudi women, we have the right to…”
“Our Islam, it is nothing like Saudi Islam because...”
“Well, it is not like the Emirates, where…”
These casual verbal cues signaled a sense of identity built on what Moroccans 
are not, as opposed to what they are. Many medina residents also pointed out 
that while the city and country have some who self-identify as Salafi, the Salafism 
found in Morocco is not Saudi Wahhabi Salafism. In fact, the word 'Wahhabi' was 
almost never used by Fassis; my informants instead used the phrase 'Islam 
Saudi' and a hand-motion miming a long beard, at times with clear scorn. The 
roughly 6% of my informants who did self-identify as 'Salafi' also completely 
rejected the title of 'Wahhabi.' One of my most conservative Salafi informants, 
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whose arranged marriage is described in the later chapter on dating, once 
laughed when I foolishly called him Wahhabi, and politely informed me of my 
error:
I am not a Wahhabi! Do I look Saudi? No, I am Moroccan! 
The Wahhabis, they treat their women as sheep. We 
Moroccans, we treat our women as queens. Just because I 
have a beard like Bin Laden, my American friend, do not 
lock me up in your GitMo! [He began to chuckle heartily] 
No, even for those of us who seek true Islam, there 
different ideas. The Wahhabis, I do not support their ideas, 
their intolerance. I am Moroccan, and we have Islam in our 
heart, not oppression.
Fassis identified Wahhabism with the national identity of Saudi Arabia, leaving it 
an identity inaccessible to Moroccans. Even those Fassis whose Salafist beliefs 
would put them at odds with many other Moroccan Muslims self-identify within 
the boundaries of Moroccan Islam and against affiliation with Gulfi subjectivities.
In addition, Gulfi businessmen and tourists are the target of many Fassi 
women’s ire in regards to dress and sexuality. These Gulfi men, identifiable in the 
medina and Ville Nouvelle by their white thobes and gutras—outfits never worn 
by Moroccan men—were often described verbally to me, but were also described 
to me physically through that common hand motion that imitates the stroking of a 
long beard. Thus, these women identified Gulfi men both by their behaviors and 
also by their outward manifestations of piety—a contrast that would be amplified 
in the painful stories young women recounted. Many young women experienced 
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criticism from Gulfi men visiting Fes—interactions which insulted the girls in 
relation to their nationalist, religious, and gender-based identities.
I had never heard Amina swear before, and I never did again. But as we 
sat in a small, dirty corner of her apartment building’s roof, her eyes welled up 
with tears. I had asked her about her thoughts on Wahhabism, but soon she was 
describing an encounter with Gulfi men she had experienced a few weeks 
previously while walking past a notable four-star hotel in the Ville Nouvelle. She 
described three Saudi men standing at the entrance to the hotel, waiting for their 
car while smoking cigarettes. As she walked past, one asked why she was not a 
good Muslim woman, pointing to her tight jeans and lack of headscarf.
“He said to me, “why do you not cover like a good woman?” I told him that 
I choose my clothing and my headscarf, and that I am free to do so! Then he 
called me a whore!”
Amina’s voice trembled, “A whore! But he and his men see prostitutes in 
that very hotel! But they drink in that hotel! They think all Moroccan women are 
whores and witches. They call me a whore, but they buy women all the time.” 
Growing further enraged, Amina burst into angry tears and slammed her hand 
onto the dusty concrete. “Fuck ‘dem!” she yelled out, in one of the few English 
phrases I ever heard her use. 
“I am no whore,” she exclaimed, returning to colloquial Moroccan Arabic, 
“and they are hypocrites! Saudis, they visit the whores, and then they tell us that 
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our Islam is not pure. Do you understand me, Miriam? When they look at me, 
Saudi men see trash, they see food! No,” her body shook as she began to sob 
and her tears fell into my hair as I pulled her close, “I am no whore. My body is 
not theirs, and their religion is not mine.”
Amina’s story was surprisingly not unique in my discussions with female 
Fassi informants. Several young women who did not wear headscarves 
described being critiqued or disrespected by Gulfi men. Even my own host sister 
described negative interactions with Saudis who verbally criticized her dress in 
public. Many other Fassis girls reported sexual harassment, groping, or verbal 
abuse by Gulfis in both the medina and the Ville Nouvelle. While none of these 
encounters included violence, many were deeply upsetting to the young women 
interviewed because of the contrast between the supposed piety of the Gulfi 
perpetrator and the un-Islamic nature of their advances.  Because of this 
discrepancy, many women used the words 'nifaaq' (hypocrisy) or 'munafiq' 
(hypocrite) in their discussions of Gulfi men’s willingness to harass them.
Fassis also saw themselves as disconnected with North Africa, particularly 
in relation to the Arab Spring. During the first few months of the Arab Spring 
(January to May 2011), Ben Ali of Tunisia fled, Mubarak of Egypt stepped down, 
and Gaddafi of Libya lost control of his nation. After one day of protests on 
February 20th, 2011, the Moroccan king, Muhammad VI, addressed demands for 
constitutional reform and announced a new governing document would be 
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produced in collaboration with Islamists, academics, and politicians from across 
the nation. Moroccans faced neither tanks nor brutality; instead, the 2011 
protests were viewed as part of an ongoing opening of the public sphere of 
political discourse which began with the ascension of Muhammad VI and his 
gradual, if not snail-paced, program of liberal reform (including the 2004 reform of 
the mudawanna, or women's code). Morocco was already in a low-level state of 
fitna: the Arab Spring did not carry the same explosive opportunity there as it did 
elsewhere in North Africa.
Moroccans strongly supported the demonstrators in Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Libya, and passionately followed the events of each despot’s overthrow via 
satellite television. Yet the Moroccan experience of the Arab Spring—one with 
few demonstrations and a quick acceptance of a new constitution—was so 
markedly different that many Fassis expressed disconnect with the contagion of 
the Arab Spring. Fassis openly discussed the need for political change, but with 
moderation and patience. In 2012, one elderly Fassi woman expressed several 
of the views I commonly heard from informants:
Of course we want change. Who does not wish for each 
generation to have a better life? But our king, he loves us. 
He loves us more than his father ever did. If we remove our 
king, then who is our leader? Look at Egypt! Look at all they 
have lost! And a whole generation of youth will die in Libya! 
For what? No. Even our young know patience. If we chase 
our king to Saudi Arabia,20 who will love us then? We are 
20 The informant is referring to the fact that Ben Ali of Tunisia received sanctuary in Saudi Arabia 
upon fleeing his country. Many Moroccans cited this fact as yet another marker of the poor 
character of Saudi Arabia's leadership.
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blessed in Morocco, we have a king who is good. Moroccans 
thank Allah for this blessing.
Not all Fassis I interviewed were as pro-monarchy as this informant. Many Fassis 
did hope for reform from the government, though it was rare to hear calls to 
remove the king. But Moroccans were not swept up in the momentum of the Arab 
Spring, and instead saw the losses suffered by Egyptians, Libyans, and 
Tunisians as something 'over there.'21 For many, Moroccan identity includes 
allegiance to the king not only as a political leader but also as an integral part of 
Moroccan Islam. The Arab Spring thus reaffirmed Fassis' sense of Moroccan-
ness, connecting them to their monarchy while disconnecting them from the 
experiences of other North Africans.
Moroccans thus differentiate themselves from other North Africans and 
Gulfi Arabs, both in terms of political experiences and Islamic practices. 
Moroccans also do not view themselves as Europeans or Americans, though 
many Fassis I interviewed have relatives living in France and expressed interest 
in Islamic affairs in Europe. In particular, Fassis were interested in French laws 
regarding the hijab and facial veil. But while a sense of national identity and 
religion—especially in contrast to other nations and regions—are essential 
components which can be bundled into young Fassi women's subjectivities, it is 
the central location of Fes in these narratives that fills Fassis with a sense of 
21 The fact that Morocco is physically separated from the rest of North Africa by the gigantic 
country of Algeria, which also did not experience regime change during the Arab Spring, 
obviously contributed to Moroccans' disconnect from the Arab Spring experience.
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pride and identity. Once in Fes, however, Fassi women use another vector of 
differentiation that allows them to separate themselves into groups: district within 
the city. 
A Tale of Two Cities: The Ville Nouvelle and Medina of Fes
To elucidate the importance of the Fassi districts, I will just be honest—
Fassis hated my survey for a number of reasons, but the survey did help me to 
understand the importance of residential district identity in Fes. As described in 
my introductory chapter, I struggled to conduct successful surveys during my 
fieldwork because I could not prevent informants from conferring about questions 
and answers. But I also failed in the use of what I assumed was one of the 
simplest questions of my survey. Borrowing from a colleague's survey, I asked 
informants whether they considered themselves religious, and then asked them 
to express their degree of religiosity on a scale of one-to-ten. This question would 
allow me to correlate degree of religiosity with other responses regarding hijab-
use or visitation to the shrine of Moulay Idriss II, as well as score each district's 
residents on religiosity for comparison. Thus, the following question appeared 
very early on in my short survey.
Do you consider yourself religious?       YES   or   NO
On a scale of 1 to 10, how religious do you consider yourself? 
(1 is the lowest and 10 is the highest)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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The first problem that I noticed was that respondents did not like the first 
part of the question. Several respondents asked me to explain the question, but 
even rewording the question in multiple languages did nothing to remove their 
confusion: one young woman asked me to explain how a woman who circled 
“NO” would behave. It was unfathomable to many informants that this question 
could even make sense: how could someone not be religious? As one young 
man argued, “if you are Fassi, you are Muslim. If you are Muslim, you are 
religious.” One college student warned me against using the question, stating 
that some Fassis would find the implication that they were not religious to be an 
insult, and several informants did express a sense of suspicion and discomfort in 
relation to that question. The question bordered on the absurd for many young 
men and women. Unsurprisingly, one hundred percent of my respondents circled 
'YES' on their surveys. 
The one-to-ten scale was an even larger problem. Nearly every 
respondent required me to explain the question, in all languages. I began to 
cringe as I watched respondents reaching the question on the survey, knowing 
they were about to express confusion. My ethnocentrism caused me to assume a 
scale question would be easy to answer, but my respondents repeatedly queried 
how I could ask them put a number value on emotion and faith. How could a 
woman know how much her love of Allah compared on a scale, or how could a 
man measure how strongly he was devoted to Islam? Many respondents asked if 
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I was referring to specific ritual practices—how good the informant was at 
following rules for fasting or hijab-use or prayer—but when I explained that I 
wanted a measure of their overall piety and sense of Muslimhood, most became 
more confused. Several wrote notes beside the rejected question:
“you cannot measure my love of Allah on a line”
“I cannot pick a number for how my heart feels”
“you do not understand Islam if you mark it with a number”
Another problem with the one-to-ten scale was that my informants could 
see through the purpose of the question—to rank my respondents on a scale of 
my own—and they were eager to use this as a way of asserting their own 
identity. Earlier in the survey I asked the respondent which of the three Fassi 
districts (Ville Nouvelle, Fes Jdid, or the medina) she hailed from. Several women 
specifically connected this question to the one-to-ten scale, asking if I was 
checking to see if respondents from the medina were more religious. One young 
woman stated roughly, “you will see, there are women like me from the Ville 
Nouvelle who are good Muslims, you will see,” while many medina residents 
assured me that the survey would fulfill the stereotype that the most religious 
Fassis come from the medina. Informants filling out the survey asked which 
district's residents were ranking themselves most religious: Fassis themselves 
were eager to learn about my initial findings. More than one informant explained 
that she would mark a higher score on the scale so that her district would be 
seen as being more religious. 
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Some informants also rejected this question because they felt it was too 
temporary a measure. One young married woman explained, “today I went to the 
mosque to pray, so I want to mark I am very religious. But yesterday, I fought with 
my mother when I visited her for dinner. I was ashamed that we were so angry. 
Yesterday I want to mark that I am not a good Muslim woman, and not very 
religious. What if you ask me tomorrow? How can you learn that I am religious 
just to ask me today?” Inherent in her query was a notion that, while always 
Muslim and religious, her day to day life was filled with concerns, practices, and 
events which lead to imperfect and ambivalent religiosity. Nearly 30% of survey 
respondents crossed out the question with the scale—not only failing to answer 
it, but rejecting it as a legitimate question on my survey. 
Ultimately, a majority of my survey respondents questioned the validity of 
the scale question, all citing the similar arguments: how could one quantify a 
quality held within the self, or how could one place a singular numerical value on 
an individual's ever-shifting sense of piety? These arguments highlight two key 
aspects of ambiguous subjectivities and imperfect Islamic practice. First, many of 
the young Fassi women I talked with balked at the notion that I could ask 
respondents to place a number, which could be compared to the numbers of 
other Muslims, to correspond to a love of the divine. Second, to imply that such a 
number could reflect one's religiosity in any continual way made little sense to 
Fassis who themselves accepted the fact that they were genuine and real 
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Muslims even when they behaved in improper and imperfect ways. Attempting to 
correlate a degree of religiosity with any other practice was a failure when 
working with a population that had no interest in pre-cut scales and pre-existing 
subjectivities.
But perhaps more importantly, the question offered an opportunity for 
Fassis to express their own identities to me. The young man who said “if you are 
Fassi, you are Muslim” was expressing a notion I commonly found throughout my 
fieldwork: Fassis are presumed to be Moroccan Muslims, and this Muslimhood 
was a core part of their identity. But the scale question, so commonly referenced 
in relation to the district in which the respondent lived, pointed to the importance 
of one's district within the city for shaping one's subjectivity. Although most Fassis 
travel freely between the different 'cities' of Fes, they self-identify with the third 
where they currently live. While neighborhood affiliation is important in certain 
areas of the medina and paralleled in the Ville Nouvelle, many Fassis move daily 
through multiple neighborhoods for work, visiting relatives, and shopping, all 
while the unique nature of individual neighborhoods is diminishing. The result 
was that almost none of my informants self-identified based on the specific 
neighborhood they lived in, but nearly all instead focused on which district—the 
medina, the Ville Nouvelle, or Fes Jdid—they lived in. Through this survey, 
Fassis themselves asked me to reaffirm associations between district, religiosity, 
and sense of self.
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The city of Fes has three geographically distinct districts, so Moroccan 
women are not only geospatially located by city, but also by the part of the city 
they live in. All of Morocco’s imperial cities (and several others) are actually an 
amalgamation of a medina and its accompanying slums and a Ville Nouvelle, a 
French addition from the Protectorate period, with its associated slums. Fes also 
includes a third district, known as Fes Jdid (New Fes), yet another unique aspect 
of the Fassi experience. The medina is the original city: in the case of Fes, 
construction of the medina began in 808 C.E. and the district has been occupied 
continually since. The medina of Fes is a UNESCO World Heritage Site, full of 
mosques, shrines, palatial homes (riads), and shops dating from each dynasty of 
the country's long history. The labyrinthine mess of collapsing homes, tourist 
must-sees, and lively businesses is the world's largest pedestrian zone and 
houses nearly 30% of Fes' population (HCPM 2004). 
Many residents in the medina emphasized the district’s authenticity as 
quintessentially Moroccan and deeply pious. This included specific discourses 
about the superiority of medina women over women from other districts. For 
example, Fassi medina women are considered by many both in Fes and 
elsewhere to be the 'most talented cooks' as well as 'very beautiful.' Food is an 
essential aspect of Moroccan culture, and while this fact hardly makes Morocco 
unique globally, Moroccans are well aware that their cuisine is a major contributor 
to Morocco’s tourist industry and its overall positive image internationally. Fassis 
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emphasize the skill of Fassi women to cook popular favorites, but also their 
ability to draw on regional and rural ingredients and techniques to create rich, 
provocative flavors. The pride Fassis in the medina feel regarding their women’s 
cooking abilities comes most to the fore in the weeks before Ramadan. During 
this time, many shops and restaurants along the edges of the medina close their 
doors and rent their space out to families selling shebekiyya, the sweet cookies 
considered a required food during iftar. Moroccans from all over the country 
travel to the medina specifically to purchase these cookies by the bucket full. I 
interviewed one of the women working with her husband and son at a tiny stall 
near Bab Boujeloud. In the two weeks before Ramadan, the month of 
celebration, and the week of Eid afterwards, her cookies earn the family enough 
money to cover most of their annual expenses. She commented that, 
See, Moroccans come 
to [the medina of] Fes 
for our shebekiyya. 
They come from the 
Ville Nouvelle by taxi. 
They come from Casa, 
from Oujda by train. 
They come from Paris 
by airplane! Even 
Moroccans in France, 
in America, they come 
back to the medina. 
Only our women make 
shebekiyya good 
enough for the iftar. 
Even Moroccan women 
who are not Fassi eat 
our food at their tables.
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Figure 1: Stall Selling Shebekiyya by the Bucket Full in 
the Medina of Fes During Ramadan 2012
Throughout Morocco, the Ville Nouvelles of each major city, marked by 
their wide boulevards, high-rises, traffic lights, billboards, and French styling, 
stand in sharp contrast to the dark, twisting side-streets and piles of donkey 
droppings which characterize the medinas of major cities. Construction of Fes' 
Ville Nouvelle began in 1912 when the French began stationing troops and 
advisers in the city. The Ville Nouvelle of Fes now offers many of the 
cosmopolitan services imported to Morocco: car dealerships, movie theaters, 
supermarkets, McDonald's, and fitness centers. Businesses are primarily 
centered in a few neighborhoods in the east of the Ville Nouvelle, and then 
residential neighborhoods reach west, devolving into shanty towns and slums as 
highways stretch like tentacles into the surrounding farmland. Roughly 68% of 
Fassis live in the Ville Nouvelle (HCPM 2004).
Between these two districts sits Fes Jdid, a small district primarily 
consisting of the Royal Palace and the former Jewish district, known in Morocco 
as the mellah. This district's homes and businesses were constructed during the 
Merinid dynasty (14th century), and most of these buildings are run down and in 
poor repair. Most of Morocco's Jewish population left with the creation of the 
state of Israel, and Fassi Jewish families moved to the Ville Nouvelle in the 
1980s, so the vast majority of the homes and businesses are now occupied by 
lower-class Muslim families. Consisting of two major markets, the district only 
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houses about 2% of Fes' residents (HCPM 2004) and plays little role in 
discussions of the city of Fes. 
Fes, like all Moroccan cities, has a small upper class, a struggling lower 
class, and a precarious but growing middle class. In 2011, Morocco had one of 
the largest middle classes in Africa, at 84.6% of Moroccans living on between $2-
20 a day. However, 57.3% of Moroccans are 'floating middle class,' living on 
between $2-4 a day, meaning that they can easily slip into the lower class 
(Kayizzi-Mugerwa, Lufumpa, and Ncube 2011:22). 13.4% of Morocco's 
population is considered poor, living on less than $2 a day (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 
Lufumpa, and Ncube 2011:20). In Fes, middle class residents live in apartment 
complexes in the Ville Nouvelle and in family homes in the medina, but most of 
the medina's middle class fit into the 'floating middle class' while the middle class 
in the Ville Nouvelle is more financially secure (Newcomb 2009:16-19). According 
to Morocco's 2004 census, roughly 17% of Fassi households are considered 
'vulnerable' and living at under $2 a day, but when examined by district, the class 
distinctions become more apparent: only 15% of Ville Nouvelle households are 
'vulnerable' while 20% of medina households fall into this category (HCPM 2004). 
Many of the medina's poorest residents live in shanty towns outside of the 
ramparts (Newcomb 2009:38-42). There are a few very wealthy families who 
maintain their generations-old riads in the medina, but the vast majority of Fes' 
upper class has moved to the Ville Nouvelle and left the palatial medina estates 
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to be developed into hotels for wealthy foreigners. The medina has become 
overcrowded with poor migrants from the countryside with a population density of 
over 1000 residents a hectare (Guerraoui 1996:161), most in dilapidated 
buildings. 
The medina of Fes has a larger lower class and a larger vulnerable middle 
class than the Ville Nouvelle. The medina is heavily associated with poverty, as 
well as with piety. Both the largest Sufi brotherhoods and the largest Salafi 
families reside in the medina, and all of the city's notable mosques, shrines, and 
madrasas are located in the medina. At the time of my fieldwork in 2011-2012, 
alcohol could not be purchased in the medina, but was sold in bars, restaurants, 
and supermarkets throughout the Ville Nouvelle. Newcomb repeatedly notes that 
the stereotype that medina residents are more swayed by religion in their daily 
affairs is held by residents of all districts, which I also found to be true. While the 
majority of Fassis who view themselves as secular hail from the Ville Nouvelle, 
this is not to say that there are not medina residents who do not adhere to 
normative Islamic practices or beliefs. But I do not have percentages to describe 
the prevalence of Salafis, Sufis, or secularists, and I do not have percentages to 
differentiate those who heavily rely on Islam to shape subjectivity from those who 
do not prioritize Islam when defining their sense of self. In fact, determining these 
percentages was the very purpose of the one-to-ten scale survey question 
described earlier in this chapter that failed so miserably to produce quantifiable 
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results! However, Fassis behave as though the medina is a more pious space, 
and its residents are assumed to be more religious than those living in the Ville 
Nouvelle. 
Thus, while it is safe to say that the most rigorous forms of Islam practiced 
in Fes—from Salafi scriptural literalism to life-long adherence to a Sufi 
brotherhood—both exist primarily in the medina, all three districts are heavily 
populated by moderate Moroccan Muslims who broadly follow normative Islam, 
like a little Sufi flavor to their ritualized practice, and are very much interested in 
drawing information from multiple sources of Islamic knowledge to mainstream 
their own ethical subjectivity. In terms of defining my informant population, none 
of my informants identified as secular and less than 10% identified as any form of 
conservative. Thus, the vast majority of my informants identified as religious but 
were imperfect practitioners of Moroccan Islam: trying to balance their Islamic 
subjectivity with other concerns and identities. 
For Fassi women, identifying with one district was often done at the 
expense of the others. Prejudice against those living in the medina was rampant 
among the residents of the Ville Nouvelle, and I often found young Ville Nouvelle 
residents to be the most critical and dismissive of the medina. There is 
undeniable animosity between residents of the two districts, most surrounding 
notions of cleanliness and wealth. But, interestingly, the third district of the city, 
Fes Jdid, is also filled with lower-class residents and experiences the same 
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challenges with cleanliness that the medina does, but is almost never discussed 
by Fassis. As a sort of liminal space, residents of the medina and the Ville 
Nouvelle largely view Fes Jdid as a district to be driven around or quickly passed 
through; only the two main markets in fine jewelry and jellabas brought Fassis 
from other districts. Even residents of Fes Jdid spoke poorly of the quality of 
living in the district. While Fassis from the medina and Ville Nouvelle greatly 
disagreed on the character of each others' districts, everyone could agree that it 
was better than living in Fes Jdid. 
Rachel Newcomb’s work in the Ville Nouvelle of Fes—the most in-depth 
and reflective work conducted in a Moroccan Ville Nouvelle—speaks to the 
growing gulf between residents of the medina and the Ville Nouvelle. Newcomb's 
work also possesses both the animosity her informants express toward the 
medina's residents, and Newcomb's personal, scholarly critique of Fassi studies. 
Newcomb laments Orientalist scholars who focus on the medina of Fes, and she 
expresses frustration, shared by Janet Abu-Lughod, that the medina of Fes has 
been elevated as an idealized “Islamic City” (Abu-Lughod 1987:157; Newcomb 
2009:14). Newcomb, like many of her informants and many of my own informants 
from the Ville Nouvelle, bluntly objects to the notion that the Fassi medina is 
more authentically Moroccan than the Ville Nouvelle, arguing that “privileging the 
old medina as somehow characteristic of a timeless, essentialized Fes, and 
disparaging the Ville Nouvelle as that which has been corrupted, is false” 
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(2009:16). While I appreciate her point, and agree that, before her own 
ethnography, the field of Moroccan studies focused overwhelmingly on medina 
experiences with few notable exceptions (Ossman 1994), I have not found 
medina-oriented studies to disparage the Ville Nouvelle as culturally corrupted, 
simply as less historically relevant to the Moroccan national narrative. 
As Newcomb notes, Fassis from both districts see the medina as heavily 
connected to the past, a finding I confirm. She writes that, “among the Fassis I 
know, the medina serves as an object of nostalgia, as a symbol of the former 
apogee of Moroccan civilization, and as a place over which they feel proprietary 
even if they no longer own property in its districts” (2009:17). It is this sense of 
nostalgic ownership—by all Fassis—of the medina that makes the nationalistic, 
religious history of the medina a source of subjectivity for all residents. This 
feeling is compounded by the fact that the medina of Fes is a UNESCO World 
Heritage Site and a tourist hotspot. This increases the sense of historical gravitas 
in the medina, but coincides with continued tensions between lower-class medina 
residents struggling to maintain their dilapidated homes and those championing 
renovation projects for tourists (Guerraoui 1996:158).
As Newcomb concisely described, Ville Nouvelle residents “asserted that 
the medina was dirty, overcrowded, overrun by people from the countryside, and 
the opposite of what a modern city ought to be. …By contrast, these Fassis were 
very proud of the Ville Nouvelle, and of its tall high-rises, wide boulevards, 
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gleaming cafes, and modern administrative buildings” (Newcomb 2009:17). My 
interviews confirm Newcomb’s analysis; in fact, the word most commonly used by 
young Ville Nouvelle women to describe the medina was 'dangerous' (Hteera). I 
was asked by almost every one of my Ville Nouvelle residing informants why I 
chose to live in the medina and if I felt safe enough. One of my female informants 
from the medina who attended university in the Ville Nouvelle complained of 
harassment from classmates from the Ville Nouvelle who accused her of being 
unwashed and criminal simply because she came from the medina. 
Surprisingly enough, women from the medina had the exact same criticism 
of the Ville Nouvelle. They argued that the medina was superior because 'people 
take care of each other' and that the lack of social ties in the Ville Nouvelle 
rendered that side of the city dangerous, especially for women. Medina residents 
pointed out that there were also slums and shantytowns on the edges of many 
Ville Nouvelle neighborhoods, which are also not safe for women to walk in at 
night. Medina residents also commented that Ville Nouvelle residents were not 
as pious as they were, pointing out that discoteks and bars are in the Ville 
Nouvelle.
Fassi women identify by district in which they live, each of which has a 
broad range of socio-economic classes and degrees of religiosity. This means 
many peer groups maintain a variety of opinions and beliefs, leading to heated 
debates that will be described in upcoming chapters. These discussions, like the 
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opening vignette of the Salafist agitator, are situated within a nation-wide series 
of ethical debates that are characterized as fitna.
A Productive Chaos: Fitna in Morocco
In closing her ethnography on women in the Ville Nouvelle of Fes, 
Newcomb noted that she struggled to stay abreast of her fieldsite after leaving 
because of many significant events occurring in the nation, including the 
Casablanca terrorist attacks of 2003 and the mudawanna reform of 2004. She 
described her informants' excitement relating to this period of broadened 
discourse and the fitna around them (2009:186-187). This fitna, she argued, is 
“frequently linked to how different groups perceive the position of women. The 
notion of “woman” is a prime site in the contradictory process of defining 
Moroccan modernity and community” (2009:192). The connections she 
illuminated between gender, social change, fitna, and subjectivity formation 
would remain throughout the years between our studies and well into 2011 and 
2012 when I conducted my own fieldwork.
In 2006, the French-language magazine TelQuel declared Morocco a 
“Schizophrenic Nation” (blad schizo). The article debated the boundaries 
between morality, religion, normalized practice, and modernity, ultimately 
proclaiming that “the Moroccan is still searching for his identity, but he is lost en 
route” (Allali and Hamdani 2006). As mentioned above, the same magazine 
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published the results of a survey conducted by prominent Moroccan academics 
in 2007 with a cover story asking “What Muslims are We?” (Iraqi 2007). Each 
discussion mentions the existence of a public debate about religious and ethical 
norms. Moroccans are aware of the fitna occurring in their public sphere; they 
likely recognize that fitna can also be a “productive space,” one which “provides a 
means of expression through which Fassis can critique social practices” 
(Newcomb 2009:191). 
When I began my fieldwork in 
2011, many Fassis were already 
talking about the notion of fitna in 
Moroccan society. Some of this, of 
course, was the coincidence of 
politics: my research began just 
days before Ben Ali fled Tunisia 
and numerous North African 
countries were just beginning what 
would come to be known as the 
Arab Spring. Societal upheaval, 
political instability, and social 
chaos was on every television and every newspaper's front page as Egyptians 
took to Tahrir Square. 
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Figure 2: TelQuel Cover Story "Schizophrenic 
Nation" from 2006
But as the weeks of protest continued across the Arab world, I found my 
Fassi informants to be more focused on social and economic questions than 
issues of political representation or democracy. They felt their fitna (social 
disorder) was often related to gender issues, just as Newcomb predicted. Many 
focused their complaints on the debates surrounding women's bodies, beliefs, 
and subjectivities, either by engaging in debate and discussion or lamenting the 
fact that such tumultuous debates regarding morality were occurring at a time 
when many Fassis felt economic issues should be at the forefront of popular 
debate.
During my 2011 and 2012 fieldwork, a number of complex political and 
social issues were being openly debated and discussed in ways they had not 
during my previous field experiences in 2003 or 2004. Many of these issues 
related to women’s bodies, reinforcing the association between social disruption 
and debate on the one hand, and women’s bodies and sexuality on the other. In 
2005, the nation faced international scandal when it was discovered that a 
prominent Belgian reporter had engaged in paid, sadomasochistic sex with 
dozens of Moroccan women and uploaded the footage online; the footage had 
been converted to DVD pornography sold on the Moroccan black market, ruining 
the lives of the revealed Moroccan women (Bradley 2010:217-230). In 2012, the 
suicide of 16-year-old Amina Filali, who was forced to marry her physically 
abusive rapist, brought international attention and shame to Morocco, while 
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opening up a society-wide discussion about women’s ownership of their bodies, 
the validity of this 'marry your rapist' law,22 and concerns over pre-marital sex. 
Filali's suicide led many to question whether she had the right to her sexuality, 
and whether or not her choice to eat rat poison constituted a re-exertion of 
control over her own body. Both abortion and single-motherhood are 
controversial topics receiving wide public attention. Homosexuality, including 
lesbianism, is openly discussed in the press with an increasing degree of 
acceptance. The appropriateness of bikinis on Moroccan beaches is regularly 
debated in print and on the national television channels. As seen in the opening 
vignette, YouTube and the Moroccan blogosphere exploded when editor Mokhtar 
Laghzioui stated on international television that the law banning extra-marital 
affairs should be revoked and that he would accept his wife or daughter having 
affairs since they were in control of their own bodies. Additionally, Moroccans 
have joined an emerging debate in the Muslim world regarding sexual 
harassment in the streets, with Fes and Marrakesh often singled out as 
particularly problematic locations for young women.
In each of these cases, women's bodies and behaviors become a focus of 
societal discourse. Many of the debates about sexuality, abortion, premarital or 
extra-marital sex, or sexual harassment have centered on whether universal 
human rights—a relatively new concept in Morocco that is gaining a great deal of 
popularity—include the right to one's own body. As Zakia Salime notes, even 
22 Moroccan Penal Code Article 475. This article was finally amended in January of 2014.
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women's struggle for gender equality is contested, as many Moroccan women 
debate whether their participation in demonstrations and electoral politics 
constitutes a new feminism or a modern exertion of feminine subjectivities 
(Salime 2011:19-23).There are, of course, political and economic examples of 
fitna occurring in Morocco, just as Newcomb noted, but focusing solely on fitna 
related to young women's behavior and Islamic ethics elucidates the open field in 
which young women can experiment with the edges of accepted behavior. These 
debates also demonstrate the vectors along which change is rapidly occurring 
from generation to generation in Fes: sexuality, dress, harassment, and 
gendered interactions. 
Concluding Thoughts
My informant community, consisting primarily of young women hailing from 
the medina of Fes, crossed socio-economic classes and degrees of religiosity but 
hailed primarily from the 'floating middle class' and practiced moderate Moroccan 
Islam. But as this chapter has demonstrated, my informant community also 
draws on other traditions of knowledge to bundle together many complex and 
ambivalent subjectivities. As Katherine Ewing argues, “the individual is a complex 
site of conflicting desires and multiple subjective modalities... who experience of 
wholeness is illusory and contextually specific. This contextual subject is not 
constituted solely out of the gaze of the Other... but out of multiple others that 
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form through different types of relations or subjective modalities” (1997:35). 
These conflicting desires will, as we will see, sometimes lead young women to 
push the boundaries of accepted religious and social practice. Accusations of 
hypocrisy will ensue as Fassis seek to forbid the wrong and command the good. 
Many of the vignettes in this chapter—from Noora's outrage at Nhari's 
fatwa to Amina's anger at her Saudi hypocrites—show young women expressing 
frustration at the uncertainty and tension caused by fitna in Moroccan society. 
The Moroccan Islam that has shaped so many Fassis' subjectivities now 
competes with new discourses over universal human rights and new 
technologies which shape youth experiences. Still, Fes continues to play a 
prominent role in the religious imagination of Moroccans, particularly its religious 
monuments such as the shrine to Moulay Idriss II, where the next chapter begins. 
Fassis recognize the fitna their nation is facing. But fitna, if viewed as a 
'productive' opportunity, may open a social space where new youth subjectivities 
can form and peer pressure can help shape future understandings of accepted 
ethical behaviors. As such, “conflicting ideologies set forth particular guides for a 
singular Moroccan, female identity, but the country's diversity is evidence that 
there is not solely one ideology which holds sway” (Newcomb 2009:192). Thus, 
while my informants all strove to be 'good Muslim women,' which of Moroccans' 
many identities each woman prioritized in her conception of a good Muslim 
woman was a uniquely personal ethical experience based on a woman's specific 
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needs and concerns. 
The following chapters of this dissertation look at new ways young women 
in the medina of Fes play with the boundaries of new Islamic practices and 
ethical subjectivities, whether through Sufi ritual, dating, fashion, or Ramadan 
practices. The willingness to negotiate these boundaries is a result of the fact 
that “the imaginary boundary of “public” and “private” is constantly disputed, 
produced anew in each situation, and often provocatively linked to fitna” 
(Newcomb 2009:192). Whether reorienting cafes to create new public dating 
spaces, or debating national laws requiring public fasting during Ramadan, 
young women are actively negotiating the ethical limits of Muslimhood during a 
time of great change, opportunity, and fitna.
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Acceptable Imperfection: 
Women's Shame, Sufism, and the Intention Exemption
The nafs [passionate soul] has a 
rosary and a Koran in its right hand, 
and a scimitar and a dagger in the 
sleeve 
--- Jalal ad-Din Muhammad Rumi
In the days after Mawlid (the 
birthday of the Prophet Muhammad), 
turuq (Sufi brotherhoods) from around 
the country travel to Fes to visit the holy 
shrine of Moulay Idriss II, engage in 
dhikr, and spend time with other 
believers. One afternoon, I wandered 
down to the shrine and sat with some 
young ladies who had invited me down 
to hear songs from the turuq and pray 
with them. I arrived at the shrine around 
2pm and found it full of women and children, with a few men on the fringes of the 
crowds. Within the first room, the rich green cloth with delicate, golden 
embroidered Qur'anic passages lay draped over the tomb of Moulay Idriss II, and 
several women were engaged in prayer, Qur'anic reading, and personal devotion. 
Many entered with the small, colorful candles sold at the entrance to leave as 
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Figure 3: Entrance to the Shrine Moulay 
Idriss II, with a View of the Tomb 
offerings. In the next room, the cold marble floor was covered with blankets and 
packed with chatting women. People passed glasses of hot tea, made from water 
of the central fountain believed to possess the baraka of Idriss II, while others 
shared cookies and fruit. Children skipped freely through the few make-shift 
aisles between crowds as we all socialized, with topics ranging from religious 
debate to speculation about Egypt's political unrest to cooking and make-up tips. 
Near the entrance to the room sat a circle of Sufi brothers, members of a 
tariqa devoted to Moulay Abdessalam, a Moroccan Sufi saint from the twelfth 
century particularly known for the ability to heal women of mental distress. Some 
brothers wore Western style shirts and khakis; others lounged in loose-fitting 
jellabas. The leader of the group (wali), a middle-aged man with skin the color of 
charcoal23 and a voice smooth as caramel, wore a white jellaba with a bright 
orange scarf wrapped as a headdress. His smile was contagious, his booming 
voice hypnotic, and his easy charisma enchanting. The other men around him 
were of varying ages, most in mid-to-late twenties, who chatted with others 
intermingled with the tariqa. Some prepared tea over a large propane tank while 
others passed around food or water. Once the crowd began to grow restless, the 
Sufi brothers sat in a circle, with the wali's back to the wall, and began chants 
and songs. The mood was upbeat, energetic, and casual, filled with laughter, 
joking, and dancing.
23 As Cornell points out (1998:75), dark-skinned Sufi saints, particularly from sub-Saharan Africa, 
were often associated with the healing of women.
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I did not even notice the young woman enter the shrine amidst the crowds 
of dancing and clapping women around the room. It was only when the girl 
wandered to the fountain, dropped to the floor, and songs were replaced by 
gasps that I realized that something was wrong. Several women rushed to the 
young woman's side, lifting her head and attempting to revive her. Packed in a 
crowd, I could do little but join in the whispers and concerned neck-straining to 
determine what had happened. The young woman was revived but her body was 
limp and she showed signs of distress. She wailed, sobbed, and flung her body 
formlessly like a rag-doll, displaying all the characteristics of hemm, a Moroccan 
condition characterized by extreme sorrow 
and irreconcilable sadness. 
The wali stopped singing, walked 
confidently over to the young woman and 
wrapped his arm around her waist. The 
woman did not struggle, but clung like a child 
to the figure towering beside her. He walked 
her to the fountain, grabbed the plastic cup 
there for devotees to drink, and poured the 
baraka-laced water over the young woman's 
head and face. He pulled her over to the circle and sat her across from him. Two 
elderly women sat just behind her, stroking her wet hair back out of her face and 
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Figure 4: View into the Main Room 
Shrine Moulay Idris II while Empty
rubbing her arms, legs, and back. The Sufi brothers returned to the circle, and we 
spectators around them, as the wali's voice began to boom. 
The wali sang a variety of songs, interspersed with chants and brief 
monologues. The brothers joined in, swaying and rocking with the rhythms. 
Behind them, I joined the crowd of over a hundred women and children, clapping, 
dancing, and singing along with the brothers. While the songs were simple call-
and-response, many of the monologues by the wali reflected on the power of 
hemm and our dependence on Allah for joy and happiness. 
Within minutes the mood of the crowd changed. While before the group 
was disconnected as women chatted in piles about personal topics, now we were 
focused together on the wali, the brothers, and the young woman's nervous 
breakdown. Our clapping fell in time and our voices rose and fell with the 
proclamations of the wali. As we danced together, a tiny old woman wedged her 
way between two brothers and hobbled slowly to the middle of the seated circle 
before handing her walking stick to one of the older brothers. Ancient and 
withered, the woman seemed barely able to hold herself upright, yet she 
immediately commanded the attention of the hoards of eager supplicants around 
her. She began to sway front and back to the rhythm of our chants.
ALLAHU AKBAR! ALLAHU AKBAR!
The old woman turned to face the distressed woman. The old woman's 
swaying became bending and she folded herself in half and unfolded again, 
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imitating the first motions of prayer. The brothers chanted louder, and the 
audience followed suit.
ALLAHU AKBAR! ALLAHU AKBAR!
The old woman suddenly dropped to her knees, placed her hands on the 
ground, and slammed her forehead against the floor in the sujud position. She 
sat back on her heels, looked to the sky and croaked “Allahu Akbar!” Again, she 
slammed her head down, repeating the up and down motion while the brothers 
clapped. The wali, recognizing the reorientation in the group's focus, timed his 
exclamations to match the old woman's and began to speed up the clapping. The 
old woman alternated sitting and prostrating, faster and faster, and we all began 
to wail with her. Her body, which had just minutes before struggled to carry her to 
the center of the circle, was filled with both ecstasy and energy as she bent and 
re-bent faster even than I could have at some forty years her junior.
ALLAHU AKBAR! ALLAHU AKBAR!
As suddenly as she began, the old woman stopped. She sat back on her 
feet, hands raised upwards, and I realized that her face was streaked with tears. 
So too were many of those around me, and I touched my face to suddenly learn 
that I too had been swept away in the moment. On the forehead of the old 
woman, a dark red patch covered with dust had already begun to swell to 
bruising. The wali stood, came up behind the old woman, and helped her up. Her 
frail body could barely stand, and other brothers rose to gently help her to sit next 
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to the distressed girl. The wali knelt before the old woman and kissed the bottom 
hem of her jellaba24 as she placed her hand on his head. He rose, raised his 
arms, and yelled loudly.
“We will force the sadness away!” (Ghaddi n-jbaroo al-hemm baeedan)
The brothers began to chant and clap. The wali turned to the young 
woman, reached up and ripped his scarf off his head, and threw it forcefully into 
the young woman's face. The women around me cheered and laughed. The 
brothers began to throw their dhikr beads into the air; some threw them at the 
girl. The wali motioned to a brother sitting near the heavy tea kettle boiling on a 
propane canister, and the brother stood and handed the kettle to the wali by its 
thick handle. The holy man raised the steaming kettle high above our heads, 
and, standing in the middle of the circle, began to pour. Simulating the aerating of 
mint tea, he held the kettle high above his target and let the water stream 
steaming, mixing air through the scalding water. He bent beneath to catch the 
water in his open mouth. I gasped.
Mouth full of the scalding water, he leaned forward towards the distressed 
girl and spit a steaming mist out at her face. I suddenly realized that her 
demeanor had changed significantly: her color had returned, her eyes seemed 
aware and alert, her mouth even crept into a smile as the hot spit settled on her 
24 In Morocco's tradition of honor and shame, to kiss the lowest hem of an elder's jellaba is one 
of the most extreme forms of reverence performed publicly. This honorific is also used by 
members of the 'ulema during the bay'a ceremony when subjects pledge their obedience to 
the Moroccan king. For a man to kiss the hem of an unrelated woman is a sign of great 
respect. 
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face. After spitting the water into her face, he bent again, and poured a second 
deluge into his mouth. Turning to the crowd, he again spit the scalding water out, 
this time over the extended hands of reaching participants. Like a Maori warrior, 
he opened his mouth wide, stuck out his tongue, and roared. His tongue was 
pink and untouched; though the scalding water droplets stung my skin when his 
spit hit my arms, the wali's faith had allowed him to perform the 'ablution' without 
pain or distress. The crowd erupted in cheers and praises.
The wali stood, arms raised, smiling and bowing to the cheers of the 
crowd. The young woman, who could no longer be described as 'distressed,' 
rose and ran forward to hug the wali. Color had returned to her face, and her 
smile was ear to ear. She walked around, shaking the hands of each brother as 
well as hands of the crowd reaching in towards her. Her posture was one of 
confidence and her footing was sure. The wali returned to his seated position, 
picking his scarf off the floor and re-wrapping his head covering. The brothers 
began cheerful chants and songs again, and the crowd returned to their clumps 
and cliques sprawled around the shrine, brewing fresh tea and starting new 
conversations. 
Before the long afternoon came to its end, I was able ask the women 
around me about the event we had witnessed. The young woman, I learned, was 
not possessed by spirits (djinn), nor was witchcraft involved. Rather, it was her 
sorrow (hemm) which had overwhelmed her. The best solution to hemm was love 
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and attention, I was repeatedly reminded, and what greater love could be found 
than the baraka from the shrine? 
In the shrine of Moulay Idriss II, the green-roofed heart of the medina of 
Fes, I spent numerous days amidst the piles of women, praying, laughing, and 
learning. Women of all ages congregate there, to absorb the baraka of the shrine 
and to bond with the women around them. Visitors from around the city enter the 
shrine, candles in one hand and cameras in the other, to engage in brief 
moments of cultural reassurance with fellow Fassis. Nothing other than the tomb 
itself felt permanent: just as the candles melt down and are replaced, just as the 
fountain flowed endlessly even in the hottest days of drought, the shrine was a 
location through which nearly all of my female informants passed during various 
points in their lives and each visit I made surprised me with new faces and new 
perspectives. There were often men—few and fleeting, they dotted the fringes of 
the major rooms of the shrine—but even though the turuq which would engage in 
pilgrimages to the shrine at various times consisted mostly of men, the shrine 
was a woman's place. 
The young and distressed woman who sought healing at the shrine 
suffered from hemm—a form of culture-bound illness that manifests as an 
uncontrollable sadness. Her solution to this emotional imbalance was not bio-
medical or psychiatric, but spiritual and social. Her piety—even if, by orthodox 
critique her actions could be described as bida (innovation) and not piety—was 
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expressed through pragmatic Sufi practice, from her submission to the group to 
her explicit choice to bring her suffering to the shrine on the very day that 
disciples of the appropriate saint were visiting. The women's participation in the 
healing ritual was spontaneous but expected, untamed but instrumental. And 
although the young woman engaged in some behaviors (such as hugging a male 
stranger so openly in public or wailing and flailing in a crowded place) that might 
typically be viewed as shameful (hshuma), by locating her experience within 
Sufism and the shared emotion of the surrounding women, she was granted a 
kind of 'intention exemption:' her behavior was deemed acceptable because her 
intentions were genuine and pious.
As young women construct their understandings of Islam in Fes, the 
Moroccan Islam which permeates their everyday experience is, itself, inherently 
gendered. The Sufi flavor of Moroccan Islam is, especially in the urban center of 
Fes, one which is perpetuated by women for the community as a whole. I argue 
that women's association with Sufism in Fes is a reflection of the larger 
association of women with passion (nafs) rather than reason ('aql), and 
demonstrates the importance Fassis place on intent rather than orthopraxy.  This 
chapter explains the cultural framework of hshuma (propriety) which allows us to 
understand how the young woman in the above vignette was able to find a 
socially acceptable way of dealing with her sorrow. Grasping hshuma also allows 
us to understand the social context within which young Fassi women approach 
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religious experimentation and outward critique.
Extremes of the Woman's Soul: Sufism and Sorrow
Sufism, the mystical approach to Islam, is an umbrella term that covers a 
wide variety of practices that vary across time and space. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, historical emphasis on maraboutism and the pursuit of baraka 
has created a Moroccan Islam in which Sufism and legal-scripturalist belief 
cannot be easily disentangled (Eickelman 1979). In addition, there is a body of 
literature which has specifically focused on women's Sufi practices in Morocco 
(Dwyer 1978; Maher 1975) and beyond (Betteridge 2002; Fernea and Fernea 
1972; Hoffman 2009). In some cases, scholars have begun to move beyond the 
actual gendered practices of Sufism and explore the nature of gendered Sufism 
within larger socio-economic and political frameworks. For example, Victoria 
Bernal's work on women's Islamic practice in Sudan demonstrates the 
challenges women face in integrating into globalized economies because of their 
association with Sufism, folk practice, and ignorance, arguing that “women have 
come to stand for the fading cultural order, while progress and modernity are 
male” (1994:52). Betteridge's work on women's pilgrimage in Iran also illuminates 
the way the state and religious groups have to accommodate women's 
association with Shi'ite saint veneration, “a ritual practice simultaneously suspect 
and beloved, not totally orthodox but one to which many Iranians have a deep-
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rooted emotional attachment” (2002: 277). As we will see, in Fes, that 
sentimental association between women, saint veneration, and beloved 
unorthodoxy is a powerful force in shaping how women understand their practice 
of Islam.
In Fes, women's Sufi practice assumes a variety of forms. In most cases, 
women utilize the physical locations of Sufism—tombs doting the surrounding 
hillside or the major shrines of the medina, especially the shrine of Moulay Idriss 
II—to engage in Sufi practices, rather than in the home or mosque. Women 
would congregate to pray, sing, dance, wail and mourn, gossip, make offerings, 
and, as many informants stated was their favorite activity, to enjoy the company 
of other women, in the presence of the saint. Sufi practice for women is heavily 
physical, as gifts are often brought to the shrine or purchased there. Many of the 
key elements associated with women's practice—baraka-laced tea, smoky 
candles, flowers, food, oils, 
incense—are tactile and are 
consumed or drawn into the 
body in some manner. 
It is common place 
to see women bring items to 
the tomb of the Sufi saint so 
that these items can absorb 
111
Figure 5: Candles, Incense, Rose Oil, Henna, Dhikr 
Beads, Trinkets, and More Available for Purchase 
Outside of the Shrine of Moulay Idriss II
the baraka of the saint, and the items chosen often reinforce the gender roles 
performed by these women (Dwyer 1978:591-592; Maher 1975:98). For 
example, women struggling with infertility will bring lingerie to empower it with the 
ability to excite their husbands. Pregnant women bring baby clothes to prepare 
them for the coming child. It was not unusual to see pregnant women at the 
shrine of Moulay Idriss II on any given day, filling reusable plastic bottles with 
water from the fountain, which they would drink at home while pregnant to protect 
and strengthen the child growing inside them. Mothers would bring the school 
books of their sons and daughters to improve their children's performance on 
exams. Women brought wedding dresses, jewelry, and make-up to absorb 
baraka. In each case, the items were left at the side of the tomb or shrine, the 
woman would pray nearby, perhaps read some Qur'anic passages or recite some 
dhikr, and then the item would be picked up and taken home, now blessed by the 
saint. In many cases, I met women from outside of Fes who had made a 
pilgrimage to the shrine of Moulay Idriss specifically to gain the strongest baraka 
possible,  particularly when bringing items of great personal importance, such as 
the clothing of a sick child or a wedding dress, to gain the blessings of the saint. 
Women in Fes also face a number of challenges that are unique to women 
and require specialized intervention, such as experiencing hemm. Hemm is an 
uncontrollable sadness solved only with hanan—unconditional, unlimited love 
and tenderness. Men cannot develop hemm. Fatima Mernissi provides one of the 
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most vivid descriptions of hemm within her own Fassi family:
Hemm was a strange suffering, quite different from a 
mushkil, or problem. The woman who had a mushkil knew 
the reason for her pain. If she suffered from hemm, 
however, she did not know what was wrong with her. … 
The woman who had hemm could do nothing, except sit 
there silently, with her eyes wide open and her chin 
tucked into the palm of her hand, as if her neck could no 
longer hold up her head. (1994:147)
The term hemm is common in Arab culture, signifying a concern or something 
that is worrisome, but in Fes, the term is also used to refer to this specific, 
culture-bound illness that only women seem to experience. There are some 
similarities to other female-oriented afflictions, such as Janice Boddy's zar cult in 
Egypt (1989), in that hemm might best be viewed as a social illness which 
women experience publicly in order to gain attention and other social benefits. 
But unlike zar and other afflictions of its ilk, hemm is not connected to any idea of 
spirit possession. Hemm is an illness of the soul (nafs), not an illness of the mind 
or body. It is the sadness itself which seizes women, and in that sense more 
closely resembles other culture-bound illnesses such as the Latin American 
ataques de nervios (Guarnaccia et. al. 1996) or Caribbean “falling-out” (Weidman 
1979). In the case of hemm in Fes, Sufism provides the mystical and social 
'cures' necessary to drive away hemm long enough to allow the woman to 
communicate her sadness and resolve the issues causing the illness. If hemm is 
an illness of the soul, Sufism is one of the tools Fassi women have at their 
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disposal to deal with that illness.
Just as the idea of the soul is symbolically associated with both women 
and the devil, the devil becomes a link between women and Sufism through one 
of the most omnipresent physical markers of saint veneration: dhikr beads. In 
Fes, women are sometimes referred to as hbel shaytan—the devil's rope. 
Vinogradov notes that it is “no accident” that women are referred to in this way 
because of the association with women 'binding' or 'tying men up' as a 
colloquialism for impotence and sexual problems (1974:196). At the same time, 
the term hbel is also used in Morocco to refer to the strings of beads used during 
the recitation of dhikr; thus, women are the Sufi beads at the hand of the devil 
(Rosen 1984:32). While I never had a female informant use the term hbel  
shaytan to refer to women, male informants regularly made the association in 
interviews, especially when also discussing 
Sufism.
Even those who worked in conjunction 
with the shrine of Moulay Idris II reinforced the 
connections between women and the physical 
and emotional nature of Sufi saint veneration in 
Fes. In the main alleys leading to the entrance 
to the shrine, small shops sell blessed materials 
and souvenirs to worshippers and tourists alike. 
114
Figure 6: Shop Selling Women's 
Goods Just Outside of the Shrine 
of Moulay Idriss II
These shops, packed to the gills with hbel of all colors, incense, candles, henna, 
prayer-rugs, and various kitsch, are most famous in Fes and across the country 
for being one of two legitimate sources25 of helawi Moulay Idriss, a neon-hued 
sweet toffee believed to possess the baraka of Moulay Idriss. Sitting one slow 
afternoon, I chatted with Rachid, owner of one of these claustrophobic little 
shops, trading jokes and stories over sticky chunks of pink chew he hacked off a 
giant block with a make-shift knife. I asked why women visited the shrine more 
often than their male counterparts, and Rachid laughed.
Look at the things which I sell—they are 
women's things. Things for beauty, things 
for the saints. Things like candy, things 
for children. Because women, their minds 
are like the minds of children... they have 
less knowledge, and less 'aql. But their 
hearts are like the hearts of children: 
clean, without politics or the school. You 
see, women do not have schooling, they 
do not know better. They only know that 
they love Allah, and that the saints also 
loved Him. This is beautiful, no? The 
Islam of women is not pure, it is not 
correct, because women know less. But 
their Islam is from their hearts, and Allah 
sees that, and He rewards them for their 
heart. So I sell them candy to eat in the 
shrine, because it brings their hearts 
closer to Allah, and that is the goodness 
of women.
25 The only other legitimate source is from the small village of Moulay Idriss Zerhoun in the 
mountains outside of Meknes, where Moulay Idriss I (father of the patron saint of Fes and 
himself considered the patron saint of all Morocco) is buried and venerated. In my experience 
in other Moroccan cities, when helawi Moulay Idriss is sold, the vendor must verify that the 
candy is either from Moulay Idriss Zerhoun or from the streets surrounding the shrine in the 
medina of Fes.
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Figure 7: Shop Selling helawi 
Moulay Idriss near the Shrine 
Moulay Idriss II
This perspective on women was not unique to the vendors outside of the 
shrine of Moulay Idriss. Numerous men and women who worked in the 
restaurants, shops, and other businesses around the shrine reiterated Rachid's 
argument: the reason so many of the materials sold in the area adjacent to the 
shrine related to women is because women had an inherent tie to Sufism which 
was continually maintained by women's simultaneous lack of education and 
bounty of pious love. As long as a woman's intention was loving and faithful, her 
intellectual deficiencies were forgiven and she was allowed an 'intention 
exemption.'
As Dwyer noted (1978:586), participation in Sufi practices in Morocco 
cannot be measured by adherence to formal turuq. Few women in Fes belong to 
any formal tariqa: the only informants I found who affiliated with tariqa all 
associated themselves with the largest Fassi tariqa, the Bouchichiyya, and in all 
three cases, they joined the organization with a brother and were members of 
prominent families within the tariqa. I never met a woman in Fes whose only 
experiences of Islamic worship or religious participation occurred in Sufi shrines 
at the expense of the mosque. Instead, the opposite was usually the case: Sufi 
practice, especially the veneration of a saint or praying with a tariqa, was a low-
level but regular secondary practice to mosque worship or worship with the family 
within the home. Yet the ubiquity of some form of Sufi practice in the lives of my 
female informants was remarkable, and even when women did not acknowledge 
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the presence of Sufism in their lives, they still admitted to participating in the 
veneration of saints and the pursuit of baraka.
But it is also worth noting that not only are women affected by the practice 
of Sufism, but that the informal practice of Sufism in Morocco is heavily shaped 
by the influence of women. Beyond the obvious point that a number of notable 
Moroccan Sufi saints are women (Cornell 1998), women are also central to the 
practice of Sufism because “women hold a functionally primary place in the 
mystical complex in general. They do this by holding a preeminent position in the 
determination of the affiliations of future adherents, male and female, within Sufi 
Islam” (Dwyer 1978:587). Women teach their daughters and sons how to 
venerate saints, and when it is most appropriate to seek out baraka from 
particular saints. Nearly every woman I interviewed in Fes attributed the origins 
of her veneration of Moulay Idriss II to childhood practices with their mother or 
grandmother. A significant number of my survey participants, when answering the 
question “what do you do when you visit the shrine of Moulay Idriss II?” 
responded that they visited with a female relative. This response was particularly 
common for young men, demonstrating the association between women and 
Islam, as well as women's ability to shape the Sufi beliefs of men. The 
connections between women and learning Sufism are not limited to Fes or 
Morocco; Annabelle Bottcher discusses the way women taught Sufism to other 
women in Syria, noting in particular that one time primed for the sharing of Sufi 
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knowledge is during Mawlid (2002:292-295), the holiday in which the opening 
vignette took place.
The ties between women and Sufism bound not only women to their 
practices, but the community as a whole to the legacy of maraboutism in 
Moroccan Islam. The association between women and the soul (nafs) serves 
both to reinforce the gendered nature of variable and informal Sufi practice and 
to explain the flexibility in young women's Islamic practice in Fes—women are 
struggling with religious belief and proper practice because it is more socially 
acceptable for women to struggle with passion. Yet, women are also given a sort 
of exemption, a social space in which imperfect practice can be deemed 
acceptable and gently corrected. Within this 'intention exemption,' women are 
allowed to engage in Sufi or even experimental practices as long as they are 
willing to take informative criticism and have proper intention. If Moroccan Islam 
is imagined to be 'Islam of the Heart,' it is from women's hearts that religious 
subjectivities are tested, selected, and presented to the community at large for 
judgment within the hshuma system.
Islam of the Heart: Women's 'Intention Exemption'
While all Muslims believe in certain key principles, obvious variation in 
religious practice worldwide precludes any idea of a singular 'correct' or 'proper' 
Islam. As discussed in the previous chapter, young Fassi women draw most 
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heavily, though not singularly, from shared understandings of being a Moroccan 
Muslim woman in the construction of their identities. Through saint veneration 
and other Sufi practices, Fassi women reaffirm societal associations between the 
soul (nafs) and intention. Fassi women are perceived as less educated and more 
ignorant than their male counterparts, as well as more easily swayed by their 
passions, but discussion of these issues never included a discussion of willful 
ignorance. Fassi women are assumed to intend to follow the rules of Islam, but to 
not know better. They live within a system of hshuma that allows them to both 
'mean well' and openly accept criticism in a public forum.
In many cases, when discussing whether or not women's Sufi practice was 
innovation (bida) in the medina of Fes, there was an emphasis on happiness and 
joy. Women, with their larger proportion of nafs, are viewed as more 'emotional,' 
and their happiness was regularly discussed by informants specifically in relation 
to their pious practice. In many cases, if the intention is to be pious, and the act 
results in the happiness and religious confidence of the woman, then heterodox 
practices are excused. Men still experienced joy and pleasure from public piety, 
but were expected to adhere to more scriptural-based practices; women were 
given a kind of intention exemption. Thus, while many of my male informants in 
Fes associated saint veneration with bida, most also noted that it was more 
acceptable for women to engage in bida practices as long as 'their heart was for 
Allah.' Many of my younger male informants also explained that they actively 
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chose not to 'correct' their mothers for going to the shrine because, as one 
conservative young man explained to me, “going to the shrine harms no one. If it 
brings my mother peace, if it brings her to Allah, then these are gifts from Allah. 
Who I am to take those from her? She does not harm anyone, and Allah sees her 
heart is only good.”
But women were also willing to extend the 'intention exemption' to other 
women as well. On a cloudy winter afternoon, I was sitting with my young friend 
Jameela, drinking tea and gossiping. Herself a lower-middle class Fassi, she 
inquired into an invitation I had recently accepted to eat dinner at the house of an 
informant, Amina, who lived in the worst of Fes's slums. I explained to Jameela 
that I had greatly enjoyed the visit to Amina's family's house, and that I had spent 
many hours cooking with her, praying, and helping take care of Amina's three 
younger cousins. I also explained that I had experienced a strange incident: 
when Amina and I had gone into the tiny, shoddy bathroom to perform our 
ablutions (wudu) before prayer, I had asked Amina to show me how to do them. 
Jameela laughed and said that this was a sensible practice for me to do as a 
convert—that it was a simple anthropological technique escaped her—and I 
began to mime the steps that Amina had demonstrated to me. Jameela stopped 
me halfway through the process.
“Oh, no, Miriam, no. The feet are last! How could she tell you to wash the 
feet before masah (washing the head)? No, Miriam, you must do it the right way!” 
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I explained to Jameela that I did in fact know the correct way to do ablutions, and 
that I was surprised by Amina's error. Jameela responded, “well, she lives in al-
roqqum (the Fassi slums). I think she has never been to school or madrasa for 
long. So she does not know. Did you teach her?” I responded that I had not, 
because I was a guest in her home, and a convert. Jameela nodded slowly and 
responded, “yes, you are a guest and a child in Islam. But you must do wudu 
properly, Miriam, or your prayers will be nothing, they will have no value to Allah. 
And you must tell your friend, she must do them properly, and she must be 
taught that her way is wrong. Allah will see that you help her, that you are her 
sister and your heart is kind.” I paused, uncomfortable with the notion of 
correcting a host. “Do her prayers have no value then?” I asked sadly. “None she 
has ever made in this life? Because she does not do the wudu properly?” 
Jameela laughed gently, smiling and shaking her head. 
No, no. Your friend, she is a good Muslim woman, no? Her 
love of Allah puts joy (frih) in her heart, and she gives that 
joy to others? Then her prayers will still please Allah. He 
knows that she is poor, that she is uneducated, that she 
does not know the true wudu. He sees that her house is 
small, that her table is empty, but that her heart is full. And if, 
in her heart, she truly gives niyah (the intention of purifying 
oneself in wudu), if she has only good in her heart, Allah will 
forgive her ignorance, and will accept her prayers. But once 
she is taught, once she knows, then she must do right, or 
Allah will not accept her wrong. You know, Miriam, you know 
the right way, so you must now do it the right way. But your 
friend, if she is a good woman with wrong knowledge, well, 
Allah will look in her heart and see the niyah, and He will 
take her prayers. For is not Allah the merciful?
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Jameela's judgment was not unusual in my experiences in Fes. Both men 
and women emphasized the notion of intent as connected with ideas of 
education and reason. One learns to be a proper Muslim in a variety of places—
the home, the mosque, the market, and the school—but most women did not 
have the same access to public places or educational opportunities before the 
21st century. This reality was generally accepted in Fes, even by women who 
rejected the seclusion of previous generations of women, and women's lack of 
education was a constant explanation as to why women would give into their 
passions, engage in Sufi bida practices, or even perform basic religious or social 
tasks incorrectly. Yet the lack of education was not viewed as a fault or willful 
ignorance, but as a reality simply accepted as part of the women's experience. 
As I will discuss in the conclusion to this chapter, however, more Fassi women 
are becoming educated, which may lessen the number of women for whom the 
intention exemption applies and thus result in a wider variety of experiences with 
the intention exemption for younger women than in previous generations. But for 
my poor friend Amina, education was not assumed, and so Jameela was fully 
able to utilize the intention exemption to discuss Amina's failure to properly 
perform wudu. 
How can the 'intention exemption' be understood within the context of 
forbidding wrong? Al-Ghazzali argues that there are differing levels of exhortation 
that Muslims ought engage in with their voice, based on the degree of knowledge 
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the wrong-doer possesses. Those who know what they do is wrong should be 
criticized civilly; those who reject such critique should then be bluntly and harshly 
criticized. It is within these cases that accusations of hypocrisy lie—the individual 
is told by those around her that her behavior has superseded what others deem 
as 'acceptable' within proper feminine Islamic practice. But al-Ghazzali's third 
level of forbidding wrong is better understood as 'informing.' Muslims, upon 
seeing someone who is truly ignorant that their practice is 'wrong,' should correct 
the wrong-doer, but in doing so should respond with tact, avoid humiliating the 
offender, and remind all involved that no one is born with knowledge of proper 
behavior (Cook 2003:28). The idea that no one is born with knowledge of proper 
behavior reinforces the idea that individuals are born with plenty of opportunity 
for social development. For al-Ghazzali to argue that some do wrong out of 
ignorance but can be taught proper behavior demonstrates an understanding of 
reason and 'good Muslim-hood' as characteristics that are constantly developed, 
contemplated, and re-articulated. For Fassis, these understandings of proper 
Islamic behavior are conceptualized within the notion of hshuma. 
Propriety and Shame: Coping with Concerns
The moral and religious social order which organizes and dictates Fassi 
public behavior includes the ever-present notion of hshuma. At its broadest, 
hshuma is the notion of shame or propriety, but is a far more complex idea than 
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its English translation might suggest. I, like Lila Abu-Lughod, refuse to simply 
reduce the idea of hshuma to the word's dictionary definition, and instead prefer 
to focus on everyday uses of the term within the larger understanding of public 
comportment (Abu-Lughod 1986:107). Hshuma is inherently tied to ideas of 
subordination and submission to group will (Abu-Lughod 1986:103-110; 
Eickelman 1976:138). One who acts with hshuma maintains her position relative 
to those around her—submitting to the will of the group, showing deference and 
respect to those higher in social status, and demanding respect from those who 
are subordinate. One knows how to behave in accordance with the social order 
by utilizing one's 'aql (reason) and restraining one's nafs (passion). The term 
hshuma is also a part of a larger trio of terms that Moroccans often interchange 
haphazardly: hshumiyya (being shameful) and t-hash-shem (to be shameful). All 
of these terms are regularly spoken aloud, especially when condemning the 
actions of another. Men and women must both live with hshuma, and are subject 
to social opprobrium if they fail to perform honorably in public.
While it may be bold to argue that the principles of hshuma, 'aql, and nafs 
are dominant in all of Morocco, and not simply my fieldsite of Fes, I do so with 
little trepidation. Of course, there are variations from city to city, from urban to 
rural, from Arab to Berber, and so on. But the core principle—that to participate in 
Moroccan Islam is to share an understanding of shame and public recognition of 
propriety—holds beyond the ancient walls of the medina or the boulevards of 
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Fes' Ville Nouvelle. In his discussion of hshuma and 'aql in the village of Boujad 
in the late 1960s, Dale Eickelman wrote, 
I present five of the key concepts through which Moroccans 
comprehend social experience. I deliberately say 
“Moroccans” rather than “Boujadi-s.” This study is primarily 
based on fieldwork in Boujad and its region, but subsequent 
work elsewhere in Morocco suggests that the same 
underlying assumptions inform comprehension of the social 
order throughout the country. Significantly,  Boujadi-s (and 
other Moroccans) also make this presumption. … Had I 
worked near Morocco's frontiers, the issues of cultural 
boundaries would probably have been more immediate, but 
for most Moroccans the significant others with whom they 
come into contact are thought to share the same 
assumptions. (1976:124)
The Moroccan conception of hshuma is not one based on an absolute 
morality, but is instead focused on proper action in public situations. The ubiquity 
of the concept of hshuma in all aspects of Moroccan life cannot be denied—in 
interpersonal relations, dress, language, and general conduct—but in actuality, 
the concept only pertains to the public aspects of an individual's behavior. As 
such, “proper conduct is linked principally to efficacious performance in the social 
order, not to one's inner state or to abstract moral or ethical principles” 
(Eickelman 1976:134). Moral absolutes are irrelevant if they disrupt or contradict 
social norms. 
Eickelman also notes that “the locus of propriety (Hshuma) is not so much 
the inner moral consciousness of a person as his public comportment with 
respect to those with whom he has regular face-to-face relations” (1976:138). 
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Eickelman's work in the small village of Boujad makes the reality of public 
comportment rely on “face-to-face relations,” but I found that even in urban 
centers like Fes where an individual can experience anonymity, the principle 
remained. Fassis regularly observe shameful behavior in public, and it is not 
unusual for improper behavior to be proclaimed 'hshuma!' by complete strangers. 
Without face-to-face familiarity, strangers must depend on the shared assumption 
that all Fassis operate in accordance with the social norm of 'aql and hshuma, 
and it is from this assumption that claims of hypocrisy can be leveled.
Shaming someone in Fes is not only a social activity, but a physical action. 
When a Fassi, especially a Fassi woman, wants to criticize someone else of 
being hshumiyya, the critic grabs the bottom eyelid of her right eye with the 
pointer finger, pulling it down to display to all those around that the shame is 
being 'seen' by open eyes. Al-Ghazzali comments that Muslims have an 
obligation to forbid wrong, and must do so in a variety of ways which Michael 
Cook classifies into three main categories: forbidding with the tongue (through 
critique or teaching), with the heart (through internal contemplation of right and 
wrong), and with the hand (by taking up arms, destroying haram items like 
alcohol, or any other of a long list of physical actions) (Cook 2003:28-38). I would 
argue that, although the physical motion associated with hshuma in Fes is 
obviously not discussed in al-Ghazzali's work, the action is a combination of 
expressive condemnation (just using the hand rather than the tongue) and 
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physical exhortation (using physicality but not in an overt, aggressive, or violent 
manner). Condemning shame is an embodied action, one which connects 
forbidding wrong to the body of the individual. This embodiment is also shared, 
as one joins the group action of physical shaming. 
Perhaps watching the interplay between hshuma, 'aql, and nafs may 
illuminate this latent but ubiquitous system of public comportment. One cool 
afternoon in October, I was interviewing a young woman at a cafe near Bab 
Boujeloud, the major gate into the medina. As we sipped our mint tea, our 
attention was diverted by sounds of commotion near the massive entrance. A 
middle-aged man ran through the square as he was chased by a policeman, 
though this was a sight of little note and little excitement. Yet as the man was 
grabbed by the officer, a woman came running up after them, screaming wildly. A 
crowd began to gather and my informant grabbed my hand and pulled me 
forward to watch. The woman, screaming hysterically, had to be held back as she 
attempted repeatedly to strike the man. The crowd grew agitated as cries of 
“hshuma!” rang out from the men and women of the crowd. The woman stepped 
back, stood in a defiant posture, reached up, and ripped her hastily-tied hijab 
from her head, throwing it to the dusty cobblestones at her feet. She lividly called 
out:
Yes, shame! I am shameful! That man has shamed me! He is 
the brother of my husband, he came from Sidi Kacem26 to 
26 Sidi Kacem is a small town outside of Meknes, roughly an hour from Fes. Many villagers from 
Sidi Kacem settle in Fes and Meknes, meaning that many Fassi medina households have 
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visit us. He took my husband to the Ville Nouvelle, to clubs 
and bars. Now he and my husband have spent our money 
on prostitutes and alcohol! I want him arrested! Do you all 
see my shame? Now you see his shame too!
As I watched, the crowd turned on the man held by the officer. Men booed 
while women yelled “hshuma!” again and again. Suddenly, the woman was not 
the focus of the shaming—the brother-in-law, whose actions were now publicly 
proclaimed as shameful, was the target of criticism. He was now the one shamed 
by the crowd. The young woman with me reached up and grabbed her eyelid, 
pulling it down to display her displeasure, and I followed suit. As the policeman 
dragged the man away, the ire of the crowd was not directed primarily at the 
angry wife, but more towards the enabling brother-in-law. I turned to the young 
woman next to me and asked for her thoughts. She turned, laughing a bit, and 
replied, 
Well, she is right to be angry! Her husband's brother, he is 
the one who is shameful! I am not surprised that a brother 
from the countryside would make her husband behave in 
this way. But... that woman, look at her yell! Surely she has 
lost her reason ('aql)!
The angry wife's wild actions were still seen as shameful—she continued 
to violate the social norms regarding women's comportment in public—but her 
acceptance of her shame and her public testimony as to the reasons for her 
shame made her actions acceptable. The man's actions were not automatically 
familial ties back to this lower-class, agriculture and herding focused town.
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shameful, even though he had apparently engaged in some not-so-pious 
behavior, because he and the husband had engaged in poor behavior in the 
other district of town, away from the eyes of their neighbors. In addition, family 
finances are a private matter for the family to deal with in the home. By making 
the brother-in-law's actions a matter of public discussion, however, the wife made 
the man's actions shameful. 
As the story demonstrates, hshuma is not a matter of internal moral 
fortitude, but rather one of public performance. To live with hshuma is to accept 
social norms and demonstrate to others that you can live within those norms. 
Wrong action is witnessed, condemned, and shamed, in an effort to return to 
popularly-understood social norms. The notion of hshuma—performing publicly 
according to accepted norms, as well as publicly shaming those who do not 
behave properly—is part of the social framework that allows Fassis to fulfill their 
religious obligation to command right and forbid wrong. 
Hshuma is a social concept which sits at the intersection of two opposing 
ideas: 'aql (reason) and nafs (passion). My young informant's commentary that 
the angry wife had 'lost her reason' demonstrates one half of this dichotomy. One 
knows how to behave with hshuma if one possesses 'aql; when one loses it and 
gives into nafs, one will then behave improperly and become hshumiyya—
shameful. Together, my informant and I expressed our criticism physically, by 
drawing down the eyelid, and vocally, by joining in the yelling and shaming. In 
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performing these actions, we were demonstrating that we were women who 
possessed our own 'aql, and thus knew which actions were inappropriate and 
how to appropriately critique those actions.
Reason and Passion: A Framework for Female Experimentation
The Arabic term 'aql is used in many Islamic societies to refer to proper 
behavior and socially acceptable public comportment, what Abu-Lughod 
translates as “social sense” (1986:90). The word is translated by scholars as 
“reason,” “rationality,” and “sense” (Davis and Davis 1989:6; Eickelman 
1976:130-138; Rosen 1984:30-34), or, less appropriately for the Moroccan case, 
“mind” (Wehr 1993:630) or “intellect” (Gianotti 2001; Tritton 1971). Famous 
Deobani theologian Maulana Ashraf 'Ali Thanvi noted that 'aql is a trait that 
humans share with the angels, while nafs is shared with animals (Metcalf 
1992:164). The notion of reason flows naturally from the idea of hshumiyya, as 
'aql is the mechanism by which one determines proper action and avoids 
improper action, and “just as the possession of 'aql enables persons to control 
their needs and passions in recognition of ideals of honor, so it allows them to 
perceive the social order and their place in it” (Abu-Lughod 1986:108). 
Reason is a trait which an individual develops over time, and is not 
something which one is born with. Children develop reason over time, and are 
not expected to act with reason until they age and mature. This is, for example, 
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why Fassi children are not expected to fast during Ramadan or why young girls 
are not expected to make the choice about hijab until they attain 'aql. Davis is 
particularly insightful in her observations regarding gendered adolescent 
development as she notes that “one is struck by the difference for males and 
females in the expectation of behavior that demonstrates 'aql or responsibility: 
while for males the ultimate expectations may be higher than those for females, 
males appear to be given at least an extra decade of life to achieve this mature 
behavior” (1986:49). I too found that young women were expected to develop 
'aql at an earlier age, even as they were constantly criticized for not possessing 
'enough' 'aql, and it was often their mothers and elderly female relatives who 
encouraged the early development of girls' 'aql. Girls were expected to 
demonstrate this, even at the shrine: as girls developed proper behavior, they 
were given more difficult tasks (carrying boiling tea kettles, collecting tea glasses, 
assisting elderly women to the restrooms, etc) which would publicly demonstrate 
their maturity and poise to all the other, older women at the shrine.
Reason is not simply a trait that a Fassi possesses; it is a tool which must 
be continually used. Eickelman argues that “since the pattern of events of any 
given moment is divinely ordained, the “reasonable” man sets about perceiving 
the multiple empirical ties between persons and adapting them to his interests as 
best he can” (1976:130). One with much 'aql is aware of his concerns and needs 
as well as both the opportunities and limitations of his current situation and acts 
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in his best interests. While Islam is one of the traditions of knowledge from which 
a reasonable man draws, as it will be shown, it is not expected that every Muslim 
possesses the same degree of understanding of Islamic knowledge, bringing 
intention into the equation. Thus, even a reasonable actor can err and if he errs 
publicly in Fes but is known to be a reasonable individual, accusations of 
hypocrisy are a first line of societal defense.
While I find Eickelman's analysis of 'aql, with its emphasis on agency and 
adaptation, to be the most accurate for my Fassi research, his discussion is one-
sided in regards to gender. Like many Moroccans themselves, Eickelman refers 
repeatedly to the 'reasonable man,' creating an automatic association between 
men and reason. Indeed, most Fassis speak about 'aql as something men 
possess, but not so exclusively as to preclude the ability of women to have 'aql. 
In fact, women do possess 'aql; as Susan Schaefer Davis points out, children are 
only considered adults when they develop 'aql, know how to behave as adults, 
and have “a sense of oneself and one's functioning in Moroccan society” 
(1989:6).  Rather, Fassis regularly commented that women 'forgot their reason' 
more often or 'did not listen to their reason.' As Davis notes (1989:48), the term 
which stands in opposition to reason—passionate spirit (nafs)—is rarely used in 
conversations with Moroccan informants, but the tension between the two ideas 
particularly comes to the fore when discussing women's Sufi practice.
The notion of 'aql is contrasted with that of nafs, or passion, animal 
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instincts, or “desires and appetites” (Davis and Davis 1989:188). The nafs is the 
inner passions of an individual, including greed, sexual drive, desire, and 
impropriety. The term is commonly used in non-religious contexts to refer to the 
'soul/mind' in a psychological sense, or as a psyche. Yet the term also has deep 
religious connotations and appears in multiple forms in the Qur'an. In most 
cases, the Qur'anic use of the term nafs relates to the personhood of an 
individual27 (or to an individual himself) in relation to Allah's judgment, and not as 
an active factor in moral decisions. The 'soul' as is discussed in the Judeo-
Christian context falls to a separate term—ruh, or 'divine soul'—while the 'nafs' is 
the aspect of the spirit connected to the baser, animal instincts. Similar 
understandings of nafs as an animalistic trait appear in South East Asia 
(Laderman 1987:75). The nafs is barely controllable, and is associated by many 
in Morocco with fitna or even the devil (Dieste 2012:35).  Differentiating between 
ruh and nafs, however, can be extremely difficult, and Islamic theologians have 
struggled to separate or clearly define either of these terms (Gobillot 2010). In 
addition, Muslims are not the only Moroccans with nafs—Jewish Moroccans also 
possess nafs and 'aql, but Jews are more strongly ruled by their nafs because 
they lack the guidance of the Qur'an (Rosen 1984:156-157). 
In the Qur'an, a human's nafs, in the passionate sense, is referenced in 
three unique ways.28 The first relates to the baser instincts of the individual, 
27 See, for example, the use of the term 'nafs' throughout the second Surah, Al-Baqarah. The 
term there more directly parallels Aristotelian perspectives on the soul.
28 See Schimmel 1975:112-113 for a more in-depth explanation of the portions of nafs as related 
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referred to broadly as the nafs al-'ammara (the untamed soul), which is often 
connected to ideas of sexuality and women's sexuality in particular. For example, 
when Yusef proclaims his innocence against attempted seduction by his master's 
wife, the wife agrees that she was at fault, proclaiming “And I do not acquit 
myself. Indeed, the soul is a persistent inciter of evil, except those upon which 
my Lord has mercy” (Surah 12:53). Those who transcend the lusts of the 
untamed soul are rewarded by Allah: “But as for he who feared the position of his 
Lord and restrained the soul from base desires, then indeed, Paradise will be his 
refuge” (Surah 79:40-41). This connects to the second notion of the soul in the 
Qur'an: nafs al-lawwama (the self-monitoring soul), the self-criticizing portion of 
the soul which strives for perfection and critiques one's own poor action. Thus, in 
the Qur'anic eschatology, man is told: “I swear by the Day of Resurrection, and I 
swear by the reproaching soul: Does man think that We will not assemble his 
bones? Yes, we are able to measure him to his fingertips!” (Surah 75:1-4). The 
final vision of the moral soul in the Qur'an—nafs al-muTma'inna (the tranquil 
soul)—is the portion of the soul which is at serene rest while in tune with Allah's 
will. This portion of the soul is the confident and obedient soul, which will help to 
bring the individual to Paradise: “And to those who are righteous, they will be 
told, “Oh, reassured soul, return to your Lord, well-pleased and pleasing to Him” 
(Surah 89:27-28). In all three of these intertwined cases, however, the emphasis 
is on the individual personhood inherent in the soul: it is something one is defined 
to Sufi belief.
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by, but also something an individual must define and limit within himself (Chelhod 
1955:106-115; Michon 1973:220-228; Rosen 1984:33; Schimmel 1975:25). The 
nafs is all one's passion—sometimes acceptable if tempered, sometimes wild 
and undesirable—but always connected to the soul, the ineffable center of an 
individual to be judged in the final days.
But while the term appears regularly in the Qur'an, 'nafs' much more rarely 
dots the scholarly debates on gender in Islam. The term does not appear 
anywhere in Eickelman's analysis of Moroccan Islam (1976), though he does 
discuss the term in relation to understandings of personhood in Pakistan 
(Eickelman 1993:181). Abu-Lughod's opus on women's propriety, Veiled 
Sentiments, develops a profound understanding of hshuma and 'aql without ever 
mentioning the idea of nafs. Davis and Davis approach the topic by directly 
quoting large blocks of the informant's testimony in Rosen's work (1989:48). 
Dieste also depends on Rosen and Eickelman to define the 'aql-nafs dichotomy 
(2012:36). Lawrence Rosen fumbles with the term in his writings, contradicting 
his own informant's stories even as he presents Moroccans' views on the issue 
(Rosen 1978: 567-569; Rosen 1984:30-38) before bluntly admitting that he was 
not able to ask women about nafs and so could not present their perspectives. In 
my opinion, the lack of discussion of nafs has less to do with the value of the 
concept, but with the difficulty separating nafs from ruh and the tendency to 
imitate our informants in the elevation of the male-associated term.
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According to Bourdieu, in Algeria, female genitalia is referred to as 'nafs' 
while male genitalia is referred to as 'ruh' (1977:139). While this idea occasionally 
appears in other literature (Adohane 1998:76), I agree with Rosen that the terms 
do not carry those connotations in Morocco. Instead, the association of women's 
sexuality with the unchecked passions and male sexuality with control is the 
more important symbolic register for this analysis. Nafs is still associated with 
women's bodies, however, through breast milk. Dieste notes that, historically, 
lower-class women were preferred for surrogate breast feeding because to their 
“milk was attributed a more powerful nafs and certain protective properties” 
(2012:323). Most women in Fes breast feed for at least the first months of a 
newborn's life, and many women explained to me that they enjoyed breast 
feeding because they felt they were giving nafs to their baby. 
And while few scholarly writers have confidently grappled with the notion 
of nafs, the notion has powerful resonance in Arab culture and appears in 
literature. For example, in his famous novel Bedaya wa Nehaya (The Beginning 
and an End), Egyptian Nobel Laureate Naguib Mahfouz describes the 
complexities of 1930s Cairene family life. The main female character, Nafisa, is 
tempted into pre-marital sex, fails to find love, and becomes a prostitute. Her lack 
of sexual control and inability to control her passions is reflected in her name; 
she is one controlled by her nafs, one who has lost her 'aql. 
Reaching farther back, the 13th century Sufi poet Rumi mused that “the 
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nafs has a rosary and a Koran in its right hand, and a scimitar and a dagger in 
the sleeve” (Schimmel 1975:114). It should be of little surprise that one of 
Sufism's most beloved poets commented on the interconnections between the 
soul and dangerous passion. Schimmel notes that “the struggle against the nafs 
has always been a favorite topic of the Sufis, and they have never tired of 
warning their disciples of its ruses, not only in the crude forms of sensual 
appetites but in the guises of hypocrisy and false piety, which must be carefully 
observed and obliterated” (1975:114). Again, the subtle connections between the 
controlling the passionate soul, observing that which is wrong, hypocrisy, and 
warning or correcting others find their place within the debate regarding proper 
Islamic practice, even within Sufism. And so, as our opening vignette illustrated, 
the practice of Sufism in Fes is deeply intertwined with the ideas of 'aql, nafs, and 
intention; this ultimately means that, for many Fassis, Sufism is associated with 
women and feminine religious practice at a core, emotional level. 
Concluding Thoughts
This chapter has focused on one of the dominant discourses that shapes 
subjectivity formation in the medina of Fes today: hshuma and the gendered 
associations relating to 'aql (reason) and nafs (passionate soul) which inform 
hshuma. Women's ability to engage in Sufi folk practice or other actions that 
serve as religious boundary-pushing emerge from their association with the 
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unreasonable passionate soul, and women without education are given an 
intention exemption as long as their intentions are pious. The Fassis of the 
medina also rely on the dominant discourse of hshuma emphasize the notion of 
forbidding wrong in gracious and respectful ways. 
For the young woman requiring healing at the shrine, Sufism allowed her 
to dismiss a moment of overwhelming nafs and reincorporate herself into the 
Fassi conception of shame and propriety. For the angry wife, her public 
spectacle, while hshuma and lacking 'aql, allowed her to regain her sense of 
dignity by creating the shame around her brother-in-law's actions she so 
passionately desired. For my friend Jameela and her concern over washing 
before prayer, I was obligated to correct my own Islamic piety in the face of 
knowledge, but my misguided foot-washing-friend was offered an intention 
exemption that allowed all the women involved to maintain their sense of piety. In 
each case, the women involved actively used their social position within the 
system of hshuma to gain the recognition and support they desired, maintain 
social order, and alleviate social tensions regarding conflicting notions of 'good 
Muslim womanhood.' 
The social system of hshuma creates a religious public sphere which 
allows—even requires, in many Fassis' opinions—critiques, social shaming, and 
use of the tool of hypocrisy. The notion of hypocrisy in Fes is not simply tied to 
the idea of hypocrisy in the Qur'an. In fact, I would argue that the Fassi 
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understanding of hypocrisy far supersedes the Qur'anic notion of the hypocrite 
and is instead oriented in broader cultural notions of hshuma and the duty of the 
Muslim to forbid wrong. Women in particular, because of their association with 
nafs and well-intended ignorance, are expected to demonstrate their 'aql by 
engaging in critiques of each other. Young Fassi women are expected to call 
each other hypocrites when they move past the socially accepted norms of 
Moroccan Islamic practice. Yet receiving such a critique is often not considered 
an insult but as a marker of the edge of acceptable behavior. And while hypocrisy 
is a social tool available and utilized by a variety of societies, the notion of 
hshuma in Morocco makes the Fassi public sphere ripe for declarations of 
hypocrisy. Having a system by which individuals already publicly 'call out' others 
for shameful action means that claims of hypocrisy are sensible, consistent, and 
easily accepted. 
This chapter also illuminates the intention exemption at a time when that 
notion may also be facing the prospect of serious change. The intention 
exemption, while being a justification for women's folk practices and adherence 
to Sufi beliefs, may not have the same social resonance for future generations 
because the inherent connection between women and lack of education is 
breaking down. According to the World Bank, the gender parity index for primary 
and secondary school life expectancy29 has increased from 0.5 in 1971 to 0.9 in 
29 'School life expectancy' in this case refers to the number of years spent in primary and 
secondary schooling by an individual. The 'gender parity index' is a measure of the ratio of 
female school life expectancy to male school life expectancy. In this case, a gender parity 
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2012, meaning that while, in previous generations, young women spent half as 
many years in school as young men before dropping out, today young women 
spend nearly as much time in school as their male counterparts (World Bank 
2015b). However, since most of my informants from the medina of Fes were from 
the lower class, many of these girls from poor families do not finish their 
education so that they can work; of course, many of their male equivalents also 
leave education to make money at an earlier age than Ville Nouvelle residents. In 
1982, the gender parity index for literacy30 was 0.4, while in 2011, the ratio was 
0.8 (World Bank 2015a). In addition, literacy rates have greatly increased for all 
Moroccans, but the gains have been greatest for young women. In 1982, only 
31% of young women31 could read, while 58.1% of young men could read. In 
2011, the year I began my fieldwork, 74% of young women were literate, while 
88.8% of young men were literate (World Bank 2015c; World Bank 2015d). 
While most of my female informants will be far better educated than their mothers 
were, and thus may not be accorded the intention exemption, women in the lower 
socio-economic class in Fes will most likely still have the exemption applied to 
their actions. The relationship between women's Sufi practice, education, and the 
index below 1.0 means that males are spending more time in schooling, while a gender parity 
index above 1.0 would mean that females attend school for more years than their male 
counterparts.
30 The 'gender parity index' in this case is a measure of the ratio of female literacy rates to male 
literacy rates. In this case, a gender parity index below 1.0 means that a larger percentage of 
males can read, while a gender parity index above 1.0 would mean that a larger percentage of 
females can read.
31 According to the World Bank, 'youth' are defined as those between ages 15 and 24 at the time 
the survey was conducted.
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intention exemption may change a great deal in the next ten to twenty years in 
Fes, and serves as an example of another ethical understanding that is changing 
around these young Muslim women as they attempt to form their own 
subjectivities.
These two initial chapters have focused on two of the dominant discourses 
and traditions of knowledge which inform young Fassi women's subjectivities: 
Moroccan Islam and the notion of hshuma. Going forward, this dissertation now 
focuses on three topics of great importance in the lives of young medina women: 
dating, use of the hijab, and Ramadan practices. Each of these major concerns 
embedded in the lives of my young informants is a cluster of issues that are in 
many cases changing: new norms for cross-gender public contact, alternative 
uses for the hijab, emerging nation-wide debates over fasting laws, and other 
ethical challenges that contribute to a Fassi woman's religious sense of self. As 
we will see over these chapters, many of these debates surrounding new 
opportunities and pushed boundaries are being led by ambivalent, imperfect, but 
highly critical young Muslims, seeking to live out their own definition of a 'good 
Muslim woman.'
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Only the Prophet was Perfect: 
Dating, Contact, and Changing Conceptions of Public Space
If one does not have a boyfriend or 
a girlfriend, he or she might be 
considered knotty and backward. 
This is simply because we are in 
the process of normalizing this kind 
of relationships. That is to say, 
people are taking such relationships 
for granted.
--- Hajar Berghabi
Mixed gender focus groups of youth are incredibly productive when 
studying dating and sexual behavior. While I am focused on their answers, youth 
are focused on impressing, debating, and flirting with each other. Such was the 
case on one sunny Wednesday afternoon when I pulled together a dozen young 
men and women, aged 18-20, to discuss dating, sex, dress, and romance. We 
met in the open Square Baghdadi near their former school, and, armed with 
snacks and large glass bottles of Coca-Cola, I sat them down in a pile in the 
amphitheater-style seating. The scene, deliberately designed to be casual and 
fun, was an opportunity to discuss somewhat taboo topics outside of any formal 
settings such as the home, school, or mosque. Within minutes, my attempts to 
get them to sit neatly failed; ladies sprawled out on each others laps, while the 
gentlemen moved around the group as they joked physically with both the males 
and females. 
This group of young men and women had all attended the same public 
high school, considered one of the best non-religious schools in the medina. 
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While some had continued to college, others who were from less wealthy families 
had not. I asked one of the girls to set up the group, and she invited her friends; 
no one in the group was related. These youth came from a variety of medina 
families, some of which were lower class. Most were middle class youth from the 
Andalusi neighborhoods and would be considered 'floating middle class.' They all 
came, like most Fassis as discussed in Chapter 2, from moderate Muslim 
families that adhere to Moroccan Islam. No one in the group would consider 
themselves secular. While most of the girls wore relatively conservative clothing, 
only two of the young women wore a hijab to the focus group. They self-formed 
as a peer group because of their high-school ties, and thus felt comfortable 
policing each others' comments and positions. Although these young people 
cannot be said to be representative of all Fassi youth, they do provide insight into 
the process of ethical debate and boundary-pushing occurring within many Fassi 
peer groups. Their debates also allowed me to better understand the 
perspectives of middle/lower class moderate Fassi medina youth.
Even without hearing their responses to my questions about public and 
private comportment, I could see that things had changed in Fes since my first 
arrival there in 2003. Whereas before unmarried/unrelated youth men and 
women did not touch each other in public, now in 2011 classmates and dating 
couples regularly put their arms around each others' shoulders, held hands, and 
slapped five out in public. Young men put their arms around their female friends, 
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girls touched the boys' faces when joking that they should 'be quiet,' and friends 
tickled each other across gender lines. No one in the group was dating each 
other. There was constant physical contact between the genders, and even when 
I attempted to separate them physically for an exercise, the group refused to 
gender-segregate.  
When I inquired as to what was appropriate for a woman to wear on a first 
date, everyone responded excitedly with their opinions. One young man 
responded that, “she should wear what she would wear normally, so that the man 
knows what kind of woman she is from the first moment.” Many young men and 
women nodded their heads in agreement. When I asked what that outfit might 
be, he reached over to the young lady he was sitting next to and responded, 
“well, headscarf, that is her opinion. But her arms should be covered to her wrists 
like this.” He then ran his hand down her arm to the wrist, and clasped his thumb 
and forefinger in a ring around her like a bracelet. “And her pants or skirt should 
go down all her legs.” As he said this, he placed his hand on her knee, fingers 
gently wrapped around her inner-thigh. He lingered there a moment before subtly 
taking his hand away, a quick moment of connection that only I and the pair 
seemed to notice. 
The most outspoken young lady, a beautiful and confident dyed-blonde 
named Kawkab, was clearly the favorite of many in the group. Dressed in tight 
jeans and a very form fitting top, it seemed that she always had some other girl 
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hugging or touching her, and she often initiated contact with the guys of the 
group, giving out high-fives and hugs with aplomb. She often took very liberal 
perspectives on issues, arguing for example that women should not bring 
companions on dates, that parents should not be involved in choosing your 
spouse, and schools needed to offer sexual education to help women be in 
control of their bodies. While many of her views were applauded by the group, 
there was clear discomfort on the faces of some of the young women and men 
when she spoke so casually about such topics. She often made the young men 
blush, and at times seemed to relish in the opportunity to dominate the group. 
As the group swirled and mixed during the several hour discussion, I 
began to notice Malika in the middle. While many of the youth in the group were 
in their first year at the local public colleges, Malika had secured herself a 
prestigious scholarship to a pharmacological school in the Ville Nouvelle through 
hard work and focus on her studies. Though other girls and guys hugged and 
touched her, she never instigated contact with others. Having known Malika for 
several months, I also knew that while she did not wear headscarf, she always 
dressed in the no-skin look, covering all of her body from the neck down except 
for hands and sometimes feet.  Often, she was more articulate than her peers, 
but she was unwilling to compromise her stances and initially did not seem to 
mind that her comparatively conservative opinions often set her at odds with 
Kawkab.
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As the afternoon continued, I felt quite pleased with the group dynamic, 
one which I fully admit I had some hand in shaping, in that this was a constructed 
focus group. Everyone was contributing and seemed to be enjoying the 
discussion and debate. We began to discuss what kinds of actions, such as 
petting or oral sex, still allowed a woman to be a virgin. I deliberately oriented the 
discussion to be impersonal, with questions like, 'if you had a friend who did this, 
would she still be a good Muslim?' or 'I've heard this is an acceptable practice, is 
that true?' This seemed to put them at ease, and I was given a number of stories 
about 'a friend of a cousin who did this' or a 'neighborhood girl who behaves this 
way.' Kawkab casually noted that these practices were necessary for pious girls 
so that they could remain virgins until marriage. Several laughed, though I could 
not tell if this was because they took the comment as a joke or if they found the 
comment ironic coming from Kawkab, who herself admitted she had had 'many 
boyfriends before.' Their laughter, however, seemed to be the last straw.
“Enough! (safi!) You, enough! I am tired of this hypocrite! (munafiqa)” 
Malika proclaimed in a loud and strident tone, “I will hear no more of these words! 
Kawkab, you say you are a Muslim woman, but you speak about zina' as if Allah 
did not forbid it! It is in the Qur'an, hypocrite, you can read it there. A woman must 
protect all her body for her husband. Are you a Muslim woman or no?”
“I am a Muslim of course,” Kawkab fired back, “and why do you question 
when you wear no hijab?”
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“And where is your hijab?” Malika responded. 
The tension was incredible, and I began to panic that I had lost control of 
the debate. Suddenly, a young man of the group declared, “perhaps Benkirane 
spoke true about the hammam!”32 All laughed, even Kawkab and I, though Malika 
remained stone-faced then and for the remaining hour of the focus group. I threw 
out a question about dating websites in an attempt to reorient the entire 
discussion away from the fight. Successful, we continued our discussion until the 
group grew too restless, and then I thanked them for their time and help and set 
them loose. The group scattered away, but as I finished throwing out my trash, 
Kawkab approached me. She checked to make sure no one was around us, and 
then reached out and put her hand on my arm.
“Miriam, please,” she whispered to me in English, “please, you do know 
that I am a good Muslim. I know that I do things which are haram. But Allah 
forgives us our small mistakes, and as long as I only make small mistakes, He 
forgives me. Truly, only the Prophet [Muhammad] was perfect.” 
This story is but one of many I experienced during my research, in which 
the idea of hypocrisy was invoked during a debate about proper Islamic practice. 
32 Earlier that month, Moroccan Prime Minister and Islamist PJD leader Abdelilah Benkirane 
experienced a bit of scandal after an interview on AlJazeera. After winning office with the 
promise that officials guilty of corruption before 2011 would be prosecuted, he back-tracked, 
which led to anger in Morocco. When questioned about this on AlJazeera's “Without Borders” 
series, he stated, “I came to redress the situation of the country, not to fight like women in 
hammams.” Women's groups in Morocco expressed outrage that the Prime Minister would 
reduce the country's women to petty squabblers on international television. The video spread 
like fire across a number of women's and youth protest blogs and similar pages on social 
media. Domestically, Benkirane and Moroccan women became the butt of many jokes. This 
gaff led many Moroccans to call for Benkirane's resignation.
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While the accusation of hypocrisy was seen as an insult, it was not an intolerable 
slander and, perhaps more importantly, was not so out of place that any of the 
other youth were shocked or embarrassed. Neither girl faced social sanctions 
from the group, but they did publicly perform their beliefs in front of the group 
seeking approval. As I will argue later, these women expressed their opinions 
because young Fassis are more interested in their peers' opinions than their 
parents when discussing dating and the boundaries of appropriate dating 
practices.
In fact, it was only in her comments after the group had left that Kawkab 
showed her concern that I had a negative impression of her piety. Yet Kawkab 
also did not deny the accusation or pretend she did not know why it had been 
leveled. Instead, she sought to reorient my understanding of the 'properness' of 
her actions by utilizing a nuanced idea of 'mistakes' that allows for imperfection 
and experimentation.
In addition, this focus group reaffirmed for me the very fluid and 
experimental nature of these young men's and women's piety. New ideas about 
courtship and dating are fraught with insecurities and ambivalent hesitations as a 
result of “the tension between the emotional intimacy teenagers have 
increasingly learned to crave and the physical desire they can satisfy only at the 
cost of shame or potential dishonor, desire that coexists so tenuously with 
romance” (Davis and Davis 1989:133). These Fassi youth are exploring their own 
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sexuality and path to marriage just as Moroccan society at large has begun to 
seriously debate topics such as premarital and extra-marital affairs and sexual 
harassment of women.
This chapter first explores how young men and women approach dating 
and courtship in the medina of Fes today, with comparisons both to my 
observations of changes in comportment in the past decade, and to stories from 
women of previous generations. I discuss the practice of dating across socio-
economic and religious axes, emphasizing new conceptions of public dating 
practices as a way of avoiding accusations of shamefulness. I parallel a 
discussion of changes in physical contact between the sexes with changes in the 
physical use of space for dating in the medina. The role of hypocrisy in shaping 
dating practices is then discussed. I demonstrate how religious subjectivities tie 
into the romantic experimentation of youth and how questions of religious 
hypocrisy shape peer-group understandings of the courtship process in Fes. 
More importantly, I capture a moment within a period of great social and ethical 
change in Morocco by exploring how dating is evolving for new generations of 
young Fassi women.
Dreams of the Past: Older Generations' Perspectives on Marriage
Perhaps all grounded discussions of generational change in women's 
practice in Fes begin with the work of Fatima Mernissi. Born in 1940 to a wealthy 
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family in the medina of Fes, Mernissi describes life at the end of several eras—
while the French Protectorate was in ascendance, as the French lost control of 
the nation, and as Moroccans began to come to grips with the ideological shifts 
caused by the French, including changing views on women's education, women 
in the workplace, and marriage. Her ground-breaking works of scholarship on 
Islamic gender relations in the 1980s were heavily shaped by her own 
experiences as a young woman growing up in Fes in the same neighborhood 
where I conducted my own work. Mernissi's Dreams of Trespass (1994), a 
simultaneously romantic and dystopic view of the final years of harem practice in 
Fes, is a fountain of intimate descriptions, colorful moments, and fascinating 
characters. 
As Mernissi describes, life in the harem was constantly marked by kin 
relations and obedience to older authority. The strictness of hudud (keeping 
boundaries) is a constant frustration for Mernissi, and the gender separation 
required to maintain hudud constantly shapes her evolving relationship with her 
close male cousin, Samir. Marriage was still arranged at the time of Mernissi's 
youth, and she often notes avenues by which families learned of the 
marriagability of other families' children. 
But love is also a serious and continuous topic of conversation and 
thought within the harem. Mernissi describes learning potions and practices to 
bewitch a man into love (1994:177; 195), as well as the important practice of 
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learning how to make a 'love glance.' Here, one can find in her descriptions the 
beginnings of a breakdown in the steadfast rules of gender segregation:
It is true that the youth of each house kept to its own terrace, 
but they often sang love songs loud enough to be heard by 
their neighbors. Chama danced also, and so did [girls of the 
neighboring  family],  thus  managing  to  sculpt  fleeting 
moments  when  adolescent  love  and  happiness  floated 
around, and turned the sunset into a red and romantic haze. 
Worst of all for Mina, though, was the fact that the boys and 
girls did not just look at each other from the terrace—they 
exchanged love glances (1994:176). 
However, much has changed since Mernissi's personal experiences, 
particularly because many young women have no real experience of hudud and 
seclusion in the home, even in the most conservative of Fassi medina families. In 
the few generations since Mernissi's childhood, young women in Fes expected a 
completely different dating process, in which they knew and socialized with their 
potential spouse.
Mernissi also shines a light on Moroccan marriage practices in the 1950s 
through the 1980s in her interviews in Doing Daily Battle (1989). The women she 
interviewed come from a variety of socio-economic backgrounds, yet many 
describe a similar process of engagement—male representatives (walis) sign 
marriage contracts with little input from the bride, and marriages were arranged 
based on family ties and social networks rather than love or affection. In one 
interview,
A: My sister was adorned with pearls for the [engagement], 
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but  the marriage was not consummated. My family tended 
to celebrate engagements. It was during the marriage feast 
of my big sister that my turn came to get engaged.
Q: How was that?
A: A woman who used to make mattresses for us saw me in 
my  father's  house.  Then  she  went  to  make  some  at  the 
house of my future family-in-law, and it  was she who told 
them that my father had marriagable daughters. Then they 
came to ask for my hand. My father refused to marry me off 
before my sister Aisha. They told him: ' Your word is enough 
for us while we await the marriage of your elder daughter.' 
And when my sister Aisha became engaged, they came back 
for me. I was married right away. I had given birth  to Sidi 
Muhammad  and  then  Sa'ida  while  my  sister  was  still 
engaged, and she remained so for five years. Afterwards, it 
was the turn of my niece and a lot of the others among the 
young girls in my group. (1989: 28) 
Mernissi thus sheds a light on arranged marriages, as well as on the 
puzzling question of how young women in harems were 'discovered' by families 
with marriageable young men. Numerous other interviews in the text tell similar 
stories of arranged marriages, including tales of many women who protested 
against poor matches, demanded divorces, or even engaged in zina.
Mernissi also reminds readers that the process of selecting a marriage 
partner is not without women's input, since many of the women she interviewed 
were able to avoid poor initial matches by expressing extreme frustration, leading 
many women to not be married until a second or third fiancé that they found 
more acceptable. She notes, “the stubborn determination of these women to 
create a family based on a strong couple is shown by their persistent refusal of 
the partner chosen by their parents. Almost all of these women refused the 
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'fiance' offered to them by their parents and claimed for themselves the right to 
choose another man who better met their tastes and desires” (1989:9). It is thus 
important to avoid oversimplifying the notion of arranged marriage as one in 
which all women had a similar experience. Rather, an open space already 
existed in urban Moroccan life which allowed for varied courtship and marriage 
practices, and variation in young women's experience was the norm.
The wali, or male representative, was a major player in courtship practices 
of previous generations. A father, brother, or other senior male in a woman's 
family was responsible for the negotiation of the marriage contract on behalf of 
the woman. However, this practice was already becoming less common in 
marriages in the medina of Fes when, in 2004, the makhzan passed the 
mudawanna, or “Women's Code.” In this new family code, the wali system was 
abolished, and urban women now conduct their engagement negotiations on 
their own.33 The mudawanna also describes rules for drawing up marriage 
contracts that are more protective of women's rights in regards to second wives 
or divorce (Zoglin 2009:971-972). None of my female informants under the age of 
25 stated that they had a wali, though many noted when asked that their fathers 
would still ensure their rights and protect them. Most young women also 
expected their fathers would negotiate their dowries and marriage contracts once 
33 While the wali system was abolished in 2004, some families in rural Morocco still use the 
practice. However, during my fieldwork in the medina of Fes, I did not meet any young 
informants who had a wali. In addition, as described in Chapter 2, many young Fassi women I 
interviewed went so far as to criticize Saudi Arabia for its use of the wali system.
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a couple has decided to become engaged.
Today, dating and courtship are still topics openly discussed between 
generations in the medina of Fes. Many young women described having 
conversations with their mothers, though rarely about sexual acts themselves, 
about attracting and keeping men's attentions. Young men also described 
discussing courtship with men in their family, but more often uncles or older 
cousins than with their fathers. Perhaps more surprising to me, youth of both 
genders regularly described to me the importance of discussing courtship with 
their opposing-gender parent. Even grandparents and extended family were 
brought into debates about the appropriate behaviors and romantic prospects of 
youth.
One lazy summer evening, I was enjoying dinner at the home of an 
informant in one of the 'floating middle class' districts of the medina. At twenty, 
Zeinab was the eldest daughter of four children, but her siblings were off at 
friends' houses, enjoying the long summer days. The large round table was still 
crowded, however, with Zeinab's parents, her maternal aunt, her maternal 
grandmother, and her two paternal aunts and their husbands. Over a gigantic 
tajine and seemingly endless side-dishes, we discussed how each generation 
were married off. “My mother, you know, she chose my husband,” the 
grandmother began, 
When I was maybe twelve or thirteen, I was then a woman 
[had begun menstruating]. So my mother, she began talking 
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to the women of some of the families in the village, to see 
who would have sons to marry in the future. Once she found 
a good family, she began talking to my husband's mother 
and [his aunt]. They agreed to the courtship, and he began 
to give gifts to our house. Then one morning, my mother and 
I went to his aunt's house to see her and his mother. They 
took off my veil and brushed my hair, to see that my hair was 
strong and beautiful.
“Your hair?” One of Zeinab's paternal aunts interrupted. Ever the jokester, 
she laughed, reached over, and pulled on her sister's hair. “Oh my sister! Thank 
Allah we did not have to be judged with our hair before marriage, or you never 
would have kept this man here!” The entire group laughed, and the sister 
snapped back eagerly, “And you? You would still be a [spinster] with that 
donkey's hair of yours!”
“Enough! Do not laugh—this was a serious time for me as a young girl!” 
The old woman retorted. “So, Miriam, then they brushed my hair. And then they 
gave me a chestnut to bite down on, to show that my teeth were strong.”
“A chestnut? But my grandmother, truly some girls broke their teeth on a 
chestnut!” Zeinab exclaimed.
“Ah,” the grandmother smiled, her eyes wandering off to chase shadows of 
ages past, “yes, many girls did hurt their teeth.” She chuckled heartily. “But not 
me. I was strong and lovely. They knew right then I would be a good wife for their 
eldest son. Our mothers agreed, and then our fathers made the arrangements 
and your grandfather paid the bride price (sdaq). And then we were married. I 
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was perhaps fourteen, and he was twenty-six, and we did not meet until after all 
the gifts were given.”
“Well,” Zeinab's paternal aunt chirped, 
it is good that we do not live like that any more! Biting a chestnut! 
I think there would be no more children in Morocco, if donkey's 
teeth were needed to marry. No, for me, I knew your uncle from 
school, we were classmates. Sometimes we would look at each 
other for long moments. One day his mother came to our 
neighborhood, and met with my mother. They agreed that he and 
I should consider marriage, so he and I talked a little. Sometimes 
he would come early in the morning to my house, to walk me to 
school, and he would walk me home each day. But we did not go 
out alone, nor do shameful things. Then one day my father 
asked me if I wanted to marry your uncle, and I said that I did. 
So he and my father-in-law, they arranged the marriage, and 
soon we were wed.
“Yes,” Zeinab's other paternal aunt interjected, “my marriage was the 
same, as with my sister. I knew my husband at school, and sometimes we saw 
each other at mosque, for many years. He played football with your father, and 
he told our mother that my husband was serious and good.” At this point, the 
woman's husband reached his hand across the table to Zeinab's father, and the 
two shook hands, laughing and smiling. “So you see,” she said, “we chose our 
men. We did not bite on chestnuts!”
As the light-hearted conversation continued, it became clear that each 
generation recognized that Zeinab's story would be different. She would not be 
expected to agree to an arranged marriage, nor would she be expected to avoid 
contact with or knowledge of her future husband. Most certainly, she was not 
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expected to be subjected to physical tests by female members of her suitor's 
family. Yet, as each generation spoke, there was a sense of wistfulness about her 
experience. None of the older women expressed unhappiness or dissatisfaction 
with the process of courtship they experienced, but each spoke excitedly about 
how women of younger generations had more influence in the courtship process. 
Many of my interviews of mothers and daughters had a similar flavor—the elder 
generation often expressed general satisfaction with their courtship process, 
tinged only with the slightest bit of envy at their daughters' potential choices. 
These changing views of the courtship and engagement process already 
existed by the late 1980s in Morocco. Mernissi, when asking one elderly woman 
whether her daughters should be able to choose husbands, was told, 
Oh, yes! I believe that it's up to them to choose their 
husbands because I know what happens when a woman 
marries a man she has not chosen. If one of them wants to 
marry someone, I would not oppose it. That is what 
happened with the oldest one when she got acquainted with 
someone. She told me that someone was going to come ask 
for her hand; I told her that that concerned no one but 
herself. (1989:77)
Thus, while changes in physical comportment may be a very 21st century 
phenomena, the notion that women be directly involved in finding their husbands 
is grounded in gradually changing views of women's autonomy and the 
generation-long decline of the harem and total female seclusion.
The process of dating, courtship, engagement, and marriage is obviously 
not uniform across the medina, and each stage is fraught with different concerns. 
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Countless anthropologists have and continue to examine marriage practices in 
Morocco (Geertz et. al. 1979; Olsen 2013; Sadiqi 2003:55-57; Wassink 1967; 
Westermarck 1914). I wish to look specifically at the idea of dating. The body of 
literature actually describing and analyzing current dating or courtship practices 
in the Islamic world is far smaller (Kaya 2009; Obermeyer 2000; Smith-Hefner 
2005), and, in my opinion, overemphasizes the role of online dating (Kaya 2009; 
Newcomb 2006; 2009). While some of my upper class informants used online 
dating sites, it was far more common for the internet to be used to maintain 
contact with those one already interacts with in the real world. In addition, 
communications online and via text message allowed young women to engage in 
some aspects of dating while still maintaining norms relating to gender 
segregation and avoiding shameful physical contact with unrelated males.
I also found that much of the scholarship that examine courtship in 
Morocco focus primarily on the intersection of female fear of shame and the 
cognitive dissonance created when males can date without restriction while 
females must protect their honor (Berghabi 2013; Bowen 2008; CERED 1998; 
Davis and Davis 1989; Davis and Davis 1995; Dialmy 1997; Guessous 1997; 
Obermeyer 2000). Very little attention has been paid to the actual process of 
dating itself, or the activities youth engage in while attempting courtship. This 
chapter draws data from several focus groups I set up from peer groups and 
roughly sixty interviews with young Fassi informants of both gender (though more 
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female than male). In my own observations of the practices and norms of dating 
and in the comments made by these informants, I found similarities in experience 
along two axes: degree of religious conservatism, and socio-economic class. 
Young Love: Dating Practices by Degree of Religiosity
For the young men and women I interviewed during my fieldwork who self-
described as 'not very religious' or 'a little Muslim,' dating practices are strikingly 
similar to those of young Moroccans in the West (Courbage 1995; Dialmy 1998). 
Of the fourteen couples I interviewed in depth, most knew each other before 
dating, often from schooling, and initially spent time together in mixed-gender 
groups of friends before beginning to meet exclusively. Common and enjoyable 
dates included: going to the movie theater, eating dinner or enjoying ice cream, 
strolling around the main avenues of the medina, shopping, picnicking, and, if 
they had the money, taxiing over to the Ville Nouvelle to go to the few bars and 
discoteks available.34 
Dating was also described as including some degree of physical contact 
for largely secular couples. Many regularly held hands in public, wrapped arms 
around each other, or linked arms. While many admitted to kissing in private 
places (or secluded public places like movie theaters and empty top floors of 
34 These discoteks and clubs are often associated with prostitution. In some cases, couples 
refused to admit in front of friends that they had visited discoteks but mentioned the space to 
me when interviewing privately. In other cases, liberal couples bragged about these evenings, 
especially on Facebook and social media, as an expression of rebelliousness or edgy 
experimentation.
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cafes), young couples almost never kiss openly in public. Since these young 
women rarely wore hijab, I often saw young men fix the hair of their partners as a 
sign of affection, an action I do not remember seeing in Fes before 2009.  The 
physicality among young men and women in this category was constantly striking 
to me because of how dramatic a change this behavior was from just a decade 
before. I also found it particularly interesting that, even though they did not self-
describe as particularly concerned about religion, these youth participated in 
these dating experiences outside of or on the fringes of the medina. In other 
words, these liberal youth still experience the 
overarching atmosphere of the medina as one 
which does not allow such a full expression of 
physical affection. These liberal youth also made 
up, at most, 10% of my informants, though I 
suspect that if I had opened my pool of informants 
to more youth living in the Ville Nouvelle, with its 
slightly larger secular population, this percentage 
would have been slightly higher (see Newcomb 
2009). 
While all of my young informants were willing to discuss sex and sexuality 
openly, most expressed that sexuality was a matter to be properly confined to 
marriage. Very few of my informants admitted to practicing zina, a blanket term 
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Figure 8: Young Couples 
Strolling in the Square 
Baghdadi on the Edge of the 
Medina
used among Moroccan youth to cover any degree of pre-marital sex. Zina was 
considered a shameful act (shee hshuma) by nearly all of my young informants, 
male and female alike, and less than 10% of the young people I interviewed 
considered it to be an acceptable part of dating or courtship. Scholarship on 
sexuality in Morocco (Bourqia et. al. 1995; CERED 1991, 1996, 1998; Davis and 
Davis 1989; Dialmy 1997; Dialmy and Manhart 1997; Guessous 1997; Newcomb 
2009; Obermeyer 2000) documents similar results—a small but notable increase 
in the public acceptance of pre-marital sexuality, but a general continuation of 
long-standing societal condemnation of zina as un-Islamic.
The vast majority of the young medina residents I interviewed regarding 
dating would fall in a broad intermediate category of Islamic subjectivity. These 
young men and women use Moroccan Islam to inform the majority of their ethical 
and moral positions, but do not strictly adhere to scripturalist norms. Some of 
these women wore headscarves, others did not, and still others did at some 
times and not others. Few of these men wore beards, a marker of conservatism 
in Fes, and those that did wore neatly trimmed beards more associated with 
Europeans than Salafis. Pushing the boundaries of dating behavior was 
acceptable, and debates within peer groups in this category were often heated 
when turning to the intersection of personal practice and Islamic normativity, as 
seen in the initial vignette. Within this category of Islamic subjectivity, when 
discussing dating there was an emphasis on spending time together, discussing 
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romantic or personal matters, having fun, and being seen. 
For these young Fassis, dating was a process that often involved meeting 
in public places but away from parents and other adults. Certainly, movie 
theaters and other secluded spots were mentioned as potential dating locations, 
but many Fassi youth, especially women, commented on the shamefulness of 
these locations, even if the young couple was not directly engaging in shameful 
behavior. Many young women expressed a preference for family-oriented cafes, 
parks, long walks through the medina, or neighborhood gatherings as 
opportunities to learn more about a potential partner while being observed by the 
community. 
As discussed below, one of the most physical forms of change young 
women are experiencing in regards to dating is that many of the physical spaces 
that were once the semi-private/semi-public domains of women (such as second 
floors of cafes) have now become spots for couples. As women in Fes have more 
physical mobility in the medina and more public presence in the streets, couples 
have also begun taking up public spaces in new ways that still preserve Islamic 
norms regarding shamefulness and propriety. The preference for these kind of 
“half-and-half” (Kaya 2009:262) spaces is shared with youth experimenting with 
dating elsewhere in the Muslim world, demonstrating universal challenges in 
combining normative Islamic beliefs about gender segregation with new desires 
for romantic autonomy.
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One dating practice of interest among many Fassi youth is what I would call the 
'chaperone system.' I would often see two girls on a date with one young man. 
He was not actually courting both women; rather, one girl was being courted 
while the other girl was brought along on the date as a chaperone. Often, the 
chaperone would be a friend or a cousin, but almost never a sister, for as one 
young woman noted, “I cannot take my sister, for she will tell my mother 
everything we say. But my cousin, she will allow my boyfriend and I to be close 
and not tell my mother. But my mother, she knows my cousin will not allow zina, 
and will not allow the boy to harm me.” These chaperones fully participated in the 
date, rather than standing outside as observer, and the young man was expected 
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Figure 9: A Young Trio Engaged in 'Chaperone Dating' Pose for a Picture in the Jnan Gardens
to pay for the chaperone's expenses as well as his girlfriend's. This system was 
particularly popular when going to ice cream parlors/patisseries and on picnics. It 
should be noted that none of my female informants who discussed or practiced 
'chaperoned' dating ever mentioned bringing a male relative or friend on the date, 
and so I do not believe that this is a direct extension of the wali (male 
representative) system discussed earlier in Mernissi's work.
These religiously conscious—though not conservative—youth in Fes were 
also experimenting with minor acts of physical contact between the sexes that 
would have been considered 
shameful to previous generations, 
but with a significant sense of 
trepidation and a great deal of peer-
group debate. Couples might hold 
hands in public, but quickly let go 
when passing near a mosque or 
when they realized they were 
noticed. Classmates often hid 
physical contact with small caresses
—a young man rubs his girlfriend's 
back as he helps her put on her 
backpack, or a young woman leans 
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Figure 10: A Young Couple Cuddles Openly at 
the Tomb of the Merinids
in closely to adjust the collar of her boyfriend's shirt. Young couples often 
described how they would sit together and share a pair of headphones to listen to 
music—the shortness of the cords created a socially acceptable reason for the 
young couple to sit almost on top of one another. In mixed-group settings, 
however, contact became much more common. Just as with the focus group 
described initially, many young Fassis—even those wearing hijab or other 
markers of clear Islamic consciousness—engaged in hugging, teasing, and 
general physical 'goofing off' behavior with the opposite gender in peer groups. 
Thus, young couples in large groups used the opportunity to hug, cuddle, or 
simply sit together.
For even the most religiously conservative of my informants, dating 
practices do not include complete gender segregation. I did not meet a single 
Fassi youth who did not expect to at least meet and spend some time with their 
prospective spouse before marriage. Nor did they expect to have their spouse 
chosen for them without input. Rather, in many of these cases, these youth knew 
each other from schooling, neighborhood events, or family connections. Still, 
within this category of devout Muslims, few actually 'dated' in the sense of going 
out together alone. Time was often spent together at communal events or 
neighborhood gatherings, and adult members of the woman's family were almost 
always present. A story of pious courtship may illuminate.
I met Abdullah in 2009, where he taken a job waiting tables at a cafe I 
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frequented. Then 23, Abdullah was raised and lived in a set of slums outside the 
northern edge of the medina. In his younger years, poor and with few prospects, 
Abdullah had been a petty thief, a drinker, and a motorbike racer until an accident 
left him severely injured. Spending nearly a year in recovery in his home, he 
prayed and found solace in the Qur'an, and emerged a devout and reborn man. I 
would consider Abdullah one of my most conservative informants whose identity 
was heavily based around Islam, but he accepted the label Salafi very hesitantly. 
After his accident, he stopped his 'wrong path' and became heavily involved in 
his local mosque until he decided, at 22, that he wanted a family and more adult 
life. He looked to his neighborhood and his mosque community for eligible 
women. 
At two years his junior, Fatimazahra was a pious young woman who lived 
two streets away from Abdullah. She worked with several female relatives in a 
steamy, small room full of looms, weaving carpets to make more money for her 
poor family. Their families had known each other through their shared mosque for 
several generations, and the two youths had met several times as children at 
neighborhood gatherings. Now of age, Fatimazahra had blossomed into a 
beautiful young woman, ripe with curves and a delicate face. She wore long-
sleeved, form-fitting tops and long, flowing skirts, with a hijab to perfectly match 
the outfit. When Fatimazahra made an off-hand comment to her aunt about how 
handsome Abdullah's jellaba was at an eid celebration, the families arranged a 
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joint picnic. As Abdullah said, “there, I saw her beauty, the way she laughed with 
my [female] cousins, I knew I loved her.”
So began a two year task of courtship. His father already deceased, 
Abdullah was the senior male in his family, so negotiated his marriage contract 
directly with Fatimazahra's father. The bride price (sdaq) was set at 20,000 dh, or 
roughly 2,000 Euro—a significant challenge for Abdullah, who earned roughly 
250-350 dh a week waiting tables, which he used to pay his expenses as well as 
the expenses of his elderly, widowed mother. Abdullah took on additional jobs, 
and worked constantly, saving every scrap he could. In 2011, after two years of 
saving, Abdullah had managed to raise nearly 13,000 dh, and approached his 
father-in-law to renegotiate the deal. The man agreed to lower the bride price to 
10,000 dh on the condition that Abdullah would agree to house his poor in-laws 
for the remainder of their lives.35 Abdullah arranged with a friend to rent a small 
apartment at a reasonable price, and agreed to the conditions. The couple was 
married and the pair, along with Fatimazahra's two parents, one aunt, and four 
siblings all moved into Abdullah's new apartment.
During this entire two year process, Abdullah and Fatimazahra rarely saw 
each other. They did not spend time alone together, nor did they visit each other 
at their homes. They did not go out into public as a couple because they were not 
yet married,  and never used titles such as boyfriend/girlfriend (sahebi/sahebti). 
35 See Newcomb 2009:69-70 for a discussion of the reasons behind deferred or renegotiated 
bride prices in Fes.
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The couple did communicate via text message regularly, but, as Fatimazahra 
described, “we never wrote shameful words to each other. Allah would see those 
words, even if our families did not.” The couple did not hold hands or make 
physical contact. Abdullah once bragged to me, “when I was young, I practiced 
zina with women. But then I put that all behind me and became a new man. With 
my wife, I did not even see her hair before our wedding night.” The couple's 
courtship demonstrated the continued importance of gender segregation, lack of 
physical contact between unmarried individuals, and the contractual nature of the 
courtship process. However, even among young, pious Fassis, there was heavy 
emphasis on individual choice and a desire to love the other individual. 
Decisions, Decisions: Dating Practices by Socio-Economic Class 
One of the greatest challenges in courtship for all degrees of religiosity 
was striking a balance between demonstrating pragmatic desires and being 
swept away in young love. Both genders of youth talked fondly of love and 
finding a compatible mate (mutafhemeen; literally “those who understand each 
other”). Davis and Davis have argued that men and women in Morocco 
experience young love differently:
females  rarely  seem  to  experience  the  same  intensity  of 
romantic passion as males. This may be partly because they 
are less likely to report such feelings to anyone but their best 
friend,  given  the  still  functioning  ideal  of  female  purity. 
However, their socialization to behave responsibly from an 
early age, the myriad warnings of sexual dangers, and the 
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practical  importance  of  forming  a  stable  marriage  all 
encourage young women  not  to rely on only their feelings. 
Young men as children are more likely to be given whatever 
they  want,  and  expect  similar  indulgence  in  adulthood. 
(1995:237)
I do not disagree with Davis and Davis' description of the difference in 
expectations between males and females based on the socialization of children
—as was noted earlier in our discussion of 'aql and nafs, young girls are 
expected to quickly develop hshuma while young boys enjoy a childhood of little 
discipline. But in my research, I did not find that it was gender which divided the 
carefree lovers from the pragmatists, but socio-economic class. Young men and 
women in Fes reported intense romantic feelings, but each socio-economic class 
of youth expressed their own unique concerns regarding the practical economics 
of choosing a spouse.
Dating practices differ according to 
socio-economic class because, as 
demonstrated above, dating and courtship at 
all degrees of religiosity rely on consumption 
and spending. Many of the same approaches 
are used by each class, but with varying 
degrees of frequency and display of wealth. 
Many of my upper class female informants 
discussed the necessity of their suitors to 
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Figure 11: A Couple Take a Late-
Night Stroll During a Ramadan 
Carnival
buy them perfume, jewelry and other gifts as well as take them to fine 
restaurants. In some cases, this included taking them on trips to Casablanca, 
Rabat, or Marrakesh, all of which have more trendy bars and discoteks, but this 
was only an option for the children of relatively secular families; more 
conservative families would not allow their daughters to stay overnight without a 
family representative. 
My upper class informants noted that the girls also had a responsibility: to 
dress attractively in ways that displayed their wealth, be it in tight designer jeans 
or with the finest of silk hijabs. As one male informant explained, “if I am driving 
an expensive car, why would I put a 
poor woman inside?” My wealthy 
female informants agreed, with 
reasons as broad as 'I must be 
attractive so that he is not shamed to 
be seen with me' to 'I must show that 
my family is wealthy as well.' In all of 
these explanations, however, there 
was an emphasis on being seen 
dating, as opposed to hiding from 
view, and thus an implicit 
understanding that, along as there is 
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Figure 12: A Young Couple Enjoys a 
Leisurely Evening Date on the Hillside of the 
Medina
not excessive physical contact, the date is a socially acceptable activity. 
For many in the middle class, dating is an opportunity to make real life 
decisions about the economic future. The middle class in Fes is fragile or 
'floating' and many in it have just moved up the class ladder, so young men and 
especially young women are concerned about securing that improved status into 
the next generation, if not continuing the move up. For this class, restaurants like 
McDonald's offer a way of showing their upward mobility and their embrace of 
consumerism; in other cases, ice cream parlors serve to demonstrate a degree of 
excess income (since, after all, ice cream is a luxury). In interviews, my middle 
class informants were most likely to comment that activities should be 
'popular'/'youthful' (sha'bi) and allow them the opportunity to learn more about 
each other. Dating was described more pragmatically, especially by middle class 
men on limited budgets.
For my lower class informants, and many of my informants in the medina 
fit into this category, dating was a social activity, not a financial one. A trip to the 
ice cream parlor was a treat and a clear sign of seriousness. More commonly, 
poorer couples would look for alternative spaces to spend dates that did not 
require money—a walk in the public j'nan gardens, or an afternoon on the hillside 
beneath the Tombs of the Merinids. This is not to say that young gentlemen were 
not expected to make clear gestures of attention in place of gifts. One young 
women described to me the moment when she knew her 'boyfriend' was serious 
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in courting her:
[my boyfriend], we were classmates in school. One day, I 
told him my mother was upset because the connector on our 
stove was not working, and the propane would not cook the 
food. But I did not expect for him to notice. That night, he 
came to my house with his father's tools, and asked my 
mother to see the stove. He worked for many hours and 
fixed the stove. My mother thanked him, and he left. He did 
not even say hello to me, not in the house. But when he left, 
my mother said, “truly, my daughter, that is a man who will 
be a good husband” and I knew he had love in his heart for 
me.
I also heard similar stories from poorer male informants of girlfriends who 
came to their homes to help cook when their mothers were ill or who helped to 
care for his family's young kin when at public events. In most of these cases, 
however, the displays of love and affection were also displays of necessary skills 
for marriage. While upper and middle class gifts demonstrated access to 
resources, lower class gifts demonstrated home-keeping skills, discipline, and 
pragmatism. 
Taking Over the Fringes: Changes in Use of Space
As described in my previous chapter, the medina of Fes is a physical 
space imbued with a variety of cultural and religious meanings which are 
constantly reinterpreted by its residents. In discussing changing imaginings of 
youth and women's space, the most relevant analysis comes from Rachel 
Newcomb. She explores the way women express their identity through new 
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gendered spaces such as mixed-gender gyms and cyber cafes (2006; 2009). 
Many of the debates between women in her work, particularly around propriety 
while exercising, demonstrate the competing ideas about proper feminine 
behavior in the public sphere. 
Her fieldwork also gives us a window into a specific moment in Fes' 
development as a city. Based on fieldwork from early 2001 to mid 2002, 
Newcomb presents Fes on the eve of and just after September 11th, and many of 
her descriptions of male-female interaction match my observations in 2003. Men 
and women did not engage in large amounts of physical contact at the time of 
Newcomb's work, and many of the lines of gender segregation that I have seen 
gradually eroding were still in effect when Newcomb wrote. She comments 
repeatedly in her work that, at the beginning of the 21st century, mixing of 
genders was still unusual in Fes, even in the Ville Nouvelle, and that “in cases 
where the inevitable mixing of unrelated men and women takes place, Fassi 
women borrow from available rules for interaction, such as attempting to remain 
unseen or ignoring the presence of men entirely” (2006:297). This snapshot of 
just a decade ago in Fes illuminates the rapid and experimental changes 
occurring in physical comportment, use of space, and gendered interaction.
Ultimately, Newcomb's work explores the individual and group imaginings 
of new spaces, and applies beautifully to the creation of new, fringe dating 
spaces. She notes that, “individuals’ contestations of urban social space 
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transcend the creation of individual identities. In defining the meanings and uses 
of new spaces, individuals make claims for collective visions of gendered identity 
and relationships” (2006:291). As with new dating practices in general, it is the 
individual's claim to new collective visions of space, practice, and behavior that 
allow for religious experimentation within an overarching Islamic discourse. 
Young Fassis would not be allowed, socially, to create new spaces for dating 
unless dating as a practice had already begun to be accepted by multiple socio-
economic classes in the medina of Fes.
Thus, youth in Fes, and in the medina in particular, have begun to seek 
out their own spaces for dating and courtship activities. Obviously, universities, 
schools, and the areas directly around these facilities are spots for young 
couples to 'hang out,' but for couples who are not classmates, or are not of the 
same neighborhood, specific places have to be traveled to in order to spend time 
together. One of the most common dating activities, taking a walk around the 
medina streets while perhaps snacking on roasted nuts or small sweets, was an 
activity conducted on the fringes of the medina. This may be in part because of 
logistics—the residential streets of the deep medina lack shops or any real 
posting or lighting, which could mean walking into secluded alleys, an action 
which brings a degree of shamefulness. Commercial streets deep in the medina 
are often so packed with donkeys, shops, and customers that it is not physically 
possible to stroll comfortably. Instead, on the few streets around the edges of the 
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medina—near Bab Boujeloud, BaTha, Square Baghdadi, or Rcif, for example—
youth could lazily stroll, hand-in-hand, and be in full sight of the public, ensuring 
few concerns of shameful behavior. 
Several cafes along the edges of the medina have also taken on new 
meanings to couples. As Newcomb notes, women in Fes do not often sit in cafes, 
traditionally the prevue of men (2006; 2009). For coffee shops and small cafes 
with only one seating area, this is predominantly still the case. However, several 
small cafes were built along the edges of the medina, such as in the BaTha area 
or near Rcif, which have a back seating area, or a small upper floor. In many 
cases, these cafes do not focus on coffee and tea, but on ice cream, sweets, and 
juices, and thus have a more family-oriented atmosphere. These shops are also 
often clean and well lit, important factors in making them more hospitable to 
women (Newcomb 2006:297). During my early visits to Fes in 2003 and 2004, 
these cafes often saw men and families seated at the bottom floor, while women 
with children or pairs of women would sit on the upper floor. These areas were 
largely out of sight, allowing for continued gender segregation even while in 
public. 
By 2012, these cafes saw a shift in the use of their segregated areas. 
Many of these cafes now host women in their lower seating areas, easily visible 
to the public. Women with children no longer drag them up the stairs for ice 
cream, but rather the entire family selects a table that is easily accessible. The 
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upstairs spaces have been taken over by mixed groups of youth and dating 
couples. In many cases, these quieter and less visible spaces are perfect areas 
to study together, with open tables and the ability to buy snacks. In other cases, 
couples take advantage of these semi-invisible spaces to kiss or cuddle. Laura 
Kaya observed a similar phenomena in her own work on youth dating in Irbid, 
Jordan where “the most intimate space available to couples exists in places like 
the high-rise “Here is Irbid” cafe. There, hidden behind the heavy curtain of the 
section “for families,” surveying all of Irbid though sixth-floor windows, while 
invisible to the street below, lovers sit in semi-darkness with their fully clothed 
bodies intertwined” (2009:262). In the medina of Fes, upper floors or back corner 
seating areas are particularly popular for chaperone dating, as well as for those 
in the upper class along all degrees of religiosity. 
In addition to changes in the use of commercialized space, there has been 
a dramatic change in the use of the hillside overlooking the medina of Fes. To the 
city's north, along a cliff-side, the Tombs of the Merenids have long sat in ruins. In 
2003, during my first visit to the city, I climbed the steep, dusty goat paths that 
wound up to the flat hill offering the best views of the city's panorama. The area 
was deserted other than goat herders and pickpockets, and was considered by 
most medina residents to be completely unsafe. Around the tombs are caverns 
cut into the mountain side which were used by Berber rebels at various times in 
Fes' long history to hide from makhzan and Protectorate control. However, the 
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remodeling of the luxurious Hotel Les Merinides in 2003 and development of the 
Borj Nord Arms Museum further west on the hill in 2009 motivated the city to put 
effort into cleaning up the tombs area, installing a large set of stairs leading to the 
hillside, and installing several large lights.
By 2011, the renovations were complete and the area was transformed. 
The spectacular panorama views resulted in immediate inclusion of the spot in 
new travel guides, and tourists began making the half-mile trek up the hillside for 
the view. But the vast majority of visitors to the area now are Fassis themselves. 
Some come from the Ville Nouvelle to view the medina nostalgically while 
avoiding the worst of the crowds. 
But in most cases, visitors are 
residents from the medina, looking 
for a way to escape the heat, 
crowds, and dirty air of the 
labyrinthine city. All along the 
hillside, families lay out blankets for 
picnics, packs of teens play soccer, 
and young couples canoodle. 
Couples can come with their family 
or friend-set before wandering off to 
a more secluded area, but still 
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Figure 13: The Hillside by the Tombs of the 
Merinids: The Most Romantic View in Fes
always in public where they are easily visible and free of shame. Around sunset, 
when the bowl of the medina turns purple in the shade and the mountains hazily 
disappear, many a romantic moment was spent by young couples. Rumors are 
also regularly spread about young couples using the surrounding caves to 
practice zina, but I never found an informant who admitted to the practice him- or 
herself. 
Only the Prophet was Perfect: Hypocrisy and Dating
Fassi youth are exposed to a wide variety of ideas regarding dating and 
courtship, including those of their family, friends, school, mosque, and, 
increasingly, national and international media and the internet. From these varied 
sources young women have begun to redefine courtship, but for many, this issue 
is heavily fraught with concerns of shamefulness, rumor, or impropriety. As a 
result, many young women are approaching these new-found romantic 
opportunities with some ambivalence (Davis and Davis 1989:132), similar to the 
experience of young Indonesian women described by Nancy Smith-Hefner 
(2005). Just as Fassi women experience competing and conflicting emotions, 
Javanese women are unsure of what their futures may hold: “on the one hand, 
modern social changes offers new freedoms and possibilities and encourages, 
even requires, the development of an important measure of autonomy. On the 
other hand, young women are admonished to control themselves, limit their 
desires, and remain chaste” (Smith-Hefner 2005:453-454). While the autonomy 
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and choice offered by new dating practices is exciting, many young women are 
concerned about their ability to make responsible choices for their long-term 
future, as well as concerns about how their families and peer-groups will view 
their process of selecting a husband. 
In many cases, dating is 
an activity which occurs with 
only the slightest of parental 
knowledge. Most Fassi parents 
I interviewed admitted that their 
sons or daughters knew 
unrelated youth of their age, as 
it was an inevitability of the 
educational process. But few parents had met the boyfriends of their daughters in 
secular or moderately-Islamic families, while it was more common for the families 
of religiously conservative couples to already be acquainted. A significant portion 
of my young informants, especially young women, admitted to dating or being in 
a romantic relationship without their families' knowledge. This behavior is 
certainly not unique to Fes or Morocco—a number of scholars working elsewhere 
have described similar secret romances (Smith-Hefner 2005:452). Thus, dating is 
often discussed among youth as something taboo but not entirely forbidden, 
something society loosely permits while largely still prohibits.
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Figure 14: Mixed Groups of Youth are the Loci of 
Debates about New Dating Practices
The result is that most young women in the medina of Fes are often more 
concerned about their peers' opinions of their dating practices than their families', 
because these young women do not expect their families to become involved in 
the process until the couple is considering engagement. As a result, it is—more 
often than familial pressure—peer mediation that moderates the experimental 
nature of dating in Fes. Youth place limits upon themselves within their group, all 
knowing full well that society at large is only tentatively accepting of their new 
ideas of physical comportment and romantic behavior. It is withing this context 
that accusations of hypocrisy, such as Malika's outrage in the initial vignette, are 
common.
Within peer-groups, there is rarely complete agreement about proper 
Islamic practice, as we will again see in the next chapter regarding the hijab. 
Groups share a common identity of being Moroccan Muslims, but the specifics 
are debatable, leading to a disconnect between the expected practices based on 
shared understandings and the actual practices of young women experimenting 
with dating. Combined with the overarching idea of forbidding wrong in Islam 
(Cook 2000; 2003), many young Fassis feel obligated, religiously and personally, 
to question or condemn a friend whom they view as straying too far from 
acceptable courtship practices. I was told of critiques and debates between youth 
of both genders, so both young men and women seemed willing to sanction the 
religious behaviors of others. However, since much of a young women's life is 
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spent around other young women, much of the monitoring young women 
experienced came from other young women, such as friends and classmates.
The notion of hypocrisy is often used to express judgment and concern 
that friends have overstepped the boundaries of religiously acceptable romantic 
experimentation. At times, I was surprised with the regularity with which I heard 
peers discuss hypocrisy, accuse each other of hypocrisy in front of others, or 
accuse each other of hypocrisy in writing either online or in cell phone text 
messages. Yet tensions were always fleeting and rarely were grudges held.
Dating is a topic which appears regularly in online conversations, often 
with accusations of hypocrisy. One of the most common spaces for wealthy 
young Fassis to display the practice of dating is on Facebook, where young 
women often post images of gifts received or events attended. Youth post 
photographs of mixed-gender groups from school on their pages, even while 
fellow classmates post comments condemning the group as hypocrites because 
of the physical touching shown in the photo. One young man commented to me, 
“when I see a girl that I want to learn more about, I look at her Facebook. I can 
see what she likes and how she talks to her friends. And I can look at pictures of 
her. If she tells my friends she is a good girl (bint an-nas), but I see pictures and 
she is shameful, then I know she is a hypocrite. Then I know she will only play.” 
The sharing of online images in particular was fraught with concerns about 
shamefulness and hypocrisy, as we saw at the beginning  of this dissertation with 
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Salma's panic over her Facebook page.
For almost all my informants, cell phones were a significant source of 
communication that allowed youth to break strict rules of gender segregation 
(Bowen 2008; Ilahiane and Sherry 2009). Almost all the young couples I met 
communicated via cell phone, and in many cases, these communications were 
kept secret from family members. But cell phones also have different meanings 
for each gender of youth, as D. Lee Bowen argues: “for a young man, a mobile is 
an inexpensive means of demonstrating he is part of the world. For a young 
woman, preservation of reputation is critical, but mobiles allow her to indulge in 
western patterns of romance while on the surface keeping traditional values” 
(2008:228). Setting aside Bowen's use of the term 'western,' I would rather focus 
on her description of women's cell phone 
use, where she juxtaposes the idea of 
indulgence with the notion of the 
appearance of keeping traditional values. 
Within her very argument lies the 
fundamental structure of hypocrisy—to 
make a personal choice that contradicts the 
core identity to which the individual claims 
allegiance. 
It should not be surprising, then, that cell 
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Figure 15: Cell Phone Use is Common 
Amongst Youth
phone usage was one of the behaviors most commonly associated with 
hypocrisy. Because young men and women were side-stepping the physical 
nature of gender segregation, many chose to hide their relationships from their 
families and conduct them via cell phone. Siblings and cousins often called each 
other hypocrites for simultaneously assuring their families they were pious while 
conducting cell phone affairs. In peer groups, young women in hijab were often 
accused of hypocrisy while texting their boyfriends.
Just as Malika was confrontational with her accusations of Kawkab in the 
opening vignette, some Fassi women can express extreme judgment and 
condemnation of their peers. As one young blogger from Fes wrote, 
I would say that having a boyfriend or a girlfriend does not 
really mean you are modern and cool. It has nothing to do 
with that. ... Still, young people are getting used to such 
relationships. It is maybe even in fashion. If one does not 
have a boyfriend or a girlfriend, he or she might be 
considered knotty and backward. This is simply because we 
are in the process of normalizing this kind of relationships. 
That is to say, people are taking such relationships for 
granted—as something normal. ... Some people are just 
following the crowd: just because their friends have 
boyfriends or girlfriends, they think they should have one too. 
In my opinion, that’s abnormal. (Berghabi 2013)
At the heart of this entire discussion are the rapid social and religious 
changes that are occurring in Fes, articulated above so clearly by the blogger as 
“the process of normalizing this kind of relationships [sic].” I do not wish to imply 
that all Fassis have fully or willingly adopted new ideas about dating. Most 
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parents are still extremely anxious about the breakdown of gender segregation, 
but accept it as a reality of schooling. Many parents forbid their children to begin 
dating relationships until after high school, though many youth still do so in 
secret. In a number of my interviews, youth expressed anxiety about the lack of 
set norms regarding dating, with some even questioning their own hypocrisy for 
embracing certain behaviors. I would argue, rather, that there is a process of 
social uneasiness and debate that occurs as mores adapt and change, and that 
Fassi notions of 'dating' or 'courtship' are experiencing this process. 
As Kawkab desperately noted, “only the Prophet was perfect.” The young 
men and women with whom I discussed dating and courtship were hardly 
perfect, but this fact only demonstrates their humanity, not any sort of 
exceptionalism. Many even expressed anxiety and uncertainty about the 
shamefulness or acceptability of their own actions. For others,  while expressing 
a sentiment similar to Kawkab's expanded notion of 'mistakes,' commented that 
they 'knew better' but 'gave into desires.' But for most, dating and courtship were 
processes understood within an Islamic framework, not in defiance of it. Impious 
actions were to be considered within a context of best intentions and personal 
interpretation, rather than hard and fast societal norms or religious normativities.
For young women, more so than young men because of pre-existing 
notions of women's hshuma, courtship can be stressful social process. Youth 
want to maintain acceptance within their peer-group, even as dating 
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simultaneously becomes more popular and more debated. Women who are 
actively creating their own Islamic subjectivities must consider the limits of 
physical contact, romantic language, and private interaction that they are 
themselves comfortable with while monitoring their friends' behaviors and 
listening to critiques of their own. The notion of hypocrisy is a useful tool in this 
process by reminding the critiqued of her obligation to shared notions of proper 
conduct between marriagable youth. At the same time, these women are 
participating in the process of social change by reorienting gendered space in the 
city, redefining the edges of public cross-gender interactions, and engaging in 
dating practices very different than their mothers and grandmothers experienced.
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Strategies to Make and Break Chaos: The Hijab and Identity in Fes
How can one tell the difference 
between a woman who wears the 
hijab out of conviction and one who 
does so for conventional reasons?
 --- Marnia Lazreg 
In ethnographic writing, we change the names of our informants to protect 
their privacy, selecting new monikers from a pile of generic names from that town 
or region. Sometimes, however, we choose names for our informants from our 
hearts. And so, it is with no hesitancy that I present my favorite of countless 
amusing stories I have collected over the years of my good friend, Average Mo. 
What made Mo so average? Well, he fully recognized that he was not a 
perfect Muslim, but rather that he followed some rules and bent others. 
Mohammad was a middle-aged, married father of two. He owned one of the most 
successful restaurants in all of the medina, and had a reputation of being a fair 
and reliable businessman and a generous Muslim. We met in 2009, and ever 
since I have been most impressed by his willingness to give away food from his 
restaurant and coins from his own pocket to any beggar who stopped in to ask. 
He said more than once that zakat (charitable giving) was not only an obligation 
of Islam, but also a joyful aspect of the faith. Always a gentleman, Mo provided 
me a front row seat at his cafe at a special table where I could do my work and 
not be harassed by passing men, and sometimes asked me about my hijab 
counts. More often, though, he would sit silently with me, sip his black-tar coffee, 
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and smoke long drags off cheap cigarettes. We would sit in silence and watch the 
people together.
Sometimes we would talk about topics of interest, often relating to religion. 
Mo regularly attended mosque, but he also gambled a bit, a trait hid from all but 
his closest friends. He loved his wife, crass jokes, and free cigarettes. Mo was 
the kind of guy you wanted to be around, and people constantly came to his 
restaurant just to greet him. He treated everyone equally, and was fun to listen to. 
He fit into any crowd, tried his best to be a proper Muslim, and still pushed the 
limits of good behavior from time to time. He was the quintessential example of a 
Muslim who does not fit into a perfectionist vision of Islamic practice, but is still a 
devoted and pious practitioner. 
And so, one September evening near dusk, I sat observing hijabs at the 
edge of Mo's restaurant. He sat with me, as if I were a man,36 and we drank 
rubbish coffee and split a pack of Camels while discussing the most recent 
Barcelona game. As we talked, my eye was caught by a beautiful muhajiba 
walking toward us down the street. Her sweater was red, with long sleeves and a 
high-neckline, but it tightly grabbed every inch of her ample bosom and narrow 
waist. Her hijab, white silk with a screenprint of luscious red roses, was securely 
36 In Fes, and Morocco in general, women do not sit in the front sections of cafes, nor do they 
drink coffee or smoke cigarettes. See the work of Rachel Newcomb (2009) for the best recent 
discussion of this trend in Fes. This is a relatively new phenomenon, and one I was allowed as 
a fieldworker (as opposed to a local Fassi woman). Still, I was pushing the boundaries of 
proper behavior for a woman, and would not have been able to do so if I had not had a long 
and trusted relationship with the informant.
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pinned and perfectly framed her face. Her bright red lipstick matched the 
sweater, while the heavy kohl on her eyes coordinated with her skintight black 
jeans.  Those jeans seemed nearly painted-on, tucked into knee-high black boots 
with three-inch heels precariously traversing the cobblestones of the medina 
road. I appreciated the completeness of her outfit, and the complementarity of 
her hijab. The young woman seemed in complete control of every inch of her 
presented self, from each stray hair to every color choice.
As she walked past, though, I noticed that she had caught the attention of 
Mo and several other men sitting in the front of the restaurant. While lovely from 
the front, the young woman was more noticeable from the back; her tight pants 
so faithfully hugged her behind that had I brought my Western sensibilities with 
me, even they would have been shocked. Mo was mesmerized. He leaned over 
to me and said crudely, “In America, you call that 'ass'?” I nodded my head, but 
told him never to say that to an English-speaker because it was hshuma. He 
laughed and continued. “You know what we call that in Fes?” He took a long drag 
off his cigarette, and chuckled deeply from his gut. “That! We call that... fitna!” He 
raised his coffee glass, and I did the same, and we clinked them, toasting her 
fitna while laughing uproariously. 
Mo's joke was hilarious within its cultural context. Fitna is an idea that 
exists on multiple levels in Morocco. On the one hand, fitna is the disorder that 
comes when normative Islam is abandoned and people no longer maintain their 
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moral and ethical codes, as discussed in the second chapter. Society falls apart 
as people misbehave and institutions lose control. On the other hand, fitna 
(lustfulness) is the struggle men experience when women behave or dress 
immodestly and male sexual desires become uncontrollable. Mo's use of the 
word fitna is the latter: he was objectifying the young woman and associating lust 
with a specific piece/part of that body. But he was also signaling his entry into the 
former kind of fitna: societal disagreements about women's bodies, sexual 
harassment, and the hijab. Perhaps most importantly, his joke demonstrated that 
the woman's hijab offered her no immunity to jokes regarding her modesty or 
sexual attractiveness. 
Debates about sexual harassment in particular focus on how women 
expose their bodies to the male gaze, particularly in terms of dress. The fitna 
caused by women's dress revolves around the idea that women's dress in Fes is 
now so immodest that it causes the other form of fitna—uncontrollable 
lustfulness. And in the case of our opening vignette, I believe my Average Mo 
would whole-heartedly agree.
Women's dress is always a topic of debate in the Islamic world, and 
neither Morocco nor Fes are unique in this regard. But even I have noticed in my 
decade of fieldwork experiences in Morocco that fashion has changed in Fes, 
and when I noted that to informants, not a single one disagreed. Just to give one 
tangible example, the jellaba, Morocco's beloved baggy hooded robe, went 
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through an evolution between 2003-2011 and now appears in most shops with 
knee-length and short-sleeved versions, and young women are expected to wear 
a tighter, form-fitting version of the dress. Every single Fassi I interviewed in my 
sixteen months of fieldwork agreed that women's dress in particular had changed 
dramatically in the past decade. The general consensus is that skirts had 
shortened, tank-tops were more prevalent, and, perhaps most importantly, 
women's clothing had become significantly more form-fitting.
Many of the young women I interviewed fully acknowledged this fact. 
Unsurprisingly, women in loose fitting clothes and baggy jellabas felt this was a 
dangerous change, while women in tighter apparel used language of success 
and progress. Many women noted that tight clothing resulted in more cat-calls 
and sexual harassment in the streets, and it was often pointed out to me with 
much frustration that wearing a hijab did not prevent harassment (see Stratton 
2008 for similarities across the Middle East). This was, in large part, because 
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Figure 16: The New Short-Sleeved Jellaba: (L) On Sale in Fes Jdid; (R) Young Muhajibat Wear 
a Variety of Styles, Including the Short-Sleeved Jellaba
there was almost no association between wearing the hijab and wearing baggy 
clothing in Fes. Modesty in clothing was associated with longer hemlines, 
especially long-sleeves and pants or long skirts. The tightness of clothing, in 
terms of following the contours of the body, was almost never cited by female or 
male informants as a necessity for modesty. As a result, it was very common to 
see muhajibat in form fitting clothing, especially in the summer. The hijab itself, 
then, is one piece of dress in a rapidly changing vocabulary of dress, but it is the 
most visibly Muslim aspect of a young Fassi woman's experience.
Much of the academic discussion regarding the hijab has located the 
practice of veiling37 within the context of the Islamic Resurgence (Mahmood 
2005; al-Qasimi 2010; Smith-Hefner 2007). But academics are not alone in their 
association of the hijab with the Islamic Resurgence; those engaged in the 
development of public Islam in the last forty years have repeatedly connected the 
hijab with normative Islam and proper women's practice. From the most strident 
Wahhabi to the most charismatic tele-Imam, much of the discourse of the Islamic 
Resurgence has encouraged Muslim women to don the hijab as a form of 
modesty and as a bulwark against fitna.
But Morocco has not experienced the Islamic Resurgence to the same 
37 Much of the academic debate regarding the hijab in the Muslim world refers to 'veiling' as a 
catch-all term to refer to the headscarf (hijab) and the facial veil (niqab). I will avoid the term 
‘veiling’ in the specific context of Fes because my informants there did not use the notion to 
describe the headscarf, which was always referred to as the hijab. The niqab is a very rare 
and specific occurrence in Morocco, and will be referred to as the niqab in this dissertation, 
even though some of my Fassi informants preferred the term voile to refer to the facial veil and 
hijab to refer to the headscarf.
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degree as other Islamic states, and, as discussed in Chapter Two, Fes is a city 
with a strong identity based on Moroccan Islam, one with its own sets of norms 
and values. In the localized interpretation of Islam in Fes, the hijab is understood 
in a variety of differing ways and is only sometimes a symbol of piety or as a 
submission to authority. At other times, it serves as an opportunity for personal 
expression of identity. This chapter examines how the hijab is understood in the 
medina of Fes in relation to social change, subjectivity formation, and imperfect, 
ambivalent Islamic practice. 
This chapter is not a discussion of the hijab as a part of normative Islam or 
as a political statement. This chapter is the story how a specific practice—
wearing the hijab—is understood by young women who are members of a 
society experiencing a bit of fitna. It is of no coincidence that fitna refers both to 
society-wide chaos and the internal lusts of men brought forth by women's 
impropriety. Many of the most prominent debates occurring in the Fassi and 
Moroccan media discussed in Chapter 2 are focused on issues related to 
women's bodies: sexual harassment in the streets, rape, dating, lesbianism, 
extra-marital affairs, and the hijab.
While fitna symbolizes a lack of control within society, and a man’s inability 
to control his sexual desires, I argue that the hijab has come to signify control 
within the lives of young women who choose to wear—or not wear—the hijab. It 
serves as an opportunity to demonstrate one's 'aql, not only in the realm of 
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religious piety, but also in terms of economic and social reason as well. As a 
physical manifestation of Islamic identity, the hijab is also a topic that is rife with 
accusations of hypocrisy. This chapter first examines  one avenue through which 
young medina women express their Islamic subjectivities: the hijab in Fes. The 
hijab serves as a tool from the Islamic tradition of knowledge which is being 
manipulated to address a number of concerns in young women's lives. The 
chapter then presents reasons young women choose to wear or to not wear the 
hijab in their daily lives, deconstructing the notion that the hijab is equated with 
modesty. I demonstrate, using data from a fourteen-month long survey of hijab-
use frequencies, that the hijab is not a 'forever' phenomena, as a significant 
percentage of Fassi women abandon their hijabs in summer months. Finally, the 
hijab and fitna are placed into the context of my larger discussion of hypocrisy 
and religious experimentation.
Covering the Veil: Scholarly Perspectives on the Hijab
As one of the most visible symbols of Islam, the hijab has been a subject 
of debate within scholarly literature, and the variety of perspectives on the hijab 
demonstrate what Faegheh Shirazi calls the “semantic versatility” (2001) of the 
hijab. Generally, the increase in women wearing hijab in the Muslim world over 
the past two decades has been attributed to the Islamic Resurgence, but many 
scholars, particularly anthropologists, have begun to explore the actual logistics 
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and motivations behind the rise of muhajibat in many Middle Eastern and North 
African states, and beyond. In many cases, the hijab is connected to notions of 
social status and positioning within the Islamic community (Ask and Tjomsland 
1998; Smith-Hefner 2007; Stratton 2008; Tobin 2011; White 1999). A number of 
academics have explored the hijab as a symbol of resistance and the process of 
wearing the hijab as a social or political act of defiance (Ahmed 1992; El Guindi 
1999a and 1999b; Fernea and Fernea 1997; Herrera 2001; Mahmood 2005; 
Mernissi 1987 and 1991; Shirazi 2001). In many other contexts, the hijab is seen 
as a way for a woman to develop a personal sense of piety (Bowen 2007; Ong 
1990; Smith-Hefner 2007; Stratton 2008), though again, the emphasis is on 
religious subjectivities and religious motivations. In the work of some 
anthropologists, most notably Saba Mahmood, the hijab is discussed as a part of 
women’s pious subjectivities, but as an expected, non-optional aspect which is all 
but required as part of the construction of women’s embodied Islamic practice.
Other scholars have focused on the hijab in relation to social structures 
and economic and political forces in a broader sense. The hijab can serve as a 
way to publicly announce a woman’s place in patrilineal family structures (see 
Kaya 2010 for Jordan and Abu-Lughod 1986 for Egypt). It can mark a political 
struggle against anti-immigrant sentiment in non-Muslim majority societies 
(Brown 2007; Scott 2007),  a way for women to distance themselves from the 
state (White 2002; Wickham 2002), or as part of a dialogue with autocratic Gulfi 
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monarchies (al-Qasimi 2010; Kelly 2010). It can be even connected to national 
identity and the process of strengthening nationalism (Adely 2007; Kelly 2010). 
Many authors and critics of Islam have focused on hijab as a mandatory 
part of anti-Western or anti-modernist discourse, but as the above literature 
demonstrates, this perspective is narrow and has little grounding in the actual 
experiences of Muslim women's lives.  As Nancy Smith-Hefner notes, while 
“veiling is often identified with traditionalist politics and an anti-Western rejection 
of modernity, contextual studies of women and Islamization suggest that the 
meanings of and motives for veiling are complex, varied, and highly contested” 
(2007:389). It is the last point that is most relevant—that across the Muslim 
world, the hijab is not a monolithic symbol, but a topic of debate and contestation.
Old Norms, New Norms: The Hijab in Practice
Normative views on the hijab in Islam are primarily drawn from the hadith 
and Qur'an, in which women's modesty is often emphasized. In the Qur'an itself, 
there are several passages which refer to how women should dress. Women 
past childbearing age may wear less clothing (Surah 24:60), men and women 
should embrace clothing as a gift from Allah now and in the afterlife (Surahs 7:31; 
16:81; 35:33; 44:53), and both should avoid excessive nakedness (Surahs 7:31, 
24:58). But there are two passages which are often pointed to by Islamic 
scholars and imams alike as justification for the hijab. The first connects the 
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notion of women's modesty with being respected as a Muslim and thus not 
harassed or annoyed: “O Prophet, tell your wives and your daughters and the 
women who are believers to pull down over themselves [a piece] of their outer 
garments.38 That is more suitable, that they will be known as believers and not be 
abused [harassed/molested]. And ever is Allah Forgiving and Merciful” (33:59).39 
The covering in this case is not related to modesty, but exists so that others 
recognize and respect a Muslim woman in public and accord her the respect she 
deserves as a believer. The problem with this argument is that if all women in a 
community are Muslim, the issue becomes moot: they are already known as 
Muslims. As Lazreg notes “the veil as a way of recognizing that a woman is a 
Muslim loses its meaning in the context of a predominantly Muslim society” 
(2009:45), and no Fassi woman ever used this surah as an explanation to me for 
wearing the hijab. As Morocco is nearly 99% Muslim and Fes is the spiritual 
capital of the nation, the notion that Fassi women would need to wear a hijab in 
order to be known to be Muslim is absurd. However, several of my young female 
informants specifically cited this passage not in conjunction with the hijab, but in 
relation to sexual harassment in the streets, stating that a woman recognized as 
Muslim should not be harassed. 
38 It should be noted that the word in the Qur'an is not hijab, but jalaabeeb, which Moroccans 
typically read as “jellaba”, the loose robe worn by both men and women in Morocco. It should 
not be surprising that most Fassis I asked about this passage argued that it encouraged 
women's modesty regarding her breasts, waist, and legs, and had nothing to do with the hijab 
whatsoever.
39 This chapter also includes several references to hypocrisy, and notes that Allah will punish 
hypocrites but that other Muslims should not harm them.
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One cool spring evening, I sat in my local mosque at a women's halaqa 
(Qur'anic study group) run by a woman trained by the makhzn. We had broken 
up into smaller groups to discuss Surah 33, which included the verse described 
above. Miriam, a young college student who balanced her Qur'an on one knee 
and her cell phone on the other so she could translate words she did not know, 
sat with me while the older women began debating whether or not the focus of 
the chapter was obedience (ta'ah) or deference (mura'at). The surah in question 
discusses hypocrites repeatedly, so I interrupted the discussion and asked who 
were the hypocrites described in the chapter. Each woman gave me a different 
answer: soldiers who do not truly fight for Allah (Surah 33:18-19), those who 
disbelieve because they are poor (Surah 33:25), those who spread rumors 
(Surah 33:60), and other, less clear-cut answers. For Miriam, the hypocrites 
chastised in the verse were the young men who harassed her in the street:
In this chapter, Muslims are told how to respect each other. It 
says men and women are equal, and that women should 
cover so that men will not harass us. But you see, now the 
young men, they harass us in the streets. See in that surah, 
see how it speaks of hypocrisy, and tells me not to fear the 
hypocrites? So I do not fear them, because Allah tells me to 
dress modestly, and I do, and so it is those men who will see 
Allah and be judged. These young men must not read the 
Qur'an to know they are hypocrites. I do not fear them, I am 
only sad for them.
Miriam's scathing commentary connected aspects of her own daily life with 
what she was learning and debating regarding the Qur'an, and brought to light 
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her frustration as well as her willingness to choose her clothing based on her 
desire to avoid attracting unwanted attention. Yet when I asked if these young 
men would be punished by Allah, Miriam simply shrugged. “Does it not say that 
Allah will forgive believers? Perhaps if those young men studied Qur'an, they 
would change their behavior. Then they would not be hypocrites, and Allah the 
Almighty would forgive them.” Miriam's willingness to accept hypocrisy as a 
temporary or fixable characteristic did not surprise me. I was more surprised, 
however, that she ascribed a lack of knowledge to men rather than women, 
displaying a new perspective outside of the usual Fassi understanding of the 
'aql/nafs divide. However, the very fact that this opinion was voiced at a religious 
education meeting may have caused Miriam to utilize an alternative discourse 
relating to 'aql and education. Her emphasis on intention, however, continues to 
echo themes from Chapter 3's discussion of an 'intention exemption' for those 
who do not yet know 'proper' codes of conduct.
The other passage commonly cited more directly addresses the notion of 
fitna, and implores Muslim women to limit those men who can gaze upon their 
beauty: 
Tell the believing men to lower their gaze and be modest. 
That is purer for them. Lo! Allah is aware of what they do. 
And say to the believing women that they should lower their 
gaze and guard their modesty; that they should not display 
their beauty and ornaments except what must ordinarily 
appear; that they should draw their veils over their bosoms 
and not display their beauty except to their husbands, their 
fathers, their husband's fathers, their sons, their husbands' 
198
sons, their brothers or their brothers' sons, or their sisters' 
sons, or their women, or the slaves whom their right hands 
possess, or male servants free of physical needs, or small 
children who have no sense of the shame of sex; and that 
they should not strike their feet in order to draw attention to 
their hidden ornaments.40 And O ye Believers! Turn ye all 
together towards Allah, that ye may attain Bliss. (Surah 
24:30-31)
From this perspective, women are charged with maintaining their modesty 
by limiting who can see her beauty. Both men and women are called to lower 
their gaze and to protect their modesty, but while the male is encouraged to be 
modest, first women are instructed how to be modest, and then women are given 
a clear-cut list of acceptable and unacceptable viewers. The hijab, and women’s 
active use of it, helps to prevent societal chaos and encourages all to lower their 
gaze and maintain modesty. Most of my Fassi informants cited religion as the 
main motivation for wearing the hijab, and more than half noted that the hijab 
helped prevent fitna, especially during Ramadan. The question, as I will later 
discuss, was how willing women were to bend the rules of religious practice 
when wearing the hijab was strategic, and whether the resulting fitna was 
considered to be negative in all cases.
For young women who cited religious motivation for wearing the hijab, 
many experienced a moment in their lives when they suddenly felt obligated to 
wear the hijab out of a sense of religious duty. For example, one mid-20s 
40  This refers to the fashion in 7th century Arabia in which women wore family wealth as anklets 
containing many silver trinkets which would jingle when she walked loudly.
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muhajiba described the afternoon when, while engaged in prayer (salat), Allah 
asked her “why I wore the hijab to pray, but not in the street. Did I not love Allah 
in every place, at every time?” Nancy Smith-Hefner describes a similar sentiment 
among young muhajibat in Java, noting that “almost without exception, these 
women describe their decision in pietistic and personal rather than social or 
political terms, a result of a deepening religious understanding, a “becoming 
aware” (menyadari) of their religious responsibilities” (2007:398-399). This notion 
of 'becoming aware' of religious responsibilities and proper social comportment 
could be rearticulated in Fassi terms: these young muhajibat are gaining greater 
control over their nafs, honing their sense of 'aql, and demonstrating their moral 
agency in a public way. 
Even for these young women, who could find comfort in the socially-
accepted religious motivation for hijab use, the experience of wearing the hijab 
was not without social pressure, and like Smith-Hefner, nearly all my informants 
cited social reasons for wearing the hijab in conjunction with religious or personal 
motivations. Social motivations—to fit in with peer groups, to please their families 
or mosque communities, to be fashionable and 'hip'—often caused the inevitable 
stress of trying to please a crowd even as they allowed these young women to 
exert a sense of control over their public persona. Even for women who decided, 
for religious reasons, to commit to a lifetime of hijab-use, the sense of 'becoming' 
aware/pious/an adult/faithful/beautiful/etc remained strong even years after 
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making the decision to become a muhajiba. 
Whether a young woman is 
wearing the hijab for explicitly religious 
reasons, or is wearing the hijab in 
response to other pragmatic concerns, 
the image created will be the same: 
colorful and controlled. The hijabs of 
Fassi women complement the wide 
variety of clothing worn by women in the medina. Hijabs came in the full 
spectrum of colors, patterns, and prints. Sequins and logos of the top European 
fashion houses added flavor, while 
hijabs with pendants on the ends made 
an appearance in early 2012. Beyond 
the scarves themselves, young women 
experimented with the style of twisting, 
tying, and pinning their hijabs. A highly 
placed bun with a bright, sweeping hijab 
was dubbed the Emira (princess) style, 
imitating both a crown and the latest 
fashion out of the Gulfi states. These 
seemingly arbitrary details, like much of 
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Figure 17: Hijabs on Sale in the Medina
Figure 18: Young Women and Matching 
Hijabs
fashion, were highly performative, allowing young women to express individuality. 
Many of my young informants also expressed a sense of happiness and 
satisfaction from wearing the hijab. In Indonesia, “women widely report that 
veiling helps them feel “calm” (tenang) and more in control of their feelings and 
behavior, particularly in interactions with the opposite sex” (Smith-Hefner 
2007:401). I found Fassi women expressed a similar sense of control, often 
noting that the hijab allowed them to feel or 'walk with' a sense of confidence 
(tiqa). Confidence was, in fact, the word most commonly associated with the 
hijab for young women who wore it instrumentally, and was also commonly used 
by young women who considered themselves muhajibat and wore the hijab on a 
daily basis for primarily religious reasons.
In many places in the Muslim-majority world, the hijab is associated with 
married life. In Fes, young, unmarried women were not expected to wear the 
hijab, but married women were expected to wear the hijab, and those that did not 
were sometimes questioned or critiqued. Many of the young women I interviewed 
in Fes directly connected the hijab to marriagability in one of three ways. First, 
many stated that once they were married, they would be expected to wear a 
hijab, and most young women felt this was the correct practice because 'my 
beauty is for my husband.' Second, many stated that they expected to begin 
wearing hijab when they wanted to date seriously with the intention of marriage, 
meaning that they connected taking on the hijab with a life-course event, and not 
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with any specific religious awakening or understanding. Third, many stated that 
'good Muslim men,' by which most young women meant non-drinking, non-
womanizing, financially-stable men, were looking for a woman in hijab for a wife. 
As a result, many young women discussed the hijab as a strategy to increase 
their marriageability with the most desirable of men.
Yet while it was widely understood that many young women would take on 
the hijab when they became married, it still was a point of contention for some 
young couples. I was walking through the J'nan Sbil gardens on the outskirts of 
the medina, talking to young couples about dating and romance while 
administering my survey. One young couple, consisting of a gentlemen in a tshirt 
and jeans and his girlfriend in a pretty blouse and slacks with her long, wavy hair 
in a loose ponytail, began taking my survey sitting next to each other. As was far 
too often the case, the two began conferring about their answers, debating what 
number on a scale of 1-10 to choose to represent their religiosity and discussing 
who they debate the Qur'an with. One question, 'if you are a woman, why do you 
wear the hijab?' confused the young man. I told him he could answer whatever 
he felt about the hijab. He wrote, “I only want to marry a woman in a hijab.” His 
girlfriend, a minute later, glanced over at his survey, read his answers, and 
gasped. She hit him on the shoulder and said roughly,
“Hypocrite! (munaafiq) Do not write that! You should be honest on her 
paper!”
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“But I am! My wife will wear hijab!”
“But look! You wrote that you are very religious! And you say that you will 
marry a woman in hijab. But none of your girlfriends (sahebatek) wear hijab! And 
me! I sit here with you, and you say that on your paper!? You cannot say you are 
a good Muslim but lie on her paper! You cannot say you only want hijab when 
you do not choose muhajibat!”
The young man paused, and looked at me awkwardly. He stammered 
some incomprehensible Arabic before asking, “then what is true?”
She narrowed her eyes and looked from his paper to his face. “I do not 
speak for you. I write my words on my paper. What is true in your heart?”
He scratched out his previous answer, and paused. He quickly wrote in 
Arabic, “I want my wife to wear hijab after we are married because I want to 
marry a good Muslim woman.” He showed it to his girlfriend, and she nodded 
approvingly. She showed her paper to him, where she had written, “I do not wear 
hijab now because I like to show my beauty. But once I am married, I will wear 
my hijab so that only my husband will see my beauty.” He nodded his head, and 
the couple happily continued working together on their respective questionnaires. 
Wearing the hijab is only one aspect of a young woman's identity, and as a 
result, the construction of peer groups is rarely based on hijab-use. As public 
schools neither require nor ban the hijab, groups of young women in Fassi high 
schools and colleges were almost always mixed. I was struck by the regularity of 
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mixed packs of young women strolling the avenues of the medina—some with 
hijabs, others without. Every young woman I interviewed in Fes reported having 
some friends who wore the hijab and some who did not. 
It became most apparent to me 
that peer groups of girls with and without 
hijabs were accepted and normalized in 
Morocco when I saw one of the most 
bizarre commercials I have ever 
witnessed on television. It was sixty-
second advertisement for Always Maxi-
Pads, the most feminine of products, and 
featured sixty-four smiling young Arab 
girls in white holding bright blue 
packages of napkins. Exactly half of the 
young women wore matching blue hijabs; the other half had their heads 
uncovered. To the lilting melodies of orchestral music, the girls danced through a 
choreographed show with formations colored coordinated by hijab: a 
checkerboard pattern; a blue square surrounded by a ring of bareheaded ladies; 
alternating stripes. They shot longing glances at the blue packages they danced 
with and then smiled at each other knowingly. Only at the very end of the 
commercial, when the package was shown with the product name in French, was 
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Figure 19: Mixed Groups With and 
Without Hijab are Common in Fes
the audience told that the feminine product was ideal for all women. The young 
women dancing in the commercial were representative of the demographic that 
they advertised to, and the peer group it presented was one of happily mixed 
young women.
But the commercial also drove home a very clear cut point: both the young 
women in hijabs and those with bare heads were there to be viewed, and 
observed. While their sexuality may be hidden—even while it is subtly implied 
that the intended audience possesses sexual potential by the very nature of a 
product designed for menstruating women—their bodies were meant to be seen, 
and were manipulated as part of the presentation. In addition, the hijab was a 
color-coordinated aspect of the women’s outfits and was part of a larger visual 
aesthetic. This is an important perspective from which to view the hijab: as an 
accessory which carries its own visual content and marks a woman’s sense of 
style, and not simply as a marker of a pious or non-pious individual.
Deconstructing Modesty: Fashion and Wanting to Be Seen
Most normative understandings of the hijab in Islam are connected to 
ideas of modesty. There is not a singular definition of what modesty actually 
entails. “Anthropologists correctly point out that modesty in Middle Eastern 
societies refers to a whole array of ideas and practices, including modalities of 
covering the body partially or totally; character traits such as bashfulness, 
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humility, diffidence, and shyness; and the system of beliefs and customs that 
embed gendered conceptions of sex, chastity, virginity, adultery, and the like” 
(Lazreg 2009:23). Modesty, then, is a concept wrapped up in notions of propriety, 
limited or withheld sexuality, but also connects conceptually to notions of virginity, 
honor, respectability and public comportment. What is deemed 'modest' differs 
from one society to the next, even within the Muslim-majority world; thus, while 
Lila Abu-Lughod provides a striking discussion of the nexus of shame, modesty, 
gender, and the veil in Bedouin Egypt (1986),41 her ethnographic material feels 
largely disconnected from the internet-obsessed, globalized young women of 
Fes' medina. And, as Saba Mahmood (2005) points out, even when a society, 
such as Egypt, agrees that female modesty is desirable, what practices 
constitute—and perhaps more importantly, require—modesty are also debatable. 
To Mahmood, the
most interesting features of [the hijab] debate lie not so 
much in whether the norm of modesty is subverted or 
enacted, but in the radically different ways in which the norm 
is supposed to be lived and inhabited. Notably, each view 
posits a very different conceptualization of the relationship 
between embodied behavior and the virtue or norm of 
modesty: for the pietists, bodily behavior is at the core of the 
proper realization of the norm, and for their opponents, it is a 
contingent and unnecessary element in modesty's 
enactment. (2005:23-24) 
Yet Mahmood also falls into a trap she repeatedly sets for herself by 
framing her entire discussion of women's piety within a normative framework of 
41 Abu-Lughod has herself acknowledged that in her seminal work Veiled Sentiments she heavily 
romanticized the 'resistance' aspect of her discussion of women's modesty (1990).
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Islam and the political nature of feminist, Islamist women's practice. She cannot 
explain the variation in motivations for wearing hijab. One might argue that 
Mahmood even falls victim to the same preconceived bias of her informants in 
regards to the normative 'purpose' of the hijab. As Samuli Schielke argues, 
women's headscarf (higab)... despite having become the 
standard dress of Muslim women, is expected to go hand in 
hand with the commitment to a pious disposition and, most 
crucially, a conservative sexual morality. Even when people 
acknowledge that this may not be the case in practice, their 
sensitive reactions to any public representations of higab-
wearing women in roles that do not fit the ideal of pious 
commitment show that they do expect the two to coincide. 
(Schielke 2012:98) 
Mahmood writes from a position which maintains this same expectation of 
coincidence between the hijab and piety. This chapter directly challenges this 
assumption of automatic coincidence.
What Mahmood considers to be one of the greatest strengths of her 
approach to women's piety is what I consider to be the weakest aspect of her 
attempt to engage with topic of the development of women's moral agency. 
Borrowing heavily 
from Foucault, 
Mahmood argues 
that, “an inquiry 
into the 
constitution of the 
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Figure 20: Two Contrasting Ideas of 'Beauty' and 'Appropriateness' in 
Young Fassi Women's Dress
self does not take the personal preferences and proclivities of the individual to be 
the object of study, but instead analyzes the historically contingent arrangements 
of power through which the normative subject is produced” (2005:33). She seeks 
to avoid identity politics, but I agree with Samuli Schielke (2008:541) that a return 
to identity politics42 is exactly what is needed to understand the highly 
individualized nature of the choice to wear the hijab, either permanently or 
instrumentally. This analysis must also include the possibility that young women 
may also fluidly shift between pietistic and instrumentalist understandings of the 
hijab as the circumstances of their lives change, and that each understanding 
may even evolve into the other with repeated embodied practice. As such, 
understanding how and why individuals and groups of women wear the hijab, 
and how they imagine it, is important for reaching an understanding of the moral 
agency behind the decision to wear the hijab.
In Fes, selecting, purchasing, and wearing a hijab, even if only on 
occasion or for brief periods, is a matter of taste, comportment, and social 
awareness. One of my first lessons upon moving into my household in Fes was 
that I had no taste in hijabs. I was unaware of the unwritten rules of choosing a 
proper hijab. Fashion came first, convenience or comfort came much later. 
Colors and patterns were essential and coordination with other aspects of an 
outfit were of great import. Creating a color palette to allow one to mix-and-match 
42  By 'politics,' both Schielke and I are referring to the negotiation of identity in relation to power, 
and not specifically the state or governmental apparatus.
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hijabs with jewelry, shirts, even sunglasses was a sign of self-awareness and 
taste. As Emma Tarlo notes, 
far from promoting an image of 
dull uniformity, the headscarf is 
often the most self-consciously 
elaborated element of an outfit, 
carefully co-ordinated to match 
or complement other details of 
a woman's appearance. Worn 
in a diverse range of colours 
and textures, built using 
different techniques of 
wrapping, twisting, and layering 
and held together with an 
increasing variety of decorative 
hijab pins designed for the 
purpose, the headscarf has in 
recent years become a new 
form of Muslim personal art. In 
many cases, it provides the 
aesthetic focal point of a young 
woman's appearance. (2010:1)
I find Tarlo's notion of personal art to 
be profoundly applicable in Fes. Most 
of my informants emphasized the idea of beauty in association with the hijab; not 
only in terms of the beauty that would be protected, but also in regards to a new 
beauty that is created through the use of the hijab. “When my hair is not clean, 
not soft,” argued one young medina resident, “I make my head beautiful with the 
hijab. Blue, pink, yellow... now my head is like a garden, not like the weeds” 
('asheb; 'grass').
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Figure 21: Shopping for Hijabs was a Serious 
but Fun Activity for Young Fassi Women
As a result, fashionability was one of the major concerns for many of my 
informants, young and old, and the process of purchasing hijabs was a social 
activity. I often spent sweaty afternoons standing in tiny hole-in-the-wall hijab 
shops, lined from floor to ceiling with hundreds of silky, gauzy, and shiny 
swatches of cloth. Sometimes the girl had a specific color or print she was 
seeking, or sometimes she had a new jellaba or other piece of clothing she was 
looking to coordinate with. The ritual was nearly universal: dozens were pulled 
out, unwrapped, and examined. Sometimes they were tried on right in the shop; 
in other cases, the aforementioned new jellaba would be pulled out of a bag and 
held to ensure a truly perfect match. In particular, hijabs should match not the 
main color of the outfit, but an accent color, such as the piping and embroidery 
on a jellaba or the bright flash of a hot pink necklace. Patterns were an 
opportunity to spice up a dull sweater while solid colors helped offset a busily 
decorated blouse. In each case, the choice was well-reasoned, and advice was 
often sought from girlfriends who came to join in the shopping. Versatility was 
also prized, particularly when groups of sisters or friends who regularly shared 
hijabs went shopping together. 
The notion of the hijab as a mark of fashion-forwardness, rather than of 
piety or modesty, is not unique to Fes, and as hijabs have become understood as 
a fashion accessory in more places, “the result has been not only a notable 
increase in numbers and styles of veils… but also increasing uncertainty as to 
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whether veiling is actually indicative of religious commitment or merely a fashion 
statement” (Smith-Hefner 2007:413). Smith-Hefner's comments come amidst a 
discussion of 'funky' (fongki) hijabs in Java. Linda Herrera describes a shop 
named “Flash for Hijab-Wearers” (flash lil-muhajabat) for young women looking 
for hijab chic in Cairo (2001). Noor al-Qasimi delves into the theological debates 
by Saudi clerics that led to fatwas which banned the “ 'abaya-as-fashion” in favor 
of what she calls the “juridical 'abaya” (al-'abaya al-shar'iya) (2010:56). 
Elsewhere in the Gulf, Marjorie Kelly notes that wealthy Kuwaitis display their 
piety and fashion sense simultaneously by paying attention to the context in 
which their dress will be evaluated and dressing with the proper amount of flair 
for their audience (2010). Outside of the Muslim-majority world, Emma Tarlo 
explores the complex subjectivities crafted by young Muslim immigrants in 
London, arguing that the expressiveness present in hijab fashion allows girls to 
create both malleable looks and malleable identities (2010). All of these 
examples broadly align with Allegra Stratton’s coyly coined term “muhajababe,”43 
a term to describe the young, fashionable, and experimenting women in capitals 
across the Middle East who are making the hijab a fashion accessory par 
example (2008).
Thus, wearing or not wearing a hijab for many young women was directly 
connected to the outfit they were constructing. In this sense, the hijab was an 
43  I never heard the term 'muhajababe' used in Fes. However, when I used the term, many of my 
young informants found the term humorous and applicable.
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aesthetic element that they could clearly control. This was especially true for 
women who were struggling with the beauty of their hair. One of the most 
common excuses for temporary hijab-use was a bad haircut or hair coloring 
accident. Early in my research, I began to question my informants. So many 
women, especially young women, explained that their hijab-use was temporary 
and seasonal, though this seemed to contradict much of the literature outside of 
Morocco regarding the hijab. As a result, I sought to determine if there were 
significant changes in hijab-use throughout the year. 
Seasonal Covers: Hijab Count Data Analysis
For four months in 2011 (mid-January to mid-May) and the entirety of 
2012, I collected counts of hijab use at the same location inside the medina of 
Fes. I situated myself roughly a block inside one of the medina’s major gates, at 
an intersection point of several major avenues leading deep into the medina, at a 
spot near businesses but within a reasonable walk of a hammam, mosque, and 
school. Each count was taken within the hours surrounding sunset; these are 
some of the busiest hours in the medina. Women were counted by hand, and 
separated based on a variety of physical features into the categories of 'older 
women' and 'young women' (see the section of the Introduction chapter to this 
dissertation to review methodology for this count). In each case, I counted and 
tallied the members of each cohort wearing hijab and not wearing hijab, to 
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calculate the percentage of hijab-use by older women and young women  in the 
medina of Fes. Over the course of 250 total days44 of sampling, I counted over 
120,000 individuals45 including approximately 51,000 young women (roughly 
42.5% of my sample). In addition to counting all women who passed my location, 
I also recorded the date and ambient air temperature, to allow me to draw 
general conclusions regarding how the environment affects hijab use in Fes. In 
essence, when my informants assured me I would witness fewer hijabs in the 
summer, I went out and counted to determine if there was a notable difference in 
hijab frequency depending on the season and conditions outside.
44  In addition to these 250 days of sampling, hijab counts were conducted during the holy month 
of Ramadan in 2012. As is discussed in later in Chapter 6, hijab-use shifted dramatically 
during Ramadan. As such, the data from that month has been removed from this analysis and 
is discussed later. The analysis presented in this chapter refers to all non-Ramadan months of 
the year. 
45  Obviously, this figure does not imply 120,000 distinct individuals, but to 120,000 data points 
over the course of the 16 months of data collection. 
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Graph 1: Women's Hijab-Use in Fes 2011-2012, By Month
As can be seen in the above graph showing women's hijab-use in the 
medina of Fes, I found a remarkable difference in hijab frequency based on the 
season. Older women and young women adjust their hijab use based on the time 
of year. Graph 1 presents the averages for each month, combining 2011 and 
2012 data sets for the months of January, February, March, April, and May. For 
older women, hijab use declined from 89% use during winter months to 74% in 
August, meaning that roughly 15% of older women in Fes adjusted their hijab-
use for the weather. In comparison, young women were much more willing to 
remove their hijabs in the summer, moving from 55% on average in winter 
months to 30% in the heat of July: nearly a quarter of all young women, and 
almost half of the young women who wear hijab at any point remove their hijabs 
when the summer months arrive. Even combining all members of the sample, 
hijab-use drops from 77% to a low of 52% in June, meaning that a quarter of all 
women in Fes adjust their hijab seasonally. 
When women make the choice to wear or not wear hijab based on the 
season, they are usually making a decision based on ambient air temperature. 
Fes rarely experiences rain, and, as the saying goes, when it rains, it pours. Most 
Fassis stay inside during the short, violent rains that occur in Spring and Fall. 
Hijab-use is thus rarely affected by precipitation or other weather factors beyond 
temperature. The second graph, shown directly on the next page, presents 
average hijab-use by air temperature across all fourteen months of sampling. 
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Graph 2: Women's Hijab-Use in Fes, 2011-2012, By Temperature
Graph 2 presents the averages for degree of temperature, combining 2011 and 
2012 data sets. For older women, hijab-use declined from 92% use during cooler 
temperatures to a low around 70% in the hottest of days, meaning that one out of 
every five older women was willing to remove their hijab in hot enough weather. 
In comparison, young women were much more willing to remove their hijabs 
once temperatures began to rise, moving from nearly 70% during the coldest 
evenings to below 30% in the heat, implying that nearly half of young Fassi 
women are willing remove their hijabs when heat led to discomfort. Combining all 
members of the sample, hijab-use drops from 83% to a low of 50% as 
temperatures rise, meaning that a third of women in Fes adjust their hijab as the 
heat increases. 
But perhaps the most useful conclusion which can be definitively drawn 
from this data is that, at every point, there is a tangible gap between the 
percentage of older women who wear hijab and the percentage of young women 
who do the same. As was mentioned earlier, many Fassi women see the hijab as 
a marker of married status, and so many high school and college-aged women 
reported to me that they would eventually wear the hijab, but not until they had 
accomplished certain career goals and married. As such, my data found a 
consistent gap of roughly one third, or 36%, between older women’s hijab-use 
versus young women’s hijab-use. Women across all age groups reduced their 
hijab-use noticeably during warmer summer months. However, as both graphs 
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demonstrate, there is a slight expansion of the divide between older women’s 
percentage of hijab-use and young women’s percentage as temperatures 
increase. In other words, an additional 10% of young women wearing hijab are 
willing to cease wearing them during hot weather than older women. Young 
women appear to be more comfortable adjusting hijab-use based on weather. In 
all cases, however, it should be quite clear: in the medina of Fes, the hijab is not 
a permanent condition.
Many of the college-aged women I interviewed discussed the hijab as an 
accessory or fashion strategy, rather than as a state-of-being. Young Fassi 
women often noted that they would make a decision regarding the hijab at a later 
point in their life, with the expectation that they would embrace the hijab when 
they were married. As one young woman argued, “then my beauty belongs to my 
husband. So I will hide it when I am in public. I do not let others eat his food or 
wear his clothes. I cannot let them look upon me.” But while the expectation that 
they will wear hijab at marriage explains the difference between percentage of 
hijab-use among older and young women, this argument does not explain why 
some young women choose to experiment with the hijab, or to occasionally wear 
it.
Purposeful Piety: The Hijab as a Woman's Strategy
The fact that there are statistically significant decreases in the 
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percentages of older women and young women wearing hijab in the summer 
demonstrates that some Fassi women choose to wear the hijab in public on 
some days and to go bare-headed on others. While this statement may seem 
matter of fact, it is problematic to a normative view of the hijab as a permanent or 
forever condition, or even to the notion of the hijab as a permanent marker of 
mature, married status. In Amman, Jordan, Sarah Tobin found that “the notion 
that “the hijab is forever” is rather wide-spread and pervasive in Amman across 
social classes and ethnic distinction between Jordanians and Palestinians” (Tobin 
2011:253). Nancy Smith-Hefner also found the notion that young women, when 
they were ready, would take on the hijab in a permanent way (2007:402). In Fes, 
I found many young women who were recontextualizing the hijab outside of 
notion of religiously-inspired modesty. The hijab was a fashion accessory, but it 
was also a tool which could present a controlled image to the world. Choosing 
exactly when, where, how and why they wore the hijab allowed these young 
women to exert control in their appearance, and in many cases this was used to 
shape economic and social opportunity.  The very fact that many Fassi women 
chose to wear the hijab at some times, and not at others, and that environmental 
factors directly affected hijab use demonstrates that motivation is multifaceted 
and adherence to normative religious beliefs was imperfectly practiced at one 
end of the spectrum, deliberately rejected at the other.
In some cases, the hijab was simply a cover, a scrap of fabric like any 
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other piece of fashion that could be used as a cover. In this sense, this form of 
dress is not exactly a hijab, but a scarf for the head, and could be paralleled to 
any woman choosing to cover her head. Yet, because the scarf has an 
associated symbolism, many see a woman with a covered head and associate 
the piety and modesty assumed with the hijab. In some cases, however, that 
assumption could not be more incorrect.
Rachida and I had been friends for several months before I gathered the 
confidence to question her regarding her hijab. A first-year student at a local 
university, Rachida had grown up in the medina of Fes and now made the daily 
commute to the Ville Nouvelle for class. Her family was lower-class and 
financially insecure, and Rachida was forced to cover her own expenses as well 
as contribute to her family’s finances whenever possible. She worked small jobs, 
waitressing near her university in the Ville Nouvelle, or taking small tips for 
tutoring her upper-class university classmates in chemistry. She became my 
informant when one of her professors, a Fulbright Scholar and friend of mine, 
mentioned that he could no longer tutor her in English and that she needed a 
new, inexpensive tutoring option.
For months, we met once a week for a few hours to converse in English, 
often about topics of mutual interest—women’s life, dating, sex, Islam, politics, 
and more. Rachida often laughed when I asked her questions regarding her 
piety; she told me more than once, “I’m a good Muslim girl, but we all are, right?” 
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(ana Muslima mezziena… walakeen, kunna, nam?) Rachida prayed several 
times a day, though rarely at mosque, preferring to pray with her mother in their 
home. She often dressed in form-fitting clothing, but with conservative hemlines 
and measured coverage. While hardly the most conservative of my informants, 
Rachida often spoke of the importance of proper Muslim conduct, especially 
during Ramadan and other sacred times of year.
Yet it was her quixotic use of hijab which confounded me. She would only 
wear the hijab for a week or two a month, seemingly at random, yet nothing else 
about her clothing or demeanor would change. After several repetitions of the 
behavior, I asked her gently why she chose to sometimes wear hijab. 'I’m sick 
now' (ana murida deba) was always her response. This puzzled me greatly—my 
own experiences with the hijab taught me that constricting nature of the hijab, 
particularly on the forehead and throat, was unpleasant while ill. Was it pursuit of 
baraka for the sake of healing? Did it reinforce self-confidence during times of 
physical insecurity? Yet for each question, I always received the same response 
– 'I’m sick now.'
This was until late one October afternoon when after a long conversation 
regarding what I believed was the instrumental use of the hijab by young women 
in Fes. When I noted that I had been surprised to learn how many young women 
in Fes chose to wear hijab on a day-to-day basis, rather than as a life decision, 
Rachida blushed and tugged at her own tightly-tied hijab. “It is true, Miriam. Many 
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women, we wear the hijab for not only Allah. We wear it for us.” When I pressed 
her to explain her position, she stumbled in English. I asked her to switch to 
Arabic, and she paused before leaning forward across the table and whispering 
to me, 
“I will show you my ‘sickness’, Miriam, but you cannot tell my family.”
We looked around the café, and asked the waiter where the closest 
washroom was. He directed us to a small hotel next door, where we visited the 
bathroom after paying for our tea. Rachida frantically pushed me into the small 
toilet area, slamming the stall door behind her and ensuring twice that it was 
locked. “You will not tell my family?” she asked again. I reassured her that our 
discussions and meetings were always private, and that I would never tell her 
family, whom I had never met regardless. Satisfied, she pulled off her hijab and 
gently caressed her neck. 
“Miriam,” she whispered softly in the dingy room, “in Arabic… this is al-
huDDa al-jinsiyya. What do you say in English?”
I paused, my heart in my throat, my jaw locked shut to keep it off the floor. 
“Those…” I hesitated, unsure how to explain in English other than to teach her 
the colloquial term. “Those are named ‘hickeys’, Rachida. Do you have a 
boyfriend?”
“No,” she replied just before breaking into tears. “I have a job.” (andi  
khedma)
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As she would then explain to me after we returned to the café and ordered 
another round of teas—once, of course, her hijab was again securely fastened—
Rachida had been forced to take a job as a prostitute based in one of the 
discoteks on the edge of the Ville Nouvelle of Fes. Her family had not been able 
to afford her school books, taxi fare to university, or other expenses, and Rachida 
felt obligated to cover her own expenses rather than giving up university to work 
full-time. Instead, she worked several evenings a week in the Ville Nouvelle, 
taking clients of various ages, and soon found that the bruises that marked her 
body could be hidden by conservative clothing. Her neck, however, could only be 
hidden beneath a hijab. She would even wear the hijab at home, explaining to 
her family that she was overtaken by a love of Allah and a desire to be modest. 
Already a moody and distant daughter, she explained, her parents did little to 
question her behavior. 
The stories she had told me, of waitressing and tutoring, were the lies she 
told all who asked where her money came from. Her fear, however, was not her 
family’s judgment, but the judgment of her family by others if those in her 
neighborhood knew of her shameful profession. After discussing the issue that 
day, we never discussed it again in our future meetings, as Rachida showed 
great shame and discomfort in talking about her time as a prostitute. From that 
point forward, however, each time I saw Rachida in her hijab, I thought of her 
tears and my own confusion, because I came to see her hijab not as a sign of 
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piety, but as a marker of her financial distress and loss of control over her own 
body. Her hijab use was entirely instrumental—the scarf was a tool to hide her 
activities, and being a muhajiba (hijab wearer) was a purposeful activity, not a 
permanent way-of-being. 
In contrast, for some young women in Fes, the goal was to control others' 
perceptions of them by depending upon the assumption that a muhajiba was 
pious, and were thus engaging in a kind of 'purposeful piety'—a public display of 
piety for a pragmatic goal that has little to nothing to do with normative Islamic 
beliefs about modesty or faith. These women are essentially betting on rhetorical 
nature of the question: “How can one tell the difference between a woman who 
wears the hijab out of conviction and one who does so for conventional 
reasons?” (Lazreg 2009:74). 
Another interesting variant on purposeful piety was the fact that, in 
professional cases where a 'pious' or 'religious' woman was not preferred, Fassi 
women delayed their hijab use to present an image of impiety or secular-ity to 
gain social or economic advantage. This strategy was employed most often in 
relation to economic challenges faced by young women entering the very 
overcrowded Fassi work force. Of course, Fassi women and their families are not 
the only Muslims to connect the hijab with limited employment opportunities. 
Brenner (1996) and Smith-Hefner (2007:397) found that Javanese parents not 
only feared that their daughters would struggle within their peer groups if they 
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chose to adopt the hijab, but that these parents saw the hijab as a hindrance to 
profitable and respected employment. Tobin (2011), Stratton (2008) and others 
discuss a similar issue in the Arab Middle East. Yet the active dis-use of the hijab 
was striking in one interview I conducted in Fes.
Many of Fariha's friends described her as possessing 'aql, and I had to 
agree, Fariha was savvy. She knew how to assess situations, tune her own 
conduct to be just proper enough, and keenly assert herself in ways to gain 
advantage. We conducted a series of interviews throughout the summer of 2012, 
after she had just completed her bachelor's degree in business. Fariha knew 
what she wanted: she wanted a job.
Top of her class, Fariha was a hard-working 21-year-old from a middle-
class medina family. She did not need to work to support her family, but instead 
wanted a career in a bank 'for a few years, until I make a home with a husband.' 
Fariha's family was pious, and her mother and sisters wore the hijab, including 
her younger sister Samia. Yet Fariha had chosen to delay her use of the hijab. 
Early in the summer, when we first started our interviews, we met in a trendy cafe 
on the edge of the medina. Fariha was dressed in a neat blouse and professional 
slacks, the uniform of a professional woman in the medina. Our interview was not 
actually focused on the hijab at all, but on future plans and professional goals. 
She spoke in smooth French, and informed me that she was on a mission.
“Miriam, I will get a job at a bank. That is what I want to do in life. Banks 
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are good, you know. They are clean, and professional. They are good for pious 
women, because you work with men but in an office, not in a store or restaurant 
where perhaps he will be hshuma. A woman can make good money at a bank, 
and her family will have respect because she must be smart to work at a bank. I 
am very smart when I work with numbers, so I know I will be good at the job.”
“I have heard it is very difficult to get a job at a bank,” I replied, and Fariha 
nodded strongly. “Why is it so difficult?” I asked.
“Well, banks are run by men, of course. And many banks want women to 
work at the counters because we make the customers happier. But bank men, 
they do not want women in hijab.46 A woman in hijab, she will always put religion 
and family before the bank. When she becomes pregnant, she will leave the 
bank. So if you go into the interview with a hijab on, they will say no, no, she 
might be Salafiyya, do not hire her. That is why I do not wear the hijab.”
“Will you wear the hijab someday? Once you are married?”
“Oh no!” Fariha laughed. “I will wear it very soon. I want to wear it so 
much, I am so sad I cannot. I will wait until I get the job at the bank. You see, 
here, you cannot be fired. If you are bad at your job, you cannot be fired. And so I 
have talked to other women in my program [at university], and they all waited. I 
will go to the interview and act like I do not want to wear the hijab. Then, once I 
get the job, I can wear the hijab. Surely they cannot fire me for wearing hijab!”
“Why would you not just wear the hijab out in the street but then take it off 
46 At the time of my fieldwork, there were no Islamic banks in the entire country of Morocco.
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for the interview?”
“I believe that once I put on the hijab, Allah will see me, and then I will feel 
shame when I go out without the hijab. So I cannot just wear it and then take it 
off. And people will see me, and then maybe they will tell the bank man, and then 
the bank man will think I am a liar.” Fariha snorted slightly, seemingly annoyed at 
my question. “I have thought about this for many years, since before university. I 
planned so that no one could call me a liar.”
“But, once you get the job at the bank, you will wear hijab?”
“Yes...” Fariha trailed off, and then snorted again. “I suppose that I am 
lying to the bank man. I... what would you say in English? Je vais tromper la 
banque?”
I hesitated, then replied, “I will trick the bank.”
“Yes!” Fariha repeated my English phrase carefully. “I will trick the bank! 
They will think I am not pious (pieux), but I am! Yes!” 
Our interview continued as we discussed issues of education and personal 
finances. Fariha's proud use of her new English phrase went into my fieldnotes, 
and I largely forgot about the conversation until early fall, when I ran into Fariha 
near the Avenue Hassan II in the Ville Nouvelle. I barely recognized her—she 
was wearing a perfectly-cut powder blue business suit, which was entirely 
professional but very form-fitting, and a pair of stylish beige heels. Her face was 
framed with a cleanly-pinned lavender and blue flowery hijab, and hosted a giant 
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pair of black sunglasses that were all the rage among young French women back 
in Paris. Luckily, she recognized me, raced over, grabbed me by the arm, and 
demanded I have lunch with her at one of the neighborhood's trendiest cafes. I 
acquiesced, and it became clear she was quite proud of her new status as a 
career woman. Even the wallet she pulled out to pay for our meal was designer 
label. She had landed a job at one of the largest and most prestigious banks in 
the Ville Nouvelle, and worked at its most 'downtown' branch. At one point, she 
asked me how I liked her new hijab. I responded, and then asked how her boss 
liked it. Fariha laughed.
“Do you think I am a hypocrite, Miriam?” Fariha giggled and smiled 
warmly. “Yes, perhaps you are right, I am. My boss is happy with my work, he 
knows I am dependable and honest. So he does not disapprove of the hijab. He 
said I could not wear jellaba, but that is not a problem. I did deceive the bank! But 
no one was hurt. And now I wear my hijab! I am a hypocrite, but now I have my 
job and my hijab.”
Fariha's self-satisfaction was thick. For her, years of planning had paid off, 
and she had gained everything she wanted. That her ability to wear the hijab was 
an opportunity which had to be delayed until after other opportunities were taken 
advantage of demonstrated a different, pragmatic perspective on the hijab than 
normative views might suggest. While Fariha's example was one of the most 
extreme in terms of purposeful piety, interestingly enough, her reasons for 
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wearing the hijab were not unusual at all: she, like so many other young Fassi 
women I interviewed, wanted to please Allah, follow the rules of Islam, and be a 
good, pious woman. The hijab was simply going to be a physical marker of her 
identity when it was most advantageous, but delaying the hijab was not a morally 
questionable thing to do. Neither, it seemed, was tricking the bank. Her 
ambivalence toward normative Islam did not alter her own sense of Muslim 
identity, even as she self-identified as a hypocrite with acceptable intentions.
Hypocrisy and Concluding Thoughts
It should be clear by this point that the hijab is a useful marker for 
observing the social fitna occurring in Fes because it is a physical manifestation 
of piety—supposedly—and its frequency can be examined objectively. But the 
hijab is also conceptually an aspect of being visibly Muslim. After all, if a woman 
is born in Fes, unless she is part of the tiny Jewish and ex-pat community, she is 
going to be a Muslim, and her Moroccan Muslim identity is assumed as 
discussed in the second chapter of this dissertation. Her use, non-use, or 
sometimes-use of the hijab is always held in contrast to the overarching notion 
that she is a Muslim woman. Wearing the hijab is a way of performing that 
Muslimhood visually, and requires effort each day to do so. Tarlo argues that 
for most women the adoption of hijab marks the moment of 
transition  from  simply  being  Muslim  to  becoming  visibly 
Muslim. It may be adopted for private and personal religious 
reasons but it makes those reasons public and coping with 
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this public visibility is no easy matter, not least because of 
the  multiple  projections  and interpretations  of  others.  This 
means  that  however  discrete  and  private  a  woman's 
intentions might  be,   she finds her  decision to  wear  hijab 
publicly highlighted and has to learn to deal  not only with 
other people's projections but also with the changed sense of 
self that such projections engender. (2010:75)
Tarlo's emphasis on public highlighting of moral decisions and projected 
subjectivities illuminates how hypocrisy comes into play. The hijab is a visual 
marker which commands attention. Peer groups are largely mixed when it comes 
to hijab-use, and yet it was the most commonly debated topic among groups of 
young women. Young women experimenting with the hijab were often subject to 
accusations of hypocrisy. Young women like Fariha who used the hijab 
instrumentally were often called hypocrites by friends and relatives alike. And 
hijab-use was often brought up among young women who were arguing about 
other behaviors. For example, in the focus group that was described at the 
beginning of Chapter 4, when one young woman declared another a hypocrite for 
her loose views on dating, the accused shot back, “I am a Muslim, of course, and 
why do you question when you wear no hijab?” But in these many cases, the 
accusations of hypocrisy serve only to reinforce the notion of shame and 
encourage desirable behavior, not to castigate or denounce the individual.
Nancy Smith-Hefner argues that, among her informants, some “describe 
the veil as a constant physical reminder, one that helps keep them from 
overstepping the bounds of moral propriety” (2007:401-402). Yet in Fes, where 
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the hijab is not a permanent phenomena among young women, and where the 
hijab may even be used instrumentally for concerns not related to religion, it is 
not the hijab itself that prevents the individual woman from overstepping the 
boundaries of what is considered acceptable within her peer group. The hijab is a 
physical marker which brings attention to the moral flexibility of many young 
women, but it is social tools, such as hypocrisy, that allow the young women in 
Fes to push the boundaries of acceptable moral practice while also addressing 
their needs and desires. In other words, it is accusations of hypocrisy that occur 
when young women question the hijab-use of other young women that create the 
new bounds of moral propriety. As such, hypocrisy is a tool ideal for a society 
experiencing a little bit of fitna. It allows Fassis to command proper behavior and 
call attention to poor behavior but in a way that allows people to push the 
boundaries of acceptable morality with little permanent consequence.
 The hijab also serves as a physical marker of but one aspect of a young 
woman's identity,  and may in many cases not even be a reflection of an Islamic 
subjectivity so much as a tool for solving problems. But the affect is full of 
powerful embodiment as literal tying together of scarves parallels metaphoric 
tying together disparate elements of one's subjectivity.  As Emma Tarlo notes, 
“the overloaded symbolism of hijab can therefore have extremely alienating 
effects on the wearer. Learning to master the hijab, to tie it in different styles, 
experiment with colour, combine it with fashions does, in this context, have 
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considerable importance, for it becomes a means by which a person integrates 
her pre-hijab past with her hijabi present and learns to untie, or literally 'tie up' 
different multifaceted strands of identity and belonging” (2010:76). This process 
of intertwining the religious and other facets of personal identity, as discussed in 
chapter 2, is rife with stress, error, and social sanctioning. The hijab is a physical 
manifestation of this subjectivation. That women tie and untie it, and with that 
action, do so with their identities, is undeniable. What is most interesting in Fes is 
that young women will often reach over and retie their friends' hijabs 'properly,' a 
physical practice which mirrors the use of hypocrisy and other social tools to retie 
young women's identities. 
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(Ch)Eating Together: 
Ramadan, Piety, and Hypocrisy Among Moroccan Women 
The mosques are crowded 
with a sulky, grumbling 
population, making themselves 
offensive to one another on 
earth whilst working their way 
to heaven.
--- Richard Burton
McDonald's47 is a surreal place in Fes during Ramadan. With the 
Moroccan penal code banning Muslims from eating in public, most restaurants 
are closed during the daylight hours, but McDonald's remains open to cater to 
tourists and to families (since children are not required to keep the fast). More 
importantly for my psyche, and for the happiness of many Fassi university 
students, McDonald's in Fes offers round-the-clock air conditioning and free Wi-fi, 
meaning that the multi-story restaurant is always teeming with locals of the 
middle and upper classes. On the blazing days of 2012's Ramadan, when daily 
temperatures always exceeded 100ºF,  many Fassis would visit the McDonald's 
for an hour or two, without consuming any food or beverage, just to sit in the cool 
air. 
On one such hot afternoon, I sat in hiding from the sun while writing up 
notes. The air-conditioning was up so high that I shivered, while young children 
ran circles around their exhausted and disinterested parents. A middle-aged 
47 The McDonald's in Fes is on the edge of the Ville Nouvelle, about a two mile walk from the 
medina.
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couple entered the restaurant, waited in line, ordered their food, and received 
their purchases in a bag. The couple sat at a table next to me, and began to 
unpack the bag. A staff member rushed over, asked them to bring their food to 
the counter, and walked them back to the cashier. The cashier began to point to 
a sign inside the restaurant (which also appeared outside the restaurant), which 
explained the law prohibiting Muslim adults from eating in public during the 
daylight hours of the month of Ramadan. The husband, nodding, began to pack 
the food back into the bag. His wife, however, threw her purse onto the counter, 
dug in her heels, and demanded that they be permitted to eat their food within 
the restaurant where they could sit in the cool of the air-conditioning.
As the wife became more 
excitable, the young cashier's face grew 
panicked. He called over his female 
manager, Fatima, to talk with the wife. An 
outspoken middle-aged mother of three, 
Fatima immediately took charge of the 
situation as more and more restaurant 
patrons turned their attention to the 
dispute.
“Ma'am, the sign outside is very 
clear. If you want to buy food for yourself or 
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Figure 22: Sign Outside the 
McDonald's Explaining that Only 
Tourists and Children Could Eat During 
Daylight Hours
your husband, it is possible, but you must take it away from here to eat it. You 
cannot eat here, it is the law.”
“No,” the wife replied emphatically, “we want to eat here, with the air 
conditioning.”
“Do you not understand the laws?” The manager's voice grew louder. “This 
is Ramadan; you fast. Shame on you! You will not fast?! Shame! You know your 
punishment ( 'iqab) is great! And you shame your husband to ask not to fast. You 
shame us all. We must all follow the law. You shame us all!”
Suddenly, without warning, the wife leaned forward, reached over the 
counter, and slapped the manager across the face. My jaw dropped. Women 
around me gasped, and reached up to pull down their lower eye-lids, making the 
physical gesture meaning “hshuma!” Several men rose and rushed toward the 
counter, concerned about impending escalation.  The husband restrained his 
wife, who began a screaming tirade I could not manage to translate. Yet the 
manager stood her ground, un-phased by the assault. Other restaurant staff 
threatened to call the police, while the wife responded that she had done nothing 
wrong and that they were wrong for refusing to allow her to eat in the cool. After 
several minutes of screaming, lunging, and a failed second-attempt to slap the 
manager, the wife accepted that she would not be eating her Big Mac in the cool 
of the restaurant. Her husband dragged her from the scene while all of us 
watching stared in shock.
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After the proverbial dust settled and the counter-staff was able to return to 
work, I pulled Fatima aside to ask for her perspective on the assault. 
“Jackass! (Hmara!) But... it is not a problem. Allah will see her actions and 
mine. We are Moroccan, and we fast for Ramadan. That is the law. That woman, 
she is shameful. Kat t-ramaDan! (She is misbehaving because of Ramadan!)”
The concept of t-ramaDan is one loaded with contradiction and shame. 
T-ramaDan is a verb in Moroccan colloquial Arabic meaning “to behave poorly or 
with anger during Ramadan” (Ali 2010; Ouajjani 2012).48 To my knowledge, the 
term does not appear in other dialects of Arabic. A common usage is 'Sme-Hi-li,  
t-ramaDant!': 'I'm sorry, I was rude to you because it is Ramadan!' Fatima was 
fulfilling her religious obligation to forbid wrong and to command right. In 
criticizing the misbehaving wife with this term, Fatima was also acknowledging 
the obvious experiential contradiction of Ramadan: during daylight hours, 
Muslims should behave with exemplary humility and patience while 
simultaneously straining under the physical weight of the fast.  Satisfying both 
contradictory requirements of Ramadan means making a commitment to follow 
clearly delineated rules at all times, public and private, even when emotionally or 
physically challenging. 
All Moroccan Muslims are legally required to fast publicly and are socially 
48 The name of the holiday Ramadan is derived from the ninth month of the Islamic calendar in 
which the fasting of Ramadan takes place. The root ر-م-ض  refers to “dry, scorching heat” 
(often of the ground). This verb (ناضمرت), like many in Moroccan Arabic, is a bastardized 
“verbing” of a noun, and is not found in Qur'anic or Standard Arabic.
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expected to fast privately; any deviance from these expectations is, as I will 
demonstrate below, deemed unacceptable. While Ramadan is charged with 
meaning across the Muslim world, understanding the Moroccan example of 
religious experimentation is challenging because social enforcement of public 
fasting is reinforced by the laws of the state, through Article 222 of the penal 
code. As Ramadan is also a time of amplified moral stakes—expressed 
emphatically as Fatima screamed “You know your punishment is great!”—the 
holiday serves as an example of when religious pluralization cannot be tolerated. 
t-ramaDan is just one example of Fassis using the notion of hypocrisy to limit 
religious pluralization.
This chapter demonstrates the inherent contradictions that have 
developed in actual, imperfect practice of Ramadan in Morocco and uses 
analysis of those contradictions to illuminate hypocrisy in the construction of what 
Walter Armbrust calls “Ramadan the holiday” (2002). In particular, the slang term 
t-ramaDan illustrates the contradictions tied to the blessed month, as well as the 
anxiety caused by the amplified moral stakes of the holiday. In this chapter, I 
explore the theological conceptions and moral registers of 'Ramadan the period 
of fasting,' which emphasize public obedience to group and state will and the 
performance of piety in religiously and legally circumscribed ways. I present a 
snapshot of Ramadan as practiced in Fes, with all its contradictions and chaos, 
placed within the larger Moroccan debate about Ramadan as the “month of 
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hypocrisy” (Nichane 2006). I also demonstrate the importance of Article 222 (the 
Ramadan fasting law) and the Masayminch protest movement against it in 
coloring recent debates about hypocrisy in Ramadan. Ultimately, I use the 
overwhelming enforcement of public Ramadan fasting in Fes to demonstrate the 
limits of religious pluralization, arguing that the amplified moral stakes of the 
month discourage variation in Islamic practice in Fes.
Theological Constructions of Ramadan
Ramadan is a month in the Islamic calendar in which, according to the 
Qur'an, “fasting is prescribed for you as it was prescribed for those before you, 
that you may become pious believers” (Surah 2:183). The blessed month is a 
time in which Muslims experience their faith by demonstrating their commitment 
to fasting and prayer, and is a mandatory experience for all able Muslims as one 
of the five pillars of the faith. Fasting is obligatory during daylight hours, which 
includes a ban on many morally questionable activities, as discussed below. 
The daily fast is broken with al-iftar (the breakfast meal), a feast enjoyed in 
a communal setting right after sunset (maghrib) call to prayer. The communal 
aspect of the fast-breaking meal is an essential part of the Ramadan experience 
throughout the ummah. Jorgen Hellman demonstrates that even in Muslim 
communities, like those of West Java, in which eating is a private affair, the 
breaking of the Ramadan fast is a necessarily a collective act (2008). In Muslim-
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minority countries like Singapore, spaces for celebrating Ramadan are carved 
out the urban landscape annually to allow Muslims to enjoy open-air food 
bazaars together (Ismail 2006). Today, many Muslims choose to break the fast 
with cigarettes or snuff as well as the communal meal. Nights in Fes are spent 
eating, socializing, and contemplating in individual and group prayer. There is an 
increased feeling of commitment—commitment to the fast, to Allah, to the family, 
and to the community. 
Ramadan is a time in which the 'pious stakes' are higher. As I was often 
quoted by eager Fassis, during the month of Ramadan, the 'gates of Paradise 
are open and the gates of Hell are closed,'49 meaning that all previous sins can 
be forgiven. Actions during Ramadan have a sort of 'amplified' morality—good 
deeds are rewarded double-fold and bad deeds punished twice over.50 Voluntary 
prayer (tarawiyy) 'counts' more than at other times of year, leading many Muslims 
to pray more often during Ramadan. Not only is the commitment and discipline of 
Ramadan fasting rewarded many times over, but disobedience of Ramadan rules 
means increased punishment. Intentionally breaking the fast (without a 
Qur'anically prescribed exemption) cannot ever be erased, an idea that led many 
of my informants to insist that it was acceptable for the community to compel 
49 Al-Bukhârî: Sahîh, book of fasting (as-sawm), chapter 5; al-Tirmidhi: al-Jami‘ as-sahîh, book of 
fasting (as-sawm), chapter 1, hadith 682.
50 Al-Dârimî: Sunan, book of fasting (as-sawm), chapter 54 (Fadl qiyâm shahr Ramadân); al-Tirmidhî: al-
Jami‘ as-sahîh, book of fasting (as-sawm), chapter 1, hadith 683; al-Bukhârî: Sahîh, book of fasting (as-
sawm), chapter 6.  
239
people who do not want to fast to do so.51 Thus, the eating of food—or, perhaps 
more correctly, the not-eating of food—has profound moral consequences, not 
just for the individual, but for the society that must monitor and direct the actions 
of the individual.
Laylat al-Qadr, the Night of Destiny, is believed to be an evening with 
special religious reward (ajr)52, and prayers in Laylat al-Qadr are 'worth those of a 
thousand months.' Many Muslims begin increased prayer and Qur'anic study in 
the last days of Ramadan after Laylat al-Qadr (celebrated on the 27th night), 
when the rewards are multiplied.  This amplified morality means that deviation 
from religious and social norms has great moral consequence, and the group 
more readily enforces the fasting law as a tool to moderate experimenting voices. 
Laylat al-Qadr is also the beginning of a dangerous time in Ramadan—many 
believe that fickle spirits are locked up that month, but are released on the 27 th, a 
belief rejected by scripturalist Muslims but common among women in Morocco 
(Buitelaar 1993:68-69). 
Ramadan is a period that requires restraint from all bad deeds. This 
means that one should refrain from swearing, insulting others, consuming any 
mind-altering substances, smoking or using tobacco, thinking about or engaging 
in sexual activities, gambling, arguing, physically fighting, or generally causing ill-
will. This may also include enjoying music, as Sarah Tobin argues occurs in 
51 al-Bukhârî: Sahîh, book of fasting (as-sawm): chapter 29
52 Moroccans use the word ajr, which denotes the idea of “wage” or “payment”, as opposed to 
thawaab, which simply refers to “reward”.
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Amman, Jordan when “one ethical, “Islamic” framework that regards music as 
haram, or “forbidden,” eclipses another, more diverse “cultural” framework, and 
does so largely without inducing crisis or controversy” (2013:292). As Lindholm 
notes, these limitations mark not only a restriction on eating, but a larger 
limitation on the borders (hudud) of the body (Lindholm n.d.:8; see Buitelaar 1993 
for a gender-specific version of this argument). 
Because Moroccans consider poor public behavior to be taboo during 
daylight hours of Ramadan, the concept of t-ramaDan is used to express the 
social disapproval of the shameful actions in a way that recognizes that the very 
conditions which require superior behavior (the morality of Ramadan) also work 
against that superior behavior (the physical strain of fasting during Ramadan). 
Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of my informants reassured me that the superior 
behavior I would see during Ramadan would be consistent throughout the 
holiday, but this did not appear to be the case: more fights broke out in my part of 
the medina as the month wore on, and nights were hardly the bastions of piety 
that Islamic idealists would make them out to be. But in Fes during Ramadan, 
there is an overarching sense of moderation, humility, and the avoidance of 
impure thoughts and deeds.
It is also important to recognize the seasonal variation of the Ramadan 
experience. Because Ramadan moves around the Gregorian calendar year, 
Ramadan is celebrated in both winter and summer, depending on the rotation of 
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the lunar calendar. Thus, the fast of Ramadan was set apart as a sacred period, 
and “part of the genius of Muhammad was to create a new way of measuring 
time which would effectively remove all Muslim holidays from any previous 
connection to seasonal celebrations” (Lindholm n.d.:24). Ramadan in winter 
means eight or less daylight hours of fasting, while summer fasts can last up to 
sixteen hours. In my own Fassi family, 2012 was the first year my eleven-year-old 
brother began to fast. This was considered both an honor and a challenge, 
because the first Ramadan is viewed as especially emotionally and physically 
difficult, and so the commitment required was greater. To face one's first fast 
during the longest, hottest part of the summer constituted a matter of pride for a 
young Muslim, even if small allowances are made for drinking water. For all 
members of the community, summer Ramadans present unique challenges – 
dehydration and heat stroke become serious concerns, fajr53 occurs long before 
the start of the Westernized 'work-day,' and catering to non-Muslim tourists can 
become more stressful. As a result, summer Ramadans are more stressful 
(physically and, as a result, psychologically) and lead to more t-ramaDan. Most 
challenging to even the most dedicated Fassis was the ban on drinking any water 
during daylight hours, which led many of my informants to avoid the outdoors for 
the hottest hours of the day.
Despite quiet, ascetic associations with fasting, the thirty days and nights 
53 Fajr is the pre-dawn call to prayer which signals the beginning of the fast during Ramadan. 
During Ramadan 2012, fajr occurred at roughly 4:30 AM.
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of Ramadan are far from a calm, contemplative ideal. Rather, Ramadan is a 
festive time accentuated by color, energy, and sugar. As is the case across much 
of the Muslim world (Lindholm 2002; Schielke 2009b; Tobin 2011), meals during 
Ramadan are decadent and filled with meats and sweets, leading Ramadan to 
be the most expensive month of the year for most Moroccans. In the medina of 
Fes, many stores stopped selling their normal goods three weeks before 
Ramadan and began selling shebikiyya, a honey-soaked cookie considered a 
mandatory iftar course to many Moroccan families.  As explained in Chapter 2, 
Moroccans traveled from across the country and from abroad to purchase the 
popular cookies by the kilo. Fassis regularly spent 'too much' on food for 
Ramadan, particularly on fresh fruits and tomatoes, and the price of food was a 
regular topic of discussion around the iftar table. On the edge of the medina of 
Fes, in the Square Baghdadi, carnival rides were first erected a week before 
Ramadan actually began. 
During daylight hours, the square was a heat-blasted void full of the mechanical 
skeletons of bumper cars, a carousel, and other rides. At night, the spaces 
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Figure 23: Square Baghdadi During Ramadan Daylight Hours
between filled with carts of food sellers, the rides lit up and blared edgy techno 
music, and every spare stair and aisle was packed with smiling Fassis. 
Elsewhere across the city, streets were lined with flags and lights, sugary snacks 
were sold from every side alley, and music54 and Qur'an recitation poured out 
from the high slivers of windows. It is the juxtaposition between daytime piety and 
nighttime partying that leads to a public debate in Morocco regarding the 
hypocrisy of Ramadan.
Days and Nights: Different as Night and Day
To explore the 'holiday' of Ramadan, let us take one Thursday night, like 
any other night during Ramadan, when I wandered down to the Square Baghdadi 
on the edge of the medina of Fes. With the sun long gone, the giant square was 
54 While Tobin (2013) describes the social pressure to avoid music during Ramadan in Amman, I 
found the very opposite to occur in Fes. Music was still purchased and shared, and many 
youth used the Ramadan carnival as an opportunity to share this media. CDs of tarab 
(traditional Arab music) and rai (a high-energy North African drumming-based music) are sold 
in tents set up in the Ville Nouvelle during Ramadan and are given as gifts. Music was played 
so loudly from these carnivals and others that it was often impossible to sleep during night 
hours.
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Figure 24: Images from Ramadan Nights: (L) Shebekiyya Sellers; (CL) A Gambling Carnival 
Game; (CR) A Line of Young Adults Waiting for a Carnival Ride; (L) A Couple Canoodles Near 
Bumper Cars
lit by the neon and strobe lights blazing from rides and precariously wired light 
bulbs hanging from carts and make-shift tents. Ferris wheels, bumper cars, tilt-a-
whirls, and other fast-spinning behemoths stood on platforms, filled with young 
men and women on dates or younger children eagerly photographed by mothers. 
One make-shift tent housed a lottery-style dice game for winning kitchen 
supplies. Another tent, which I was rarely allowed access to, hosted a fast-paced 
betting game with horrifying odds that was only open to men. Teenage boys 
competed in shooting games to win cupie-dolls for their younger sisters while 
older boys bested each other at hammer-slam tests of strength. A fishing game 
using one-liter bottles of soda, commonly seen in Marrakesh's djamaa al-fna 
Square, was imported north for the Ramadan carnival. Perhaps most importantly, 
every space between rides hosted an opportunity for food: carts of candies and 
nuts; scorched steel-drum seed-roasters; open-flame grills with skewers of spicy 
merguez-sausage kebabs; cotton-candy whippers; men with industrial-sized 
buckets of spiced chick-peas; and, of course, endless stands selling shebikiyya, 
the beloved honey-soaked cookie.
The air was thick with smoke, heat, and exhaust. The open-flame grills 
poured greasy, meaty black smoke into the air, which lingered in the stiffing heat. 
More than half the men around me were smoking cigarettes, and cigarette sellers 
simply stood and yelled for customers, many of whom returned to the same 
vendor over and over as the night continued.55 Intermixed with these smokes was 
55 In Fes, cigarettes can be purchased at hanoot (bodegas) by the pack, but most men in the 
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the sweet, irritating smell of hashish, which some young men mixed with tobacco 
and rolled into joints.56 On top of these smokes sat a thick layer of motorbike 
exhaust from young men riding into and around the square, combined with the 
endless exhaust created by a motorbike stunt show performed in a giant tent at 
the front of the square. 
Throbbing techno music blared from the speakers of the rides, often at 
such a high volume that the speakers whined and buzzed with overload. Children 
were constantly running around, screaming and playing, while adults clumped in 
groups and chatted, laughed, and watched the scene. Young men with the arms 
of sisters, cousins or girlfriends wrapped around their waists revved motor-bike 
engines and goaded each other. Young couples sat focused on their smart-
phones, earphones split, some listening to American rap music and others 
listening to Qur'anic recitation. Quiet, poorly-lit corners on the edges of the 
square were occupied by young couples preferring a more secluded date-spot; 
some used the opportunity to steal Ramadan kisses. 
On this Thursday night, I sat on the steps lining the edge of the Square 
medina cannot afford to purchase their cigarettes in bulk. Rather, cigarettes are sold by 
'sellers' (often children, poor widows, or unemployed young men) who purchase cartons, split 
open packs, and walk around the medina selling cigarettes individually for a half to two 
dirham. The Moroccan film Casanegra (2008) provides insight into this process. Men often 
purchase one or two  cigarettes at a time to consume immediately, a practice that many men 
have privately confessed to me is done so that their wives do not catch them. During 
Ramadan, the vast majority of men I interviewed chose to purchase cigarettes individually 
during the nights to avoid the temptation of possessing them during daylight hours. 
56 While many young Moroccan men choose to smoke hashish out of pipes or water pipes in 
private, hookas are illegal in Morocco, so hashish can only be smoked 'inconspicuously' in 
Fassi public spaces using joints.
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with Lalla Aisha. Aisha was a mutelema57 and grandmother in her mid sixties. 
She had come to the carnival with her two teenaged grand-daughters, who had 
quickly run off to meet classmates. Aisha allowed the girls to wander freely, after 
giving them money for rides and food, as long as 'they stay with classmates and 
each other.' We sat, passing back and forth a bottle of cheap pineapple soda, 
and discussed the carnival. Her experiences as a child during Ramadan were 
heavily shaped by the nature of rural mountain life in the mid-Atlas, but ever 
since moving to Fes in the 1980s, she enjoyed the celebrations within the 
medina, including the carnival. She, like many older Fassis, preferred to stay on 
the edges of the chaos, where conversations could be had without yelling and 
motorbikes did not threaten to run over hobbling elders. She felt, however, that 
certain aspects of the carnivals was changing.
“Aywa, these motor-bikes! They are hshuma!”
“Why?”
“Look at the young women on the back, holding onto the man who drives. 
Look at her hands, they are not where they should be. No, I would not allow my 
[grand-daughters] to ride with boys on those. It is shameful.”
“But what about married couples?” I asked hesitantly.
“Married women, they do what their husbands ask. If their husband says to 
57 A mutelema is a woman who wears a tlem, a special facial veil worn in a specific way with 
jellaba (hooded robe) to symbolize a change in social class. Berber women who move to a city 
wear the tlem to mark that they are no longer rural or poor, and it is worn to show the eyes and 
nose. Most importantly, the tlem is not worn for piety reasons and does not carry a religious 
connotation.
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ride the motor-bike with him, she should. She is his wife, so she may put her 
arms around him. They are married, and I do not tell a wife how to treat her 
husband.”
“What about these youth on dates (msaHbat)?”
“Aywa! These girls, they have no shame! Look at the skin,” she reached 
up and rubbed her arm from shoulder to wrist, imitating the sleeveless tank-tops 
worn by many young girls. “Too much skin! And the hijabs, they come off (kanu 
azaaltu) when the sun goes down! Munafiqat!”
“Munafiqat?? Why?”
Shaking her head, she took a sip of soda and sighed. “Look at them! They 
dress... They are like wives in the day, but whores at night! (bhal zowjat fi-lyoum, 
walakeen qaHbat58 fi-leel)”
Lalla Aisha may have been an ornery old woman, but her observations 
made sense as I looked out over the crowd. Her testimony could not be a more 
clear description of generational change. All around us, young men and women 
held hands, shared headphones, and consumed snacks together. One pair 
quarreled until the young woman slapped the boy and stormed off. Packs of boys 
wandered, cat-calling flocks of linked-armed young women. While hemlines were 
more conservative than I might expect at a summer-time carnival in the US or 
Europe, the scene did not match the descriptions Fassis informants had given 
me before the holiday began. Tank-tops were common on women, and while 
58 This is a very strong term that is not used in polite company.
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shorts on women were rare, capri pants with heels or babooshes59 were favored 
by many young women. Young men wore denim shorts and a variety of styles of 
shirt, including sporty tank-tops. The split between day and night may be 
apparent in many aspects of the carnival once the sun sets, but the most visible 
marker of the experiential divide between sacred and profane time during 
Ramadan lies in women's hijab-use. 
Women's Hijab Use: Quantitative Analysis
In the previous chapter, I argue that women's hijab-use is a highly strategic 
mode of communication that more often correlates to practical concerns than to 
individual expression of piety. Because wearing the hijab is a matter of social 
choice within Moroccan society, Fassi women often choose to wear hijab during 
the month of Ramadan as a way of embracing the atmosphere of increased piety 
and humility. Others feel that hijab becomes an obligation, even for women who 
do not choose the headscarf for personal reasons. As one seventeen year-old 
college student explained to me, “during Ramadan, we are not to think of sex. 
We are not to bring fitna into our hearts. With long, hot days, this is hard for the 
men. So women, we must wear the hijab during Ramadan to help the men, to 
help control the fitna.” Both men and women expressed the sentiment that men 
would not be able to avoid sexual thoughts about women during the fasting hours 
of Ramadan unless women took action to prevent this, and that the onus was on 
59 Babooshes are traditional Moroccan shoes.
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women, not men, to avoid fitna. 
One might assume that the result would be an increase in hijab-use during 
Ramadan, and almost all of my informants, both male and female, assured me 
that this would be the case in interviews before, during, and after Ramadan. My 
quantitative-sampling data demonstrated that this claim was only partially correct 
– daylight hours did see an increase in hijab-wearing in both older and younger 
women, but nighttime hours did not present an increase in young women's hijab-
use. In other words, while more women put on headscarf during Ramadan 
daylight hours, young women took those headscarves off once the fast was 
broken. Lalla Aisha was absolutely correct: the hijabs, they come off when the 
sun goes down.
To obtain data on hijab use, I adjusted my hijab-counts to include more 
data points during Ramadan. During this month, I decided to control more strictly 
for the variable of time, collecting two data points each day: one sampling in mid-
afternoon (during daylight, fasting hours) and one sampling in late evening, after 
'isha prayers (during nighttime non-fasting hours, after daily required prayers 
were completed). For daylight hours, sample size ranged from 125-275 women, 
while nighttime counts ranged from 250-315 women.60 The results, demonstrated 
in Graph 3, include data leading up-to, during, and after Ramadan. 
60 The variations in sample size are because of irregularity of traffic based on weather, time of 
day, and other uncontrollable variables. 
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As should be clear from the graph, hijab-use during Ramadan was not the 
same for day- and night-time. Night-time numbers remained very close to the 
equivalent periods and temperatures during other months, and night-time 
numbers continued to show variation due to ambient air temperature. Day-time 
numbers, however, show considerably less variation due to temperature; after all, 
if a woman has made the decision to wear hijab during Ramadan days as a sign 
of piety or to prevent fitna, temperature does not change this calculus. But the 
interesting observation that can be drawn from this data is that young women in 
particular showed a propensity for 'removing the headscarf' between day and 
night. Young women dress much less conservatively during the nights of 
Ramadan, so the increased presence of young women's hair at night mirrors the 
increased presence of bare skin and fitted silhouettes. But there appears to be a 
marked effort, during daylight hours, to reduce the chances of young men 
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Graph 3: Women's Ramadan Hijab-Use in Fes, 2012
thinking about sex through young women's veiling, to express personal piety and 
humility, or even just to cave to public demands for propriety during daylight 
Ramadan hours. 
Ramadan Entertainment: Television and Piety
Before exploring the morality of fasting or the legal framework enacted by 
the makhzan to control Ramadan practice, it is worth pausing to examine an 
example of evening entertainment within the homes of Fassis who choose not to 
attend carnivals or other public celebrations. During the long days and high-
energy nights of Ramadan, many Muslims around the world enjoy special 
television programming produced for the holiday period. Some of the programs 
are religious in tone and content, but many are designed to fit the festive mood 
and utilize the communal nature of breaking the fast by offering programs that 
include an element of discussion or teasing. Walter Armbrust demonstrates how 
Fawazir Ramadan, a riddle-based program produced in Egypt during Ramadan, 
exemplifies the 'holiday' of Ramadan, rather than the religious experience of the 
holy month. The program challenges the audience with riddles more related to 
Egyptian culture than religion, presented by a popular actress who dances and 
play-acts the riddle to the camera. Armbrust ultimately argues that a process of 
the “Christmasization” of Ramadan, in which focus is shifted from the pious to the 
commercial (Armbrust 2002), is occurring.  He differentiates Ramadan into two 
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separate categories which are helpful in our analysis of religious pluralization 
regarding Ramadan, arguing
in public culture disseminated by the mass media, the 
religious obligation of fasting during the month of Ramadan 
has become the twin of the holiday Ramadan. Ramadan the 
holiday is associated with Ramadan the period of ritual 
fasting. The two aren't exactly the same, but it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to pull them apart. (2002:347)
While I do not see a “Christmasization” occurring in Morocco the way he 
noted in Egypt (with, for example, musical adaptations which turn Sufi chants into 
mock Christmas carols), I do agree with his overarching point about the role of 
commercialism and consumption in creating two conflicting perspectives on the 
Ramadan experience.
Lila Abu-Lughod examined another example of holiday television-
programming in her analysis of Hilmiyya Nights, a popular Egyptian soap opera 
shown during Ramadan (1995). She found that while the show emphasized 
patriotic and secular political themes, women instead related to the show on 
personal levels, identifying more strongly with female characters (an aristocrat 
and a belly-dancer-cum-caberet-owner) even though these characters were 
neither the main protagonists nor represented positive moral characteristics. 
Again, however, Ramadan viewers chose to enjoy a show that emphasized the 
history and unique cultural aspects of the Egyptian experience, with little regard 
to religiosity or the supposed ban on low-brow thoughts or sexualized imagery.
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Moroccans too have their Ramadan entertainment on television. According 
to a survey by MarocMetrie, about 50% of Moroccan viewers watch satellite 
television broadcasts from across the Muslim world, while the other roughly 50% 
of Moroccans would stay tuned to 2M or Al Aoula, the two state-run stations. This 
was, as many explained to me, because the Moroccan state television did not 
offer a variety of quality programs during Ramadan. In fact, the only television 
show which had significance in Fes during Ramadan was a candid-camera style 
show made specifically for Ramadan entitled 'Jar wa Majrour.'
The title of the show, Jar was Majrour, literally means 'The Neighbor and 
The One who is Swept Along.' but might better be understood as 'The Friend and 
the Mark.' The premise of the show is simple: a person agrees to take part in a 
candid-camera prank on his friend, and then the friend is taped via hidden 
cameras in a ridiculous and embarassing situation. After comedy ensues, the 
person reveals the con to his friend, cameras are revealed, everyone laughs, and 
then the entire group smiles at the camera and wishes the audience a happy 
Ramadan. The cons are often connected to amusing gender situations: an old 
man is driven to the airport when his friend stops to pick up a loud pregnant 
woman in labor; a macho man getting his hair trimmed at the barber has the hot 
towel from his shave removed only to see that the entire shop has been 
transformed into a salon with women getting haircuts; in several cases, a 
woman's purse is stolen at inopportune times and the male authorities she 
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reports the theft to do not believe her. During Ramadan of 2012, every single 
family I broke the fast with would, if the television was not already tuned to 2M, 
switch the channel to view Jar wa Majrour, regardless of the socio-economic 
status or degree of religious conservativeness. I would be “shushed” when the 
show began, and commercials were spent loudly debating the unfolding con and 
humorous consequences.
The appeal of the show was apparent—produced in Casablanca, the 
dialogue is in derrija and is easy to understand, the symbolism is familiar and 
often simplified, and the scenarios constructed drew on everyday activities and 
easily-relatable embarassment. But the show also fits into the contradictory 
framework of Ramadan. The Mark comes to believe that his friend is being 
genuine and honest, while the friend is actually saying or doing one thing while 
thinking another. The friend's performance is deception, not hypocrisy, as he is 
deliberately presenting a falsehood to create a con for clearly expressed 
purposes. Yet the themes exemplified in the show—that you cannot trust or 
believe what is being shown to you, that people act differently than they believe 
but at the expense of comfort and social cohesion, and that you are always being 
watched and judged even when you are unaware—resonnate on the same 
frequency as those behind hypocrisy. Ultimately, the show is about two-faced 
socializing, shame, and the anxiety surrounding the space between what one 
believes and how one acts.
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The Morality of Ramadan: The Value of Suffering
At this point, it should be apparent that there are a number of different 
'Ramadan experiences' just within the medina of Fes, let alone Morocco or the 
global ummah. Though she worked in Morocco two decades ago, Marjo 
Buitelaar's observation about Marrakshi Ramadan is absolutely spot on today: 
“even where Moroccans formulate the significance of fasting in terms of universal 
Islamic values, in everyday speech and action these statements take on local 
meanings” (1993:6). We ought, as Katherine Ewing implores us to do, depart 
with the “illusion of wholeness” (1990)—the idea that all members of a group 
share the same beliefs or experience the same events in the same way. Rather, 
we must view the holiday of Ramadan through the myriad of conflicting and 
sometimes contradictory moral registers from which young Fassi girls derive 
meaning and seek religious understanding. 
For many Muslims, the purpose of Ramadan is to be forgiven of sin and 
seek reward (ajr). While bringing families and communities together in the 
celebration of the breakfast and prayer, Ramadan is not a set of rituals which 
reaffirm communal harmony or resolve communal conflict. Rather, the focus is on 
the individual: her relationship with Allah, her discipline in avoiding things which 
bring punishment, and her commitment to moral action during the month to 
ensure amplified reward. The exceptional moral requirements and behavioral 
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limits during the month serve the direct purpose of generating ajr, and if one 
desires more reward, one must simply do more to earn more reward. As Sam 
Schiekle points out, “during Ramadan, people frequently discuss in detail the 
correct form of voluntary prayers and the exact details of fasting in order to 
maximize the reward for praying and fasting. This is a highly utilitarian 
understanding of religion that implicitly allows Ramadan to be established as a 
moral and pious exception from not so perfect everyday life” (Schielke 
2009b:S28; see also Joll 2011;Tobin 2013). Acts performed during Ramadan are 
measured by their 'usefulness' in deriving ajr. 
 Should one suffer during the day-time fasting of Ramadan? This question 
is larger than Fes or Morocco, but gets to the heart of the theological purpose of 
Ramadan. It also becomes a kind of mathematical question, in terms of a moral 
calculus, if one takes the utilitarian, reward-oriented perspective on the holiday. 
According to the Qur'an, “Allah intends for you ease and does not intend for you 
hardship and wants for you to complete the period [of Ramadan] and to glorify 
Allah by that which He has guided you; and perhaps you will be grateful” (Surah 
2:187). Lindholm argues that this passage reassures Muslims that daily fasting 
should not be a struggle or full of suffering. He contends that “if the fast is easy, it 
is at least partially because the interdicts of the fast are balanced by its 
remissions, since fasts in Islam, unlike those of other religions, last only from 
sunrise to sunset” (Lindholm n.d.:10). In this aspect, he is absolutely correct—
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Ramadan is marked by the “rhythm of constraint and release” (Lindholm 
2002:145) that splits the month of fasting into thirty individual fasts, each cut off 
from the last by an evening of celebrations. Yet while he argues that this removes 
the notion of suffering from the daily fast, evidence from Fes and elsewhere 
demonstrates that suffering is an important and, to many Fassis, necessary 
aspect of the morality of Ramadan.
There are legitimate exemptions to the rule of fasting, but these 
exemptions lead to anxiety in Morocco, and many Fassis I worked with disobey 
Qur'an injunctions against fasting in a kind of zealous public display of 
commitment. Travellers, children, pregnant and menstruating women, the elderly-
infirm, and the ill are all exempted from fasting (Surah 2:184). Because women 
are not supposed to fast while menstruating, several of my married informants 
adjusted the dosage of their contraception so that they would 'skip' their 
menstrual periods during the month of Ramadan so that no fasting would be 
missed (see Lindholm n.d.). While pregnant women are exempted from the fast, 
several of the older women I interviewed stated that they had fasted during 
pregnancy (Joll 2011:162; Yocum 1992:211), and I witnessed several pregnant 
women maintaining the fast, at least in public, while also showing visible signs of 
distress (dehydration, heat exhaustion, light-headedness, over-exertion, etc). 
When asking about the legitimacy of a woman missing the fast for pregnancy, 
many younger women suggested that the best solution would be to use 
258
contraception to avoid pregnancy during Ramadan. 
As a diabetic, I have always been exempted from fasting during Ramadan, 
but when I conducted my fieldwork, I kept the fast with my informants. My uncles 
and other male friends expressed that this was an unnecessary sacrifice I was 
making, but women consistently expressed support that I was committed to the 
fast even though I was exempted. In many ethnographies of Ramadan from 
around the world, women are described as engaging in more challenging 
versions of the Ramadan experience, including cooking and handling food, 
beginning the fast early during the month of shaban to increase reward (Buitelaar 
1993:34-36), and, in a more extreme case in Mombasa, observe a 
supererogatory fast for six consecutive days after the Eid celebration marking the 
end of Ramadan (Frankl 1996:429).
The matter of illness also created problems for a number of my informants, 
as many still chose to fast during Ramadan to the detriment of their health just as 
I did. Many refused to take medication. This is not a practice unique to Morocco 
(Aadil et. al. 2004; Buitelaar 1993): Yocum describes it in rural Turkey 
(1992:206). Those who break the fast for medical reasons do so begrudgingly. 
One of my most beloved informants, a chubby middle-aged mother with a 
debilitating heart condition, broke into tears in our interview when I broached the 
topic of fasting. She exclaimed rapidly,
I cannot fast. I must take special medication for my heart, I 
must take it with bread, many times a day. I begged my 
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doctor, “let me take it without bread, Allah will make the 
medicine work without the bread,” but he said no. So I 
cannot fast – I try, but my daughter says I must obey the 
rules of the doctor. I must sit and watch my family break the 
fast without me. I must pray to Allah that He understands. 
Why cannot my doctor give me a medicine I can have during 
Ramadan? I would eat it without bread, even without water. 
You know me, Miriam, you know in my heart that I fast.
The desire to be seen publicly fasting, to perform the obligations of 
Ramadan 'properly,' and be a part of the communitas of the Ramadan 
experience is so strong in Moroccan society that men and women will incur 
physical harm even in defiance of a clearly articulated exemption for their 
circumstance. The emphasis on commitment and discipline within the holiday of 
Ramadan makes the actions of those who refuse to skip fasting sensible, even 
honorable, even though the exemptions are clearly permitted. The idea of 
“suffering” during the daily fast has been glorified in Fes, particularly amongst 
women.
This does not mean, however, that we should view the suffering 
experienced and encouraged by Fassis during Ramadan as a form of penance. It 
is in this nuance that I believe the reality of the Fassi Ramadan experience lies. 
Buitelaar, examining Ramadan in Marrakesh in the late 1980s, observed that 
“most informants agreed that ajr may compensate for sins which have been 
committed but will never annul them” (1993:121). In addition, there are other 
cases in which fasting is prescribed by Allah in the Qur'an as a form of penance. 
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These include: fasting if you cannot pay blood money after killing a man of a tribe 
you have peace with (Surah 4:92-94); fasting for violating oaths (Surah 5:89-91); 
fasting for killing animals while in iHram (Surah 5:95-96); and for speaking the 
zihaar (a particularly de-sexualizing way for men to declare a divorce) with regret 
(Surah 58:3-4) (see Buitelaar 1993: 19-21 and Wagtendonk 1968:132-139 for 
analysis). As Wagtendonk notes in his in-depth historical analysis of fasting in the 
Qur'an, all of these examples where fasting is associated with penance list the 
fasting as a last resort, and are likely Muhammad's additions to pre-existing laws 
in Arabia (1968:132-139). In all cases, these verses are structurally dissimilar to 
the Qur'anic discussion of Ramadan fasting, which may be taken to imply that 
Ramadan fasting is different from Islamic penance-oriented-fasting. Rather, 
Wagtendonk argues, Ramadan fasting should be viewed as a “thanks-offering” 
(1968:143)—an act given in thanks and in exchange for reward.
Thus, suffering should be viewed as part of a larger calculus—a literal 
calculation in which an overall ledger is important, not the values of individual 
acts. The suffering has an absolute value, which can obtained by anyone who 
suffers, regardless of how sinful or not sinful she is during the rest of the year. 
Sins are forgiven during Ramadan, not because of penance paid through 
suffering (or, for that matter, tarawiyy prayers or other optional forms of 
exceptional piety), but because sins are always forgiven during Ramadan. Fassis 
who reassured me that my suffering during Ramadan as a diabetic would bring 
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me greater ajr were neither misunderstanding the Qur'an nor were they assuming 
I was particularly sinful and in need of penance. They were reassuring me that 
the suffering increased the reward I was already receiving by fasting in the first 
place.
The slang term t-ramaDan may be Moroccan, but the concept appears in 
other Muslim cultures, reaffirming the commonality of the physical suffering 
experience during the daily fasting of Ramadan. In Egypt a hundred and fifty 
years ago, “the mosques are crowded with a sulky, grumbling population, making 
themselves offensive to one another on earth whilst working their way to heaven” 
(Burton 1855:75); today, 
since it is believed that anger, curses, and insults break the 
fast, people attempt to avoid them during Ramadan, and in 
arguments and fights (which are numerous in Ramadan as 
people often have short tempers due to fasting), people often 
use the phrase ‘Oh God, I’m fasting!’ (Allâhumma ana sâyim) 
to  avoid  using  foul  language  but  also  to  call  oneself  and 
others  to  calm  down.  ...  Similarly,  bystanders  can  also 
appeal to people involved in an argument with the phrase 
‘Because  you’re  fasting’  (‘ashân  inta  sâyim).  (Schielke 
2009b:S27 and S38)
This form of exclamation demonstrates that those involved understand and 
recognize the shame of negative behavior during daylight hours and reaffirms the 
social norm of following orthopraxy. With the heightened chance for spiritual 
reward and punishment, the religious community seeks to reign-in aberrant 
behavior and encourage pious practice: “to call oneself and others to calm 
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down.” This again demonstrates a notion of forbidding wrong and commanding 
right. Yet t-ramaDan and it international variants also imply an acceptance of the 
imperfect nature of practice, a seeking of forgiveness, and a re-commitment to 
the ideals of Ramadan.
Many Fassis also expressed that Ramadan was a time to appreciate the 
plight of the poor by feeling sympathetic hunger and frustration and by donating 
more zakat (obligatory alms). Certainly, for those who view Ramadan as an 
opportunity for purposeful piety and multiplied reward, the giving of food to the 
poor earns the approval and ajr of Allah. But on a different level, many 
Moroccans described to me how individuals gain humility in their struggle with 
the fast, especially during summer Ramadans, and are able to better empathize 
with the poor (see Buitelaar 1993). 
But, as with so much of our discussion of Ramadan, undeniable 
contradictions emerge in examining the realities of pious practice. In his work on 
Ramadan in Djibouti, Lidwien Kapteijns focused on the way the holiday split 
Djiboutan society along class, gender, and sectarian lines (2008). He aptly notes 
that “as every household tries to share its Ramadan breakfast food with those 
who are worse off, the movement of food on plates during Ramadan makes the 
gap between rich and poor even more visible, even as it temporarily tempers it” 
(2008:46). This gap was all too apparent in the medina of Fes, where many 
beggars relied on the generosity of the more fortunate to ensure a reliable plate 
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at the hour of iftar.61 My family in Fes prepared a daily large tray of savory treats, 
breads, fruits, soup and juices to take to one who was less fortunate in our 
neighborhood. Though meant only as an act of charity by my very pious and 
generous mother, the act also emphasized the division between our family, who 
could enjoy the feast in our home with family and friends, and the man, who had 
no one to break the fast with. Lindholm's argument that the fasting and feasting 
associated with holiday of Ramadan demonstrates the “deep egalitarianism of 
Islam” (2002:145) does not correspond with my findings in Fes.
If we accept that Ramadan has a variety of meanings within Fassi society, 
from the utilitarian to the charitable, we can begin to understand why nights are 
so varied in practice. But why, if Ramadan is about individual reward or moral 
development, are normative ideas about daytime fasting so forcefully enforced? I 
argue that it is that duty to command right and forbid wrong that is taken so 
seriously by Fassis that requires public enforcements of fasting norms 
specifically during Ramadan. Fassis often stated to me that they had an 
obligation to bear witness but that performing this duty during Ramadan lead to 
increased reward. When one sees good, one must surely praise it during 
Ramadan, while all wrong-doing that is witnessed must be called out and 
condemned. Fasting during Ramadan is required under normative Islam, and so 
61 Unlike in other Muslim cities, most mosques in the medina of Fes do not coordinate food 
collection or distribution to the poor during Ramadan (or, for that matter, during Eid al-Adha). 
Poor Fassis must depend on the individual generosity of neighbors and others for food to 
break the fast.
264
every Muslim is not only required to fast, but is also required to demand others 
obey the fast. In addition, as Michael Cook repeatedly notes, this Qur'anic 
demand may be viewed by some as an obligation of an Islamic government as 
well as Muslim individuals (2003:65-72), a belief which takes shape in Morocco 
and elsewhere in the Muslim world in the form of the state's prohibition against 
eating in public during the daylight hours of Ramadan.
Makhzan and Masayminch: Hegemonic Control and the Negotiation of 
Moral Practice
Enforcing the fast, at least in public, for Moroccans who would not choose 
to participate in the fast is difficult to do in a community experiencing changing 
ideas about religious practice and Islamic morality. Moroccans resolve the 
tension between religious pluralization and the amplified morality of Ramadan by 
obeying the laws of the state, which require public fasting. Since 1962, the 
makhzan attempts to control public piety through legislation banning eating 
during daylight hours. According to Article 222 of the Moroccan Penal Code:
Anyone who, while known as a member of the Islamic faith, 
ostensibly breaks the fast in a public place during the time of 
Ramadan,  without  grounds  permitted  by  the  religion,  is 
punishable by imprisonment for one to six months and a fine 
of 12 to 120 dirhams.62
This code is rarely enforced, instead working largely as a deterrent to 
62 “Celui qui, notoirement connu pour son appartenance à la religion musulmane, rompt 
ostensiblement le jeûne dans un lieu public pendant le temps du Ramadan, sans motif admis 
par cette religion, est puni de l'emprisonnement d'un à six mois et d'une amende de 12 à 120 
dirhams.”
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ensure that all follow 'proper' Islamic practice during Ramadan. Restaurants not 
catering to tourists must close, and many restaurants carried signs or notices 
signaling compliance with the law. The law was often invoked when joking about 
fasting or when discussing ways in which the makhzan shaped religious practice. 
The few examples described to me of the police being called to enforce Article 
222 always included some element of combativeness: residents calling police 
because the neighborhood drunk was eating while sitting on his doorstep; 
petulant young wives snitching on their mothers-in-laws; mistreated workers 
getting their corrupt bosses in trouble. The only documented cases I could find of 
enforcement of Article 222 were of participants in the Masayminch movement.
The Masayminch  (“we do not fast” in derrija) movement developed out of 
the burgeoning Alternative Movement for Individual Liberties (MALI),63 a 
Moroccan human rights group that saw many of its members arrested for an 
attempted afternoon picnic near Casablanca during Ramadan 2009 (Economist 
2010; Human Rights Watch 2009). The initial protest, planned for September 
13th, 2009, was met by a trainload of police who arrested and, according to 
MALI's founders (Goebel 2010), tortured the handful of protestors. The event 
garnered embarrassing international coverage for the country, including a 
scathing article in neighbor Spain's publication El Mundo entitled “More than 100 
Police Against 10 Sandwiches in Morocco”64 (Calvo 2009). The MALI protestors 
63 Le Mouvement Alternatif pour les Libertés Individuelles, known in Arabic as “؟يلام" (not to be confused 
with the identical word in Arabic for the country Mali)
64 “Más de 100 Agentes Contra 10 Bocadillos en Marruecos”
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were crucified in the Moroccan conservative press as “the new apostles of fitna” 
(Mrabet and Ziraoui 2009). Yet the 'symbolic picnic' succeeded in catching the 
attention of many Moroccans, and Masayminch emerged as an independent 
entity sometime before Ramadan 2010.
Masayminch has one goal—the removal of Article  222 from the Moroccan 
penal code, so that Moroccans can choose for themselves how they experience 
the fast. The organization notes that not everyone in Morocco is, regardless of 
the state's definition, a practicing Muslim who wants to fast. Forced fasting is 
seen as a violation of individual rights,  and as one member argues, “any non-
practicing Moroccan Muslims and non-religious ones feel like they have to torture 
themselves all day when they are at work or in the street for the simple reason 
that eating publicly during the days of Ramadan is a “crime”!” (Rmidi 2012). Laws 
requiring public observation of Ramadan norms exist throughout the Islamic 
world, reinforcing the hegemony of normative Islamic belief as “the state-society 
dynamic is overwhelmingly collaborative during Ramadan. Furthermore, this 
collaboration often carries illiberal ends” (Tobin 2013: 296).
 The frustration and confusion expressed by many youth in the 
Masayminch movement demonstrates a recognition of the hypocritical nature of 
the law because Article 222 only prohibits eating in public, and does not 
(because, I would counter, it cannot) actually enforce Ramadan fasting in private. 
High-school-aged blogger Kacem El Ghazzali lamented that he experiences 
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alienation from Moroccan society “because the local constitution criminalizes 
eating in public and allows it in private, as I do every Ramadan in my bathroom, 
with which I have slowly developed strong ties of friendship and love” (El-
Ghazzali 2010). Bizarre as this might sound, I regularly saw customers at 
restaurants take their 'to-go' bags into the bathroom and emerge empty-handed 
minutes later.65 Protestors demonstrating in 2012 regularly posted images on 
facebook of eating in public, and in 2012 at least one protestor was arrested: 
“during his interrogation, he confirmed that he performed this act out of 
conviction, and that it was a case of him exercising his personal liberty” (AFP 
2012).
Considering how strongly many of my informants felt about fasting during 
Ramadan, it should not be surprising that the Masayminch movement was 
largely unpopular in the medina of Fes. Many Fassis reacted negatively to press 
coverage of the group, and as one of my college-going female informants 
argued, “they are just kids who want to shame their families. Now people, they 
see a young Moroccan and think “perhaps she does not really fast.” This is why I 
do not like Masayminch – they shame all of the youth (kay hshem-u kul al-
shabab).” At the national level, members of Masayminch have received death 
threats. Yet these protestors are engaged in the larger debate in Morocco about 
the hypocritical nature of Ramadan, and have placed themselves at the center of 
65 Sarah Tobin describes similarly humorous examples of Jordanians eating cupcakes in their 
cars and strategically avoiding sipping Starbucks at stoplights (2013:295).
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the debate. From their perspective, Article 222 is hypocritical, as it only requires 
public fasting but not private fasting. They argue that the holiday is already de-
sanctified, and emphasize the hypocrisy inherent in the actual practice of 
Ramadan the holiday, using many of the same depictions of Ramadan as I have 
presented earlier.
The contradictory nature of Ramadan is often a source of humorous 
critique in the Muslim world.66 Cartoons poking fun at the contrasts between day 
and night are commonly circulated among young Moroccans via Facebook and 
email. The example shown on the next page as Figure 25 first appeared on 
Masayminch's Facebook page on July 20th, 2012, and soon re-appeared on the 
pages of a number of my Fassi friends. Though produced by a Jordanian 
cartoonist Emad Hajjaj, the sentiment is common in cartoons of its ilk: through 
punning or unflattering caricature, 'proper' and 'unacceptable' behaviors are 
compared and contrasted. 
66 For a fun but slightly out-of-date analysis of Ramadan cartoons from the Moroccan publication 
L'Opinion, see Buitelaar 1993:183-187.
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Less humorous debate regarding the hypocrisy of Ramadan also appears 
in blogs, newspaper op-eds, and articles of major Arabic and French-language 
Moroccan publications. While the topic had been discussed publicly for years, in 
2006, the prominent and controversial derrija-language weekly magazine 
Nichane published an infamous cover story entitled, “Ramadan: Month of 
Hypocrisy?”67 (2006). The article addressed many of the points discussed in this 
67 The word nifaaq is used to refer to hypocrisy on this cover and in this story.
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Figure 25: A Satirical Commentary on Ramadan Practice (with many puns): 
1)The Month of Ramadan... 
2) The Month of Revelation... Not Relaxation! 
3) The Month of Obedience... Not Mindless Enjoyment! 
4) The Month of Opening One's Mind... Not of [Other] Openings! 
5) The Month of Mercy... Not Meats! 
6) The Month of Patience... Not Eating Ravenously!
SOURCE: www.mahjoob.com
piece: the massive over-consumption of food during night-time hours, the social 
pressures on pregnant women and diabetics to fast, and the commonality of the 
'cheating' experience. This opened the flood-gates to Moroccans, particularly 
young Moroccans,  for publicly criticizing the practice of Ramadan, particularly in 
regards to fasting.  
A Moroccan blogger Ismael, outraged 
at his treatment in a restaurant in Rabat during 
Ramadan, asked “Why is there concentrated 
religiosity and charity during Ramadan, but not 
the rest of the months of the year, even with 
the knowledge that worship is necessary 
throughout the year? Couldn't you say that this 
behavior of the people is an expression of the 
kind of hypocrisy?” (Elaaf 2006). In his 2010 
article “Ramadan At The Gates,” Zouhair Baghough laments Article 222 and the 
enforcement of public fasting. He criticizes the idea that Jews must 'prove' their 
religious affiliation in order to avoid the law, as well as the idea that all Moroccans 
are  'Muslims:'
And what about the atheists or the non-believers? Do we 
need a paper stating our non-belief from Richard Dawkins? 
And why being [sic] so hypocritical about it? Why would the 
Moroccan judiciary punish  anyone break-fasting  in  public, 
but turn the blind eye on those who do so but away from any 
public fuss? Doesn’t it encourage hypocrisy? Or doesn’t it 
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Figure 26: Nichane (2006) Cover: 
Ramadan: Month of Hypocrisy?
simply give in to the fear of fitna? (Baghough 2010)
For Zinab Elghzaoui, one of the co-founders of MALI, the debate over 
Article 222 is one regarding human rights, or the lack thereof, for Moroccans who 
do not wish to fast during Ramadan.  She writes, "I think that the allegedly big 
social consensus during Ramadan is in reality just hypocrisy. A Moroccan only 
exists within the framework of the Umma - the religious community of Muslims. 
The Moroccan as an individual, as a citizen in a state based on rule of law - that 
only exists in theory but not on a practical level," (Goebel 2010). From this 
perspective, the debate over Ramadan is one between those who seek to ensure 
public piety through habituating orthopraxy and those attempting to reorient the 
discussion toward individual rights and liberties.
Concluding Thoughts
As demonstrated throughout this chapter, criticisms and debates that 
occur because of accusations of hypocrisy allow the individual to both command 
right and forbid wrong in a pious public display. The tool of illuminating hypocrisy 
serves to release tension within the group as well as mark the boundaries of 
accepted practice with few long-term consequences. In the case of Ramadan in 
Fes, however, ideas of hypocrisy serve to counterbalance the limits of religious 
pluralization. Those Fassis dancing at the fringe of Muslim secularism, who see 
themselves as Muslims in name at best, face overwhelming social sanctions and 
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legal repercussions for breaking the rule of public fasting. Their defense—
namely, to accuse their persecutors of hypocrisy during Ramadan—strikes at the 
very heart of the morality of Ramadan. 
Should Ramadan days be spent suffering? Should nights be spent in 
moderation? Must the rules be followed to ensure Allah's reward and to avoid His 
punishment? Perhaps most important for secular Muslims in Fes, should 
orthopraxy be forced on non-believers to encourage societally-dictated morality 
through 'moral' practice? Are all Muslims subject to the commands of right and 
prohibitions of wrong? Does the Islamic community of Morocco have the 'right' to 
dictate public behavior, or does it have the 'duty' to protect members from 
temptations that could lead to amplified punishment at Allah's judgment? And, 
considering the unpopularity of Masayminch among everyday Fassis, should 
Article 222 be viewed as a edict of the Islamic community of Morocco (as headed 
by the Commander of the Faithful, King Mohammad VI), or should it be viewed 
as the actions of a governmental apparatus which maintains authority, at least in 
part, by dictating the religious framework of the state?
All of these questions are up for debate in Fes today, and are being 
discussed in a variety of different ways. The plurality of the Ramadan experience 
in Fes, as discussed in this chapter, shows that there is not one clear 
understanding of 'what Ramadan means.' Yet for those in the Masayminch 
movement and others who reject the Muslim identity thrust upon them by the 
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state through Article 222, Ramadan has become a unique period in which 
religious pluralization is heavily limited and moral action is forced. The 
justification for these unusual limits on religious plurality in Fes, I believe, stems 
from the amplified moral stakes of the month. The contradictory nature of 
Ramadan practice is amplified by Ramadan's heightened moral and religious 
stakes, leading to the use of the hypocrisy-oriented term t-ramaDan. Because the 
stakes are higher, deviation from socially accepted religious norms is less 
tolerable, and religious pluralization related to Ramadan (for example, in the 
nascent Masayminch movement) finds less support among Fassi Muslims.
Ultimately, a discussion of hypocrisy in relation to religious practice, and 
particularly ritualized practice, allows us to explore the changing nature of piety. 
Ramadan is a time when both the eating and not-eating of food becomes 
relevant, especially for women already experimenting with new ideas of piety, to 
the creation of a highly-individualized identity as a Muslim. Within a Muslim 
society such as Morocco, multiple pious subjectivities are being created, often at 
odds with each other even within the same individual. Ramadan, as a time of 
amplified morality, means that the stakes are higher for all involved. The 
individual must accumulate blessings through fasting and other pious efforts, but 
is also continually defining the limits of that piety through dress, eating, language, 
and practice. The pious community, in an effort to protect itself by commanding 
good and forbidding wrong, must note improper, imperfect, and even hypocritical 
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action. Even the makhzan, recognizing that public debates regarding Ramadan 
pose no political threat to the authority of the King, has a stake in maintaining a 
law that enshrines majority opinion. 
And yet, as with all good things, even Ramadan comes to an end. Many 
Fassis lament the last days, wishing they had more time to perform just a few 
more tarawiyy prayers. The holy month is ended with the Eid, and soon life 
resumes its normal pace: fewer headscarves worn, alcohol and hashish again 
regularly consumed, sexual liaisons rekindled, and mosque attendance again 
deflated. Many women in particular waxed wistfully in the days after Ramadan 
that they wished that the better behavior we displayed during Ramadan would be 
continued year-round. Yet Fassis are not unique in this reversion (Buitelaar 1993; 
Hellman 2008; Joll 2011; Lindholm 2002; Schielke 2009b; Tobin 2013). In the 
Fassi time and space where normative Islam is being challenged and replaced 
by individualized subjectivities, the amplified morality of Ramadan is the 
exception, not the rule.
275
...the discovery of Fez was just beginning. We would  
uncover its layers veil by veil, like a bride in her  
marriage chamber. I have kept a thousand memories  
of that year, which take me back to the carefree  
candour of my nine years each time I evoke them. 
But it is the most painful of them all that I feel  
obliged to relate here, since, if I did not mention it,  
I would be failing in my role as faithful witness.
--- Amin M'aloof
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Testing the Limits of Islamic Understanding: 
An Imperfect Future for Fes68
That is because [the hypocrites] 
believed, and then they 
disbelieved; so their hearts were 
sealed over, and they do not 
understand
--- Surah Al-Munaafiqun 63:2-3 
(The Hypocrites)
As a diabetic, I never should have fasted for Ramadan. But great 
lessons are learned from great mistakes.
Laylat al-Qadr is the most glorious of nights during Ramadan. All prayers 
are given extra reward, all errors result in extra punishment, and the wicked 
spirits (djinn) which Allah locks up during Ramadan, women say, are set free on 
this night, adding an element of danger to the sense of amplified morality. Special 
prayers (nawafil and tarawiyy) are performed throughout the night starting at the 
'isha call to prayer after families have shared their meal to break the fast. 
Between prayers, Fassis spend this night participating in group Qur'anic readings 
(tilawat) and reading the Qur'an on their own.
The day of Laylat al-Qadr, during my 2012 fieldwork, was a stiflingly hot 
day, yet we all ignored the heat as we prepared for a long night of devotion. I 
enjoyed 'iftar with my family, eating bowls of soup and sampling from the array of 
fried foods while attempting to rehydrate as much as possible. Dressed in my 
favorite jellaba and carrying my dhikr beads, I walked down to the mosque with 
68 This chapter is alternatively titled “A Muslim, A Hypocrite, and An Anthropologist Walk Into a  
Barth: Conclusions of a Rebel”
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several women of a family who invited me to enjoy Laylat al-Qadr prayers with 
them. We entered the women's section, which was completely blocked off from 
the main room of the mosque, and stretched out our prayer rugs together. The 
room was already packed with women in bright hijabs and jellabas, and I chatted 
with a young mother next to me as we played with her toddler daughter and 
awaited the beginning of prayers.
Prayers began at the 'isha call to prayer. On the wall at the front of the 
women's section, there was a massive flat-screen television which streamed in 
images of the imam and the men in the front of the mosque, allowing us to see 
and hear the entire service without being viewed by men. The imam began with 
prayers, and then alternated the reading of Qur'anic passages with prayers. As 
we completed each prayer, we rose again to stand as we listened to the verses 
read with emotion and devotion. We became one body, rising and kneeling, 
swaying as passages were read, and breathing together in time with recitations. 
At one point I realized that I, along with many of the women around me, were 
crying as the imam sobbed and recited a particularly moving passage. The 
feeling was cathartic and overwhelming.
It was not until roughly three hours into the service that I realized that I 
was not handling the situation well. As a diabetic, I did not normally maintain the 
fast, making this Ramadan a new challenge, one which was defeating me that 
evening. My body temperature had risen, as the room was many degrees 
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warmer than outside, and hours of tightly packed, sweating women praying aloud 
made the air unbearably muggy. I was dehydrated and light-headed as my 
diabetic body struggled to digest the complex foods I had given it after hours of 
fasting. My hands grew cold as my vision became blurred. I began losing the light 
at the edges of my vision, a sign I had learned in my fieldwork meant that I 
needed to sit, rest, and readjust my blood sugar. But I was trapped in the midst of 
over a hundred women, all deep in prayer and, I thought, oblivious to each other. 
Unable to disengage from the ritual without extreme disruption, I decided to 'hide' 
my condition. As we knelt in prayer, I felt my energy draining, and as I prostrated, 
I rest my forehead on the cool rug and opted to stay there. When the 
congregation rose, I stayed tucked tightly in sujud (prostration) position and tried 
not to feel fear as I lost consciousness.
According to the mini audio-recorder I was using to record the event, I was 
unconscious for nearly twenty minutes. As I awoke, I rejoined prayer. We 
continued for several more hours. As the evening progressed, I began to notice 
more and more older women remaining seated during the Qur'anic readings, as 
exhaustion weakened our resolves. Later in the evening, I again lost focus and 
began to feel light-headed. When I again attempted to remain in sujud position, I 
was yanked upright by the woman behind me, my first signal that I had been 
incorrect in my previous attempt to hide my sickness. This forced me to stop all 
efforts to analyze my situation and focus my energies on performing the ritual 
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with the group. 
When, well into the morning hours, my friends finally rose and collected 
their rugs and shoes, I was eager to find fresh air, water, and food. We returned 
to their home, and I sat in the living room with a bottle of cool water, talking with 
the eldest daughter in the family. College-aged, Aisha was a pious young woman 
who approached few things light-heartedly, least of all her faith.
“Did you enjoy the Qur'anic readings? (tiliwat)”
“Indeed!” I replied, “I felt Allah everywhere with us.”
“And did you understand the imam, when he cried? Did you understand 
those ayat (verses)?”
“I hope – it is hard sometimes for me to understand the [Qur'anic] Arabic.”
“Then do you not know how to pray?” she asked sharply.
“Of course I know how to pray! You've prayed with me at mosque before, 
and here in your home...”
“Yet you stayed in sujud for a long time.”
“Yes, I know. I...”
“No,” she cut me off, “there is no reason why. You have shamed yourself. 
You have shamed me! And my family! Do you not know each step of prayer? Do 
you not know the Tashahhud (the words recited while sitting in prayer) in Arabic 
to pray? Why did you stay in sujud?”
“I was ill and I...”
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“Did you not see the older women sitting? Why did you stay in sujud? You 
know nothing! How can you not know what we do now, after living here for so 
long? You shamed me and my family!”
I began to apologize profusely as hot tears ran down my face. Aisha's 
tones became more strident as she explained that the women who pulled me 
upright was made angry by my poor positioning and that I had made an 
unacceptable error.
“Your prayers, they mean nothing. Nothing! On Laylat al-Qadr! How could 
you be so shameful on such a night?”
“I only wanted to participate,” I cried out, shaking in embarrassment, 
frustration, and shame. “I only wanted to pray and learn from you, Aisha. I only 
wanted to be a part of the ummah!”
“Do you know why the imam cried when he recited the Qur'an? Because 
munaafiqun (hypocrites), they are not true believers. They are not part of the 
ummah. Shame on you, Miriam! Now we know! Now we know what you are!”
Like a blow to my chest, my breath caught in my throat and I simply stood 
and left. I ran back to my home by the dawn's light, nearly hysterical, and threw 
myself on my bed. Overwhelmed by self-doubt, I opened my Qur'an to the surah 
the imam had wailed so sorrowfully earlier that night.
[The hypocrites] have taken their oaths as a cover, so 
they averted others from the way of Allah. Indeed, it 
was evil that they were doing. That is because they 
believed, and then they disbelieved; so their hearts 
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were sealed over, and they do not understand. (Surah 
63:2-3)
This dissertation has been a hypocrite's attempt to understand: to 
understand the nature of hypocrisy; to understand how young Muslim women live 
their lives in a time of great social and ethical change;  to understand how Fassis 
negotiate the boundaries of acceptable religious practice. Full immersion into the 
lives of young Fassi women meant that I too was subject to peer pressure. I too 
was sanctioned by female friends when my practices as a convert were too 
divergent to tolerate. Had I been praying in shrine, or had it not been the most 
pious of Ramadan nights, my good intentions would have been an acceptable 
counterbalance to my error in prayer. But my mistake was too great, and that 
night I learned the limits of the 'intention exemption,' not only as a Muslim, but as 
an anthropologist. All the genuine wanting in the world cannot protect an 
anthropologist who has missed the nuance of a given ritual or practice and has 
offended her hosts. We trumpet the fragility of ritual even as we clumsily clod 
through ethnographic research only by the good humor and graces of our hosting 
communities. At times, we are all hypocrites, just like the women of Fes. In 
describing moments like Aisha's screaming outburst, I am reminded that I am an 
imperfect anthropologist just as I am an imperfect Muslim, and yet I remain both 
of those things: a Muslim anthropologist, and an anthropologist of Muslims. The 
complexity and ambiguity of imperfect subjectivities—religious, professional, 
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gendered, or otherwise—are what make individuals and social groups so hard to 
classify yet so worthy of debate. 
Fredrik Barth challenged all anthropologists, myself included:
Most of our experience of social life should lead us to 
accept as plausible this view of disorder, multiplicity, and 
underdeterminedness. Why then does it seem so difficult 
for anthropology to embrace it and develop it as a basis 
for theory? One reason may be that it goes against the 
grain of received intellectual standards of excellence: we 
are always best believed and rewarded when we succeed 
in revealing a hidden simplicity underlying the apparently 
complex, as when we can perfect an encompassing 
logical form for the data we have selected that 
underwrites the myth of an ordered, coherent 
society/culture/reality. We must rebel against this 
scenario, which may be more appropriate for other 
objects of study than ours, and which has been drilled into 
us through the type of solution favored in the preset 
puzzles of our exams. Culture, society, and human lives—
the objects we seek to understand—do not come in 
puzzle format, and we should not succumb to the 
temptation to cast them as puzzles by selecting a limited 
set of data, designing a solution that makes them appear 
coherent—and then, outrageously, claiming this to be an 
example of the coherence that obtains in the whole. 
(Barth 1993:5-6)
This dissertation has been a response to Barth's call. As an ethnographer, one 
might feel compelled to distill one's field experiences into a coherent, simple 
point. I feel no such compulsion. My informants' lives are incredibly complicated, 
their opportunities numerous, and their challenges vast. Their subjectivities too 
are complicated, numerous, and vast. The young women of the medina of Fes 
are actively and cooperatively creating their own Islamic sense of self, accepting 
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their own flaws and debating the edges of acceptable practice. To pretend that I 
can view each young Fassi woman's subjectivity as a puzzle to be solved would 
be folly.
This ethnography presented the lives of young women in Fes as complex 
collections of choices and concerns. These women were all Muslim, and in many 
cases, their Islamic identity was a central part of their overall sense of self. Each 
strove in her own way to be a 'good Muslim woman' by her own definition, while 
also addressing the myriad concerns in her life. Together, these young women 
and the Fassis that populate their lives represent some of the many perspectives 
on Fassi Islam that are constantly being revised and adjusted in day to day life. 
In these previous chapters, I have presented imperfect Muslim women engaged 
in a process of mainstreaming and adapting Islamic practice. This was done by 
highlighting emotionally valuable experiences in a young woman's life—dating, 
hijab-use, Sufi worship, celebration of Ramadan, and interaction with friends and 
family. 
I have sought, like Schielke, to pull my imperfect informants from “the 
shadow of an image of Islam as a perfectionist project of self-discipline” 
(2009b:S24) and to demonstrate the scholarly value in embracing the complexity 
and contested nature of my informants' lives. The young women of Fes do not all 
seek to be perfectly pious, but many seek to find a balance in their lives between 
competing traditions of knowledge so that they can be as 'good of Muslims' as 
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they can. These continually negotiated understandings provide each woman with 
her own unique Islamic subjectivity, while also contributing to the overarching set 
of public norms about acceptable Islamic practice and ethical behavior. 
Subjectivities adjust in accordance with or in opposition to social norms, 
and social norms and even traditions of knowledge may adjust in relation to 
multiple concerns and modernities (Casanova 2011; White 2012). In each case, 
peer pressure and social sanctioning serve to push boundaries and/or limit 
experimentation, and hypocrisy may be one of the most useful tools in this 
process of social sanctioning. Thus, this dissertation tread where no other has: to 
suspend, at least analytically, the negative connotations of hypocrisy so that we 
might examine what uses the notion has in peer groups and what advantages 
individuals who accuse and stand accused of hypocrisy have when 
experimenting with religious norms. By presenting my informants' accusations of 
hypocrisy—even of me, the hypocritical anthropologist—I have allowed us to 
delve into how subjectivities are made and how Islamic practices are being 
mainstreamed in Fes. I have also prodded my fellow academics to be more 
aware of how the term hypocrisy might be used in other societies, and to 
examine how hypocrisy can serve as an important social and ethical tool within a 
society. As demonstrated in this ethnography, hypocrisy is not a symptom of 
ethical imperfection; imperfection is inevitable, and hypocrisy is a sign people are 
engaged in debate over the boundaries of ethical realities.
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In Chapter 2, I began with the metaphorical and literal foundations of 
young women's subjectivities in Fes: their understandings of Moroccan Islam, 
and their district of residence. Morocco's history, especially Fes' place in the 
political, spiritual, and social realms of that history, has given birth to a unique 
variation of Islamic culture that serves as a starting point for subjectivity formation 
for most of my informants. Yet it was also a matter of who they were not—neither 
Gulfi nor Mashreqi—that also demonstrates values which resonate within these 
young women. Accusations of hypocrisy, leveled at other Fassis, Gulfis, and 
even Moroccan society itself, serve to demarcate the edges of acceptable public 
behavior. All of this is particularly relevant today as Moroccans are experiencing 
a period of fitna, struggling with public consensus over divine laws, ethical 
behavior, and changing gendered norms.
The following chapter illuminated the ever-present influence of Sufism in 
the medina of Fes. Women's experiences in the shrine of Moulay Idriss II allow 
them to practice Moroccan Islam, with its emphasis on maraboutic Sufism, while 
avoiding public criticism because of the notion of the 'intention exemption.' 
Spurred by their ethical duty to command right and forbid wrong, Fassis interact 
publicly within socially embedded notions of propriety (hshuma). This chapter 
explored Moroccan understandings of reason ('aql) and the passionate soul 
(nafs) as gendered notions, elucidating the role of knowledge and education in 
determining how others sanction women's practice. However, the rapidly 
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changing circumstances of young Fassi women's lives means that improving 
educational outcomes for young women in Morocco may diminish the power of 
the 'intention exemption' within personal interactions in the medina. This chapter 
may soon be, as discussed below, a snapshot which illuminates social norms as 
they currently impact the lives of my informants. I will be curious to see how 
notions of hshuma and the 'intention exemption' develop in future ethical debates 
in Fes.
In the second part of the dissertation, I presented three colorful chapters 
which explored concerns relevant in the daily lives of my Fassi informants. 
Chapter 4: Only the Prophet was Perfect: Dating, Contact, and Changing  
Conceptions of Public Space presents one of the most in-depth descriptions and 
analyses of dating practices currently evolving in the Islamic world. Every time I 
returned to Morocco, from 2003 to 2012, I was always struck by how rapidly 
norms regarding cross-gender socialization and publicly viewable touching were 
changing. But I should not be surprised that I continually saw more Fassi youth 
holding hands or engaging in other non-sexual touching in public: how else can 
one claim to be pushing the boundaries of Islamic norms without blatantly 
breaking the rules unless all actions can be seen and judged? Thus, young 
couples are reimagining public spaces, defining the limits of pious behavior within 
their peer communities, and judging each other as suitable partners. Even dating 
is not a simple experience to analyze: while I have attempted to categorize dating 
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practices based on socio-economic class and degree of religiosity, I also 
illuminated similarities between experiences that demonstrate the range of 
acceptable norms. After all, only the Prophet was perfect; my informants 
willingness to negotiate over dating norms comes in part from a desire to be as 
good as possible, but always within limits of one's concerns and opportunities.
In Chapter 5, we found another example of the disorder Barth elevates. By 
examining the multitude of motivations for wearing hijab in the medina of Fes, I 
found Islamic and academic discourses which defend the notion that the hijab is 
only a symbol of piety or resistance to be inadequate. My informants wore hijab 
to hide improprieties, they avoided wearing it temporarily to trick employers, they 
decided on a day-by-day basis to check the weather and make a decision to 
wear the hijab. Wearing the hijab is a strategic opportunity to display the values 
of one's subjectivity, including, but not to the exclusion of other identities, one's 
piety and devotion to Islam.
In Chapter 6, we reach the limits of acceptable ethical experimentation: 
Ramadan. With its heightened moral stakes, Ramadan is no time for bending the 
rules, but it is the perfect time to critique those who do. To forbid those who break 
fasting and behavioral rules during Ramadan is to fulfill a religious duty to forbid 
wrong: accusations of hypocrisy are the perfect tool to accomplish this obligation. 
Fassis are debating the hypocrisy of Ramadan practices in the medina, but 
Moroccans are also debating the issue on a societal level, demonstrating the 
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fitna discussed repeatedly in this dissertation.
This ethnography presented a number of theoretical and empirical notions 
which merit summary discussion. In a time of new economic, educational, 
technological, and political opportunities, young women in the medina of Fes are 
coming to terms with the myriad changes in their city, leading very different lives 
than their mothers or grandmothers did. They draw from the wide variety of 
sources of ethical formation, including Moroccan Islam, national historical 
narratives, familial traditions, television and social media, and, of course, peer 
group sentiments. This dissertation sought to demonstrate how the processes of 
social change are working in the medina of Fes, especially for young women, 
and illuminate some of the fitna and tensions which are causing these social 
changes. By focusing on imperfect and ambivalent Islamic practice, this 
dissertation became the story of Islam lived, with all the flaws of its followers and 
all the joyful efforts by its practitioners to live as 'good Muslim women.' 
This dissertation also connects an idea prevalent in Islamic ethical 
formation—the notion of 'commanding right and forbidding wrong'—with the 
social sanctioning tool of hypocrisy. Hypocrisy works best as a tool of social 
sanctioning when the accusation is presented to others. As Muslims heavily 
influenced by Sufi philosophy and practice, Fassis believe that verbal sanctioning 
and shaming of poor action is a religious duty. This inevitably means that Fassis 
comment on the properness of each other's actions, and hypocrisy is a 
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commonly used tool to do so. Thus, while calling someone a hypocrite is often a 
harsh action, it may also be one of ethical merit to a Fassi woman. This 
connection, demonstrated a number of times in this dissertation, helps to explain 
why accusations of hypocrisy may be more common in Islamic societies which 
focus on this notion, though it requires a society already in the throws of fitna to 
allow the term hypocrisy to retain so little of its permanent sting.
This dissertation solidly defends the notion of imperfection in the practice 
of Islam and embraces the study of ambivalent religious belief and ever-shifting 
subjectivities. My work presents an example of how young women in Fes are 
“mainstreaming” (Eickelman 2010) Islamic practice among their peer groups and 
as part of Moroccan society at large. This dissertation did not focus on piety as a 
lens through which to explore the lives of young women, even though pious 
practice and religious belief were often discussed. This was, in part, because I 
did not select my informants based on their interest in personal piety. In contrast 
for example, one could argue that Saba Mahmood's (2005) informants were 
focused on piety as members of a piety movement. Rather, I examined how 
notions of pious behavior and the ethical self were expressed in the subjectivities 
of young women with  quite varying interests in Islam as a tradition of knowledge. 
I did not seek out women contemplating Islam, I simply surveyed women living it 
and examined how they coped with the boundaries, limitations, and opportunities 
their religious beliefs offered them in relation to the other concerns in their daily 
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lives. 
Beginning to Forgive: Final Thoughts on Inevitable Change
One of the greatest conundrums of anthropology as a discipline is that we 
claim that we strive to understand the deeper, hidden meanings of our 
informants' lives rather than present a simplified, bounded image of an 
ethnographic moment, even when that moment is all we actually attempt to 
analyze and present. As technologies advance and the pace of change quickens 
in our ever-more-connected world, our ethnographies face the reality of 
becoming out-of-date before they are even written. Can we ever 'complete' a 
session of fieldwork when we stay connected to our informants through daily 
conversation on social media? Are we merely historians of the present, since our 
fieldnotes become archives before we even arrive home? 
Perhaps this challenge is obvious to me because this ethnography has 
focused on changing gender norms in a time and place where great social 
change is occurring. Throughout this work, I compare my research and findings 
to those of Rachel Newcomb, whose research on women in the Ville Nouvelle of 
Fes at the turn of the millennium is significant and has deeply influenced my own 
work. She comments, as discussed in the second chapter of this dissertation, 
that she left the field in 2002 during a time of fitna. Yet during her fieldwork, she 
could have no idea what the long-term impacts of the events of September 11 th, 
2001 would be. I too cannot predict the long-term impacts of the Arab Spring on 
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my own work. Since her fieldwork, the women's legal code (mudawanna) has 
been revamped, a new constitution has been written, and entirely new debates 
regarding women's bodies have come to the forefront. The women that she 
worked with likely live very different lives than they did during her fieldwork. How 
long will it be until I can say the same?
Three months after leaving Fes in 2012, a new shopping mall opened on 
the edge of Fes Jdid, easily within walking distance of both the medina and the 
Ville Nouvelle of Fes. This is the first mall in Fes, and the first cosmopolitan 
shopping center of any kind within proximity of the medina. My young male 
informants already complain that the Haagen-Dazs there has become a prime 
site for chaperone dating, costing them far more money than the local ice-cream 
shops. How this mall will affect the dating patterns described in chapter 4 of this 
dissertation remains to be seen. Women can buy both haute couture hijabs and 
bikinis at the mall, and it remains open all night during Ramadan for eager 
shoppers too hungry to shop during the daylight fast. With each day away from 
our fieldsites, our promise of accuracy becomes a greater charade.
With the rapid pace of change today, analyses of bounded moments in 
time are all the anthropologist can honestly provide, though those analyses are 
generative, illuminating, and deeply evocative of the strong emotions and 
meaningful experiences of our informants. Therefore, by claiming we see 
unchanging aspects of our informants' lives, anthropologists exoticize them: we 
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live in the moment, the ever-changing now, whereas our foreign informants live in 
some kind of slower-moving time, not beholden to the 'up-to-date.' We as 
anthropologists must accept that our ethnographies are recent histories of a 
moment-ago past, snapshots that we can only pretend present a coherent 
explanation of the now. Otherwise, we are trivializing the pace of change in our 
informant communities.
 For the young women of the medina of Fes, the fitna which permeates 
Morocco's public discourse regarding women and Islam is an opportunity to push 
the boundaries of acceptable practice, as well as an opportunity to fulfill their 
religious obligation to forbid wrongdoing. With their willingness to sometimes 
practice Islam ambivalently and imperfectly, young Fassi women are able to 
create a sense of self out of a plethora of competing, and potentially 
contradictory, traditions of knowledge. Therefore we, as anthropologists, must be 
the rebels that Barth demanded: instead of searching for some hidden, simpler 
system, we must accept that our informants may change subjectivities just as 
quickly as they change concerns, uncomfortable as the disorderly nature of that 
conclusion may be. Otherwise, our hearts are sealed over, and we do not 
understand.
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